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~ANM'OilY NOTES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee have 
i.ssued Opinions .,n the proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for 
European Companies .• In the light of _these. Opinions,· the Commis_sion has 
altered its original prvposal under the Article 149 (2) of ·the.Treaty 
··astablishing a European Ecom~mic Community. 
At the same time, it has carried out the adjustments ma~e necessary by 
th~ accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of 3reat Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
At the Gxpress request ~f the Europeru1·Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee, the provisions of the proposal have been fur~her 
aligned on the proposals put forward in the meantime by the Commission 
. :aonce~ning the coordination of the safeguards under national company law 
-~ci on the 8:1 terations made 'by the Comrjiss:fon to its earlier proposais en : 
this subject. The provisions -.f the proposal were alstt brought into line 
With -the work on the :creation of ~pean law by means of convenitions, and. 
. . 
. . . 
in particular with the draft ~onventi~n on the international merger of 
limi~ed .companies_, .whic~ was drawn ·up. by, Government ·eXperts from the six 
original ~~ember States in accordance with the third paragraph .c.,f· Article . 220 
of the EEC Treaty. 
Thj.s aligt;llllent- is necesso.ry in order to prevent comparable· matters being 
;r~gulated in t~e coordinated laws of Member States, or in the Conv~ntions 
CO"lclu.ded between· Me~ber Sta,tes, otherwise than in the Statute for EUropean· 
CQmpanies unless there is good reason. 
La3tl~, account was~taken ·of -the view . of. 
of numerous busi~ess associations and tta~e union organizations and of the 
th.eor.etical c~n_si.~era,ti~:ms ret:;-a.rding the Commission's pro1;1osa.l of· a. Eluropeail 
Company Statute .• · 
_,. 
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The changes are explaj.nert below. A.ttention is drawn in the noteo on 
individual Art:i.cleo to any adjustment or rearrangement of provioiono. 
II. N~TES ON 'I!!!L1rm:VIDUAL PROVISIONS 
TITLE I - GBNBRAL PROVISIONS 
- .... .,"_ ----
At the request of the Europea.n Parliament and the Economic and Socia~ 
Committee, accesz to the legal form of a European Co:npany has been extar.d~o .• 
The minimum capital reqQired for three typ3B of constitution hao been 
appreciably l.o:'lered. 
In ad.di tion, undertakir:.ge established in a legal form other ·~han that ' 
of a company limited by shares m~y also form a joint subsidiary. 
Article 2 
1.. The right to fo1m a joint subsidiary is to be gra.nted not only to public 
limited companies and to the private limited companie3 and cooperative societies 
specifically mentioned by the Parliam8nt and by the Economic and Scoial Comm~ttee 
bat also to other companies having 1•1 personality and other corporations 
engaging in econ~mic activity in the Community. 
2. It does not at present appear possible to extend the right of access to 
the S.E. furth0r. 
The right to fo:nn an S.E. by merger ot' by forming a holding co.upany must 
continue to be reserved for undertakings established in the legal forrr. of a 
company limited by shares. The exchange of s:,.u.ree associat.ed wl +.h these tY}les 
of oonstitutio~ (Articles 21 and 29) is practicable ~nly where the foun~~r 
comp~niee have t~is legal form. 
In the Republic of !re:.and and in the Vni ted Kingdom any ·.mdertaking 
having the 1 egal form of a "company llmi ted by shares'1 , i.e. includi~g 
"private compa-:1ies", may participa.te in the fonnation of an S.E .. by merger 
or by setting up a holding company. 'Ihe difference between "private companies" 
and other kir..ds of "limited company" is not such as to make special treatment. 
appear justified. 
.. 
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3. The reauest was made that the right to be incorporated as a European 
company be extended not only to undertakings established in a different 
legal form from that of a ?Ompany limited by shares but also to undertakings 
which had already merged at European level before the effective date of_ the 
Statute. 
A change of this sort would necessitate a special procedure for examining 
whether the economic char?.cterist1ce required for the formation. of a European 
company were satisfied. This would make it necessary for the original preposal 
to be radically altered and would lead to great technical difficulties. For 
• ! - : 
these reasons the criteria for fo!ffiing an S.E. will continue to be legal 
characteristics only. 
4. The Economic Committee of the European Parliament expressly requested. 
that access to the form of a European company beeven further extended.· In 
its view, natural persons should also be able to form a European company. 
Houcver, the objective of the S.E. which fo:nned the basis of the Commission 
proposal and which has been approved is to RCt as a means of integrating existing 
undertakings. It is desi~ed to stop a loophole occesioned by the fact that 
the-machin~ry for cooperation between undertakir.gs is rooted in national 
legal systems. Because of the restricted scope of these national systems, 
which end at the intra-Community frontiers, there is no suitable instrument 
for cross-frontier coooperation. The European company is intended to facilitate 
such cooperation by means of established machinery appropriate to the scale 
of the common market and independent of national law. 
There is an urgent economic need for this in the Comm~ity. 
For the formation of new undertakings, on the other hand, the national. 
instruments provide an adequate fo1~l solution.for the present. 
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5· Paragraph 3 deals \'Ti th th3 e;:tent to which the founder companies and 
corporations participating in the formation of an S.E. must be recognized 
pursuant to the Convention on the mutual recognition of companies and bodies 
corporate of 29 February 19680 
The consequences for an S.~. which flow from non-recognition of a 
founder ccmpany by ~ r~ember Sta-l:.e must be kept 11rithin the tightest possible 
limits. The proposal therefore aims at ensuring that only those Member 
Ste.tes to whose laws one ·of the companies or corporations participating 
in the formation is nnbject must have reco[:,nized the founder companies, 
and other corporations participating in the formation pursuant to the 
Convention on recognition of 29 February 1968. 
Article 3 
Paragraph 1 lays down rules concerning the participation of an existing 
S.F.. in the establishment of an S.E. by merger or the formation of a holding 
company. Paragraph 2 concerns the formation of a joint subsidiary. This 
change follows from the new version of Article 2. 
Paragr.,ph 4 covers those cases where, in addition to an S.E., founder 
companies from various Member St~tes participate in the formation of another 
S.F. In such cnses, rect'lgnition of tho founder companies incorporated under 
national law is accorded by analogy with Article 2(3). 
Article 4 
The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee were in 
favour of lowering the minimum capital. The Commission has complied with the 
Opinion of the Furopean Parliament. In so doing and in ord<;:r that the minimum 
capital re~~ired for the various types ef constitution should not vary too 
greatly, it has also loNered the capital required in the case of a merger 
or the formation of a holding company. 
.. 
.. 
, 
Article 2 
The Com~ission is holding by its proposal to allow the European company 
to have several registered offices. In the Commission's ·view, the legal 
considerations which led the European ~rli~ent to oppose this proposal are 
not sufficient to outweigh the advantages connected with the possession of a 
number of registered offices. 
The Commission provided en opportunity of opting for possession of a 
number of registered offices to combat the psychological difficulties which 
may arise as a result of companies participa.ting in the formation of an S. E. 
being closely connected by name and tradition with the country in which their 
own registered office is situated. The· european character of the new 
legal form would be severely circumscribed if this opportu~ity were not 
available. 
Probloms arise from the admissibility of possessing eeveral registered 
offices only'in legal disputes concerning the internal affairs of the 
companies (repeal of resolutions of the General Meeting, for example), 
where conflicting decisions by several competent courts must be avoided. 
Ur..der.Article 16 of the-Convention on J~risdiction and the Enfor.cement 
of Civil and Commercial Judgements of 27 September 1968, the court where 
the company's registered office is situated has exclusive jurisdiction in 
such internal disput~s. However, the jurisdictional conflicts arising here-
from will be settled by recourse to the provision cbntained in Article 23 
of the Convention, under which the court l~st appealed to declines juris-
di~tion in favour of the court first appealed to. 
' In order to avoid a-ny difficulty or uncertainty in applying the ·above 
Convention, and its At>ticles 16 and 53 in particular, to the European 
L • : 
Can~acy,., Articles 10-a.-, 10-b- and 10-c- have been addeti -
and 1'3feren::e should be made to the explanatory notes thereon. 
I 
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!-;.rticle 6 
1. In accordance with the wishes of the European Parliament but contrary to 
the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the irrebuttable character 
of the presumptions arising under paragraph 2, which enable the existence of 
a controlling influence within the meaning of paragraph l to be deduced from 
circumstances alone, has been retained. 
2. The grounds for presumption contained in paragraph 2 will in future 
also include "indirect" power to exert influence. The grounds have con-
sequently beer- extended to cover cases where undertakings can oispose of the 
power to exert influence referred to in paragraph 2 through other dependent 
undertakings or intermediaries. 
3. At the request of the European Parlie.ment, the irrebutable presumption 
of dependence arising under the o~ifinal paragraph 2 (c) when a controlling 
influence is exerted under a contract has been dropped. However, contrary 
to ths P~rliament's wish, it has not been incorporated in paragraph 3 as 
a rebuttable presumption, since contrary to what is the case with th~ other 
presumptions, it only reiterates the criterion for ncontrolling influence'' 
within the meaning of paragraph l and consequently can in no way facilitate 
determination as to whether it exists. 
The wording o: the presumption in paragraph 3 and of the provision in 
parA.graph 4 on calculating- the extent of the shareholding has been changed. 
Paragraph 3 is extended, by analogy with the rule in paragraph 2, to 
include cases Hhere influence is exer~ised indirectly through sha,res held 
by another de,endent undertaking. 
4· The extension of the rule in paragraph 3 to include indirect influence 
has made the sentence in para5~aph 4 governing this situation redundant, 
"" 
and therefore only the provision contained in th~ second- ~entenoe of this 
paragraph need be retained. 
Article 7 
This .provisi'On has be.en retained ageinst··'the \fishes of· the Economic and 
Social Committee. It is important as regards drawing the line· between the 
Statute and the national laNe ·under which the S.E. must operate·.· 
For cla.rif'ica.tim it was expressly emphasized that, for purposes of 
applying the Statute, the common rules and general principles~ of the .l~s 
of :the -Member States aa referred to in Ar:tiole 7(l)b are .regarded as 
being· incorporated therein. It is. in n:o :way unusual for. common prinoi·pl.~ 
of national 1-a.w to- be incorporated in Community .l.a.w il'l this ~. An · 
example is' the ruling on the non-contractual liability.' of the C~ni ty. 
in Article 215 of the EEC ·Treaty. 
Article 8 
Paragraph 1 has been supplemented ··by & reference t-o the d.ocum'8tltr.l to 
be filed in the European Canmercial Register_. '!his appeared desirable in 
view of th& provisions of paragraphs 3 a.nd 4· c.Otl~rning the- :tiled documents. 
. . .. . ' .. , ' ... ·· 
. . 
ln apQorda.nQe_ wi~h ~he wishes: of t_he :~opea.n Parli~e~t_, a requ~rement 
to f~le duplica_.tee of'. the c:tocuments filed in the European qomm~rcial 
. . . . ~ . .. • . .... • . • . t . ·~· 
Regist~ :j.n the supplEI!Ienta.ry register in the Member State where the S~E. 
. .. .. ' . . ' ' ' ' . \ . ' . . . ~ 
has its registered .off'.i,ce has been added to pal'EI.gr&.ph 3. 
A • ' '/~ • ', ' >, : • • 
. ·1.' 
... , 4 
At the request of the European Parliament and to prevent incorrect 
details being publiShed, the daily newspaper has been deleted from the 
5L"') ),' 
list in paragraib 1 of offici:al journals whoeie published contents entail 
legal oonsequenoes (Article 9-a-(3)). 
In addition, it has been laid do"m that only the text in the original 
language of. a notice published in the Official Journal is to be authentic. 
A similar provision also applies, for example, to the o~fering of public .. 
construction contracts ,for tender .. This is necessary in order to avoid 
legal uncertainty caused by ambiguous translations. 
Article 9-a. 
The provisi ens of Article 9-a- are based closely on Article 3 of the 
first Directive on the coordination of safeguards in company law. '!hey 
origi.na.te in a proposal by the Economic and Social Committee's Section 
for Eocnoinic ·Questions. In its report the latter recommended drawing up,. 
for the S.E., a coherent set of rules on publication .. 
Article 10 
'!his Article has· merely been reworded. 
Articles 10-a.-, 10-b- and 10~ 
; 
1. The Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of civil and 
. . . . 
commercial judgments (27 September 1968) will normally apply to law-
suits to which an S.E. is a party. This is particularly the case as to 
Article 16(2) of the Convention, which awards sole competence to the 
courts of the State in whi.ch the companies or other corporate bodies 
have their registered of 1i ce in all ma ttere regarding validity, nu.lli ty 
or dissolution and the decisions taken by their governing bodies. 'I'h·'3 
" 
case is _again t~e •ame unde~ ~rticle 53, w~c~. ass~11_1~~ates the registered. 
office of com~_es and other corporate bodies to the~; permanent residence 
for the .~pose.s of the Conventi <no 
However, where there is more than one regia.tered· office and several 
courts in different States may therefore have sole jurisdiction, sane 
. ' : "·... . ~ ' ' . ' . : . \ . . 
doubt may arise as to the recognition, in the State of execution where 
another registered office lies, of a judgment given by ~ court that 
likewise has sole jurisdiction. 
. . 
2. In ord.e!' to avcid any difficulty or uncertainty, there is good reasOn. 
for stating in expree terms, even though this point is in fact covered by 
Article 7(1), that only the registered office specified in the statutes 
a.nd not any otherde facto office should be taken into account: 
for the ·purposes of the above Convention (Article 10-e.-). 
3. Fu.rther, whm-e there is more than one registered office, giving rise 
to exclusive jurisdiction on the part of can'ts of several Member States, 
it is desirable that the provisions as to interrelated actions should be 
strengthened as against those of Article 22 of the above Convention. 
Two alterations are necessary: the one requiring the orurt seised in 
second place to stay prooeed.ino!:'B, the other applying the interrelationship 
ey~n 
rW.e so as similarly to have prooeed:\.ngs halted/where interrelated actions 
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are not pend:Lrig· at the same level of jurisdiction. Cont~ry to abandonment 
of proceedings, suspension does not in fact have the ~ffect of depriving 
the parties of ~ resort of jurisdi9tion, and it is moreover imperative 
for an S .E. that has registered offices in more than one country that 
conflicting decisions should be avoided (Article 10-b-). 
For the ·rest, Article 22 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 
applies in full, particularly as rega~ the definition of interrelation-
ship. Article 23 of this Convention, which relates to litispendcnco in the 
case of an applicat ioo falling within the sole jurisdiction of more than 
op.e court, will naturally apply without there being any need for special 
proVision to be made in respect of the S .E .. 
4· It also seems right for express provision to be made to elimin~te any 
likelihood of non-recognition in <::- Sta.te of execution due to the exc.lusi ve 
jurisdiction of its courts being repudiated by a court having similar sole 
jurisdiction in· another ~~ember State (Article 10-o-). 
.. 
TITLE II -FORMATION 
Title II, particularly the first tw9 Sections, has been aligned to a 
considerable extent on the provisions of the ~nded proposal for a third 
Directive on the coordination of safeguards in connection with mergers 
between limited canpanies ( COM/72/1668, 4 January 1973) and on the -draft 
Convention on the International Merger of limited companies draWn up on 
the basis of Article 220 of the EEC Treaty (published as Supplement 13/73 
to the Bulletin of the European Communities}. This applies in particular 
to the first two Sections" 
This met the vJishes of the European Parliament and of the Economic and 
leg~l act s·u.ch M the merger of limited compn.nies · 
should 1 ns f~r ~s possi~le, take p]ace under the sam8 conditions throughout 
the Community, irrespective of whether national· or Community· lr:>.w e.ppli€.s. 
In the new ve::rsion, en attempt has beGn made ur:der the provisions 
applicable to the formation of each typo of company to give a coherer-t 
picture of dl the formalities that must be completed. 
In the section entitled "Gen~S.ral" only those prpvisions ha~re been 
retained which are applicable without additions or restrictions to all 
methods of formation. These are, in particul2.r, the provisions concerning 
the Stp,tutes, tho supervision of formation by the European Court of .Justice 
and the requirements which the 1.uditors must satisfy. 
The provisions of Section 2 on formation by merger have been complemented 
in particular by r~les concerninr the effects o: m€.rgers on employees 
(Articles 23a to 23d; see i .. rticle 6 of the proposal for a third Directive). 
It proved possible to consolidate the provisions of Section 3 on 
formation b;~r establishment of a holding comp:::my by making greater use of 
the possibility of referring to parallel provisions on mergers. 
/.s to the rules in Section 4 oa formation of a joint sub~idiary t=md 
in Section 5 on formatio!'l of a subsidiary, it was neces82ry to ensuro that 
the requisite protection guarnntees were afforded also on the formation 
of this type of company in the event of all or ~ considerable p~rt of 
the assets of the founder companies bei~g transferred to a joint subsidiary. 
I 
• 
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Section one - General 
Article ll 
1. Par~gr~ph 1 now makes clear that the' founder comp~nies are/responsible 
for applying for registration of the S.E. 
2. Paragraph 2 contains provisions concerning the dpcuments relating to 
formation which must be appended to the appli~ation, and at the sa~me time 
indicates t~e contents of Title II. 
3. Parngrnph 3 gives a definition of the expression "founder companies" 
for the purposes of Title II. This provioion has become necessary because 
corporations other than limited companies have been authorized to_partici-
pate in forming an S.E. It would be too unwieldy if reference hnd to be 
made to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 each time the founders of the 
S.E. were mentioned. 
Article 12 
1. Arti.cle 12 now contains only the provisions of Article 12( 3) of the 
old ve~sion concerning the authentication by notarial act of the document 
of constitution and refers in respect of the other requirements as to this 
instrument to the provisions relating to each mode of formation. 
2. The Commission has maintained the notarial form for the document of 
constitution and the Statutes of the s.E. (Art.·l3). 
It i~ of great importance for the formation of the S.F.. that the documents 
relating to :'ormation should not contain any errors. In an international 
procedure such as the formation _of an s.:r.., authenti_caticin by notarial deed 
appears to offer the best guarantee age.inst the-inaccuracy of the formation 
documents and the resulting dangers for the parties to the.formation. 
Tl\e Commission considers that notaries in all Member States will be able 
to prepare themselves for the new t9.sks imposed on them by the St~tute. 
Article 13 
1. The provi8ions of this Article consolid•te the requirements as to the 
form ~nd subst~nce of the Statutee of the S.E. 
2. Paragraph 2(a) on the name of the S.E. has been chan3ed1 in accordance 
with the proposal contained in the report of the Economic and Social 
Committee's Section for Economic Questions, so as to include tr.e ~bbrevi~tion 
"S.E." in the name of the company and thus to extend leg:1l protection to it. 
Moreover, provie:ion is made in the Lnnex to the Statute for :t.Iember States 
to penalise unl.3.wful use of the description ttE'Uropean compemy" and of the 
abbreviation "S.E." 
Subpnrar.re1Ph c on the object of the undertakinr has been aligned on 
Article lB(c) of the original propos~l. 
'I'ho changes to subp~ragraph C. on the p?.rticuh,rs concerning the shares 
issued are solely aimed e.t achieving greater clarity. 
Subparagraph e of the original proposal ~oncerninc the accounting 
currency has been deleted because the relevant provisio11s of Article 40 
make it redundant. 
Subparagraphs f and g in the new version set out the p~rticulars 
required concerning the Supervisor~r Board and the Board of Manaeement of 
the S.E. wtich formerly appeared in Article 12(2)d. 
Article 14 
'l'hc rules contained in l.rticle li have been incorporated. in th<:. 
provisions on the variou8 modes of formation. 
Article 15 
1. The prov1s1on consolidates the rules on the appointment of auditors 
(pA.ragraph 1), the qualifications required of them (p.;o.ragraph 2) and their 
liability (paragr<:J.ph 3). 
The requirements as to the auditors' report have, on the other hnnd, 
been incorporated in the provisions on the various modes of formation. 
I-
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2. Paragraph 1 on the appo:i.ntment of auditors corresponds to Article 12(1) 
of the draft ~onvent.ion on tha I::1ternationa.l Merger of limited companies. 
3. 'I'he provisions of paragraph 2 on tho requirem,;nts as to audi to:-:-s have 
been cnanged to meet the wish9s of the Zurope~n Parliam~nt so as to take 
account of the admission and examinatiOl! procedures ~n the new Member States. 
In ao.di tion - in ordel'! to avert any enoroaohment ·upon., the :-independence. of 
auditors o.~;tar as may be possible:-, ineligibility on the::b .. 
o~ounde of d.epe;:;.dflnoe on a founder company ha.s been ma.de retroacti VG. 
The last senten·~e of paragraph ~, which p~ovides that the audi tcrs may 
l1e ~;;he persons r0sponsible for examinj_ng the an."'lual accounts, corresr,onds 
to ~he second sen~ence oi Article 5(2) of the amanded p~opoAal for a third 
Di.:'..·ect·~ve a!ld to "he second sentence of Article 12(3) of thl:l dra.ft 
Co:n::ent.ion .:m the International r.~ert-:-:er of limited companies. 
tL Parn.graph 3 regarding the liability of auditors replaces the es.rlie:' 
.i\rticle 20(3). 'rhe rules as to Ea.bility correspond to those applying to 
auditor~ examining -the annual accounts (Article 209), tv Members of the 
Board of Mr1.ne.gement (Lrticlos 71 e.nd 72a), and to the Supervisory Board 
of the f.E. (Articles 81 and 8la). 
It stands to reason that all these persons, who in 0~e way or anc~h~r 
are resp:msible- for safeguarding the assets of the ~.E., chould bear 
liability on a common basis. 
5. Paragraph 4 has been added in order to regulate proceedings in 
connection with the liability of tha S.E. 
Jirli<?.~_l§. 
Article 16 has been ~ncluded among the .. provisio:ns fer the formation of 
subs3.0iary compcmies, to l'lhich it is of matf;Jrial importance (Articles 35-c--
and 38( 5))., 
1. o_., n. prO"JOBc>.l from tl.: :GJono'l>.;_c and Sccir:.l \~.:>mmittee, ra.r'",f'TC1ph 2 of 
the o:t'ipi.n,~.l · version ha: ~~en del,·t ~,_:. Its m:bject - the calll.:g in o_ 
ac<::om;tants to ass:..st -'-;he Eu:.·ope:om r<r·urt r-f j-,_stice - sh_;u1.J_ ~:>8 dealt t-v:~-c:-1 
in the _;;roce.:a_llrc..l :r-eg-':-L~ tion of th::_· court, -~o{:8the:.~ w: th 2.:17 othe~ assistc:qce 
re•:rnjred b:· :he latt:lr in reaching i·~s decbic··1s. 1n "l11e Sc.:tute this 
pr-:wi~;ion can t;i.v-: rie.e to rnisunde1 Jta:1di'·1~:s r.s -,~c- th_ pur;,ose o: ~r.'3 c.vrdH, 
whicn is ~Jure: y :1. rr:eans of legal check. 
2. ;n pc.rae:;raph 2 the .c;rouncls on w}:jcr r(.~·ist:ri"'.<:jon m·:y 1::: r.;fus-:d hc.v~ 
roen red:H)ed i "- number. rl'he Co'Jrt cf Just:.ca m?.:r rcfusP- :..'<: :::·is~.rP.tion orly 
lrrhe-e the provisi·Jns of t.c; J StP. t ,-,o relc-.ti..:1g to fc rr;ation h::1ve not been 
CXi!p1;_oC: with :.ara,sraph 3(a) of the c.'if;:Lnal version) c.· whe:'G the 
Statutv3 of the S.I:. do not co:r1p::.;:,· ;vit: ch Stat:;.te (:)aravraph 3(c) of' 
tho original version). 
Parat:~aph 3(b) of the original version (i:1.c\.mpleter.e~s of thE' io:"r:djo!". 
dot::u:nents) is :c0dunda!l--'j' it i~ reple,c.d t~· paragrap:, 3 c:"' -the ne•r; ~rE-rGion 
( suppJ.:Jr.JG '-';ing of thC' docw..ents rdn,ti ng to fo:..'matio:r: >vhich have br:JGn filE<~). 
p,q,r·agre:i)h 3(cl' of tt_, Odf;ine.l ve:::sicm h,•,s 1e.:m dr_;letecl b:CG,USO it is 
amhiguous~ '"his r-."'son for re:fusB.l cc.J.ld hE;VG &i_v~.-n the "m:>:r":JSSi0n th:it 
t:.,e Cc,~n; of JusticP. Wi'1,s reqL:.i:.::·ed to ca-r-;_'3' oc..~ E.n ass'<Jssmont of -Lli9 
anf.i tcrs' re::'or+ fr .Jm a financj_al p0L1t I' ~~iav-:, Tl· is is r;:)t -,~he case 1 
espec::i .ll'T since _,}, l net-1 :r;:-ovisic::. ir: /~r-~ic" 3 ~(;.)) :3ff:.~t"cvely ensu3·: s 
that cepical is fr.lly !;a::.d up. 
3. Pe _ c;.r!_:. a.nh 3 corres:pon,.::_:::; to p<=>.regre.r·h 4 of the ori[!'im l verd C'u bJ.t }ns 
b9en lroadE'w d in o cope o;t the ~dd it io~- of -the wor> _if ~':J,ni, :;he doour.1ent s 
relatL1c; -to :·orr·.at:i or: ~-~L~·;h 4 hcy have filed". 
4. The substance of p1.rag1 3-ph 4 corresr-'mds -ljo that -Jf rr::::-agraph 5 o:.. -the 
old version. 
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Article 18 
---
1. r.rh8 ~)!'Ovisiornof Article 18 (1) huve been aligned 011 Article 13. The new 
versi1:>1~ of .ll,.rticle 8 and 9 has r.:ade su.bp?.ragr:-Jph h of the origj.nal ·version 
:redund::m'G, since the company ~~u.Tnals no lc~1gcr ir .. .::.h:de daily newspapers 
des.i r;uated l-;r the company. 
2. !.J1 paragraph 2 the provisj.on concerning pu.blicatj on in the company 
journal3 of the c:oucll:.sions contained in the audi tcr t s reJ?ort has been 
dsleteC:.. f .. J.di tors' reports are now fulJ.y incorporc::.tcd iu the dom.unent o!' 
constitution (Articles 22, 3-)~ 35 and 38). T!":e document of constitution 
may be inspected at the European Commercial H.egi.ster ar..d its brauches by 
all intereste'i persons (Articles 17 (4) and 8 (4) ). Conseqw:mtly, ~her-a :ts 
lM :need for special publication o:f it. 
0f tho First Directive 
In l:l.:!'le with the unllArlying thin1d.ng 'behind Artic1.e 2 (l)T2."it~ust 
be immediately e·.rident to any third party ,.that s.rranger.1en+.s h!1ve be-?n 
made as rege.rds the limits of the pov~ers of :::..ndividaal members .of the 
Board c f Mam.gemt3nt to "'epresent the company, even if the company's Board is 
limited to one member. (Eurc:pean Gourt of JusticE> case 32/74 "HJ'J~G.A'~). 
fs~ticle J1 
Pa:ragra.ph 1 stipu.1a.tes the d::1.te from which the 
(see Article 26 (2)). 
has legal personality 
Para.g:r·arl1 2 makes clE:ar ·that the liability dealt with therein e:::.ists 
only in rebpect of obJi5ations entered into vis-a-vis third parties •. 
At the req'lezt of the Eur0:p0;m Parliament, parP..grr-1.ph 3 provid<:ls fo:~ the 
newly-for:!led S. E. to 3.ssume liability for SilO!'.!. o11iga.ticns • 
. ~. At the request of the Economic and Social Committee 1 paragraph 1 no 
lone_~e:.- refers to the 'f.Jersons responsible" for the fou_nder companit;;s but 
to t.r:.8 ngoverning bodies" of the latter. 
2. Paragraph 2.-now expressly extends the li11bility of the founder corr.panies 
and the members 'of their governing b-.:>cies to ensu.rinc that the ccpi tal is 
fully paid up. This is tc rnake certain that -the S.E. can have access to its 
capital from the moment jt acquires legal perf'!onali ty. 
3. U:1.der paragraph 3 of the nm'i version only the members of the B"OVerning 
b<tdies of the founder companies may "!)e relieved of liability. The fou ... 11dcr 
companies the:nselves are in all oases liable for any br~h of d<1ty • 
. - .. 1 
i . 
I 
I 
',,. 
Article 21 \ 
1 ~ As regards the de:fini t ion of the merger procedure,· the wording of 
paragraph 1 hae beGn alignE:d on Article 2( 3) of the amended prc.posal. for 
a third Directive and on Art!cle 4 of the dra.ft Conventi.on on intertiationa.l 
,' 
mergers. 
2~" Paragraph 2 co!'responds to Art-icle 2(5) of t'he proposal for a Directive 
and to Article 6 of the draft Convention. 
1. This Article concBrnin.g the requireme:n"ts as to the draft documE:n-r: of 
oonstitutio:t;l h~s been mvcle'l~ed en Articles 3 and 5~3) ·;bf the e.mended . 
propocal for a third Directive·a.nd on Artic1ecs·8 and 9 of· the draft· 
Convention on merger's~ 
2 .. It further covers the oa.se where a.fcunder company has been in 
existence for less than three complete fi~e.ncial ye:=:vrs (Artic.lo ~~2( 2) c 
and e of the new version). S·Jch c'Jmpanies should also be able to partie:.--
. _pate in the formation .. 
3. The provisions o:f Article 22 of the old version concerning the 
. . ' 
preparation of a b~.lance sheet are conta.ined in krticla 22e, 'while the 
provisions on auditing ha"'te beer.. consolidated in Article· :23' • 
. . 
Care hc'l.s been te.ken to ensure· that· all p.e:,rticu,Jars and reports · 
re'levant to an assessment of the forme#tion a.re incorporated in the d: .. a.ft 
document of constitution itself. 
,. 
. : . ~-. 
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A;::--~~~ •'-le 22.-f:)p._ 
-">1..·~~--~""' 
1.. Tr<~:> Ar-ticl~: c.o:!.'ltains tae balance r.il~et re3tU.r~ticus sp:>licable in the 
e·:an"i.i ;;f f,:'!"'rr~ t:Lon ·.:·~"' merge~. P~:!'e.gra.ph 1 co::'l•et;:lpond.s to Article 11(1), (2) 
and (4) at tho old version. Article 14(3) applJ.es or.ly to J~he foma.tic.~.'l 
cf a. t.>ubsidiary axld Co/:JSetiU'mtly hAB been retained solely in tha-t conneot-
i:;,n. Article 14(4) of t . he old version ha.a been arn~mded tH~ a.s to cover, 
in pe....woticu.l a.r, l:cnef:i ts and a.l.lo~t-!lCes granted to persons w~c- 9 in order 
;;(., mal:e poucible t.'l.e fonn<>.tion of an S .. E .. , roo:i.e;;n from a fow:der eo:11pany 
or fro::n its goveri.'li.ng bodies. 
2~ Pa.r-a.crar!t 2 cox-respcnds to A:~hole 22( 2)b oi the original proposal. 
I: l.~a.E> been a.lit!nod on Article 5\£,) of the ame!ld.{id proposal for a third 
nirc~tivo and on Articla 10 of the draft Convention on mergerao 
This Article no;.,- c•Jntains e, ocmprehe:1sive set cf rules C0110arning 
It ha.3 tJoen d:rA::~~n up on the "L..l'3iB of Article 5(2) of the ama.?J.ded 
propo~t?J. for a thhd DirE:~ctive and of Article 12(5) a.nd {6) of ·the 
ConYellJGi en on nert,''8l'S. '!his amendment to tho ori.;p.:1a.l pr·oposal also 
takes a.cc·-'~mt of a !":Cquest of the E..::onC'..:nic and Social Cc'fi'_rnittt:::e in 
conned:i an w.\:th Article 22 of the c"lcl version., 
Under ~M.a iirtiole the goveming bodi~s pf the founear cor.tpanica 
nr.;:s ~ ex;:la.in the draft C.ocume.u t: of ocnsti tu:tion an-i sp-ecify t~e 
conae~snoes of the morger on th~ employeeo affected by ito 
-· 
I 
). 
. \ 
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It appears proper that the remarks of the governing bodies Ehould be 
consolidated into a single report rathet~ than as laid down in f.~.rticl~s 5 
an~ 6 of the third. nire.otive and. to. in.corporate th_is in t1J.e .draft cj7,Jcument 
,' - .. ·- ' 
~f .,oonsti tution (as l-,ras laid down in the .-first pC;\ragraph in the original 
Coq~m~f?sio_n. proposal:). 
The wording cf this .t .. rticle ·has been aligned on Articles 5(1) ·and 6(1) 
of the amended p~oposal for a third Directive. 
This Article ensu.::. .. es that the draft document of constitution is made 
pu~l.ic in an appropriate ma.~er. Previously t,his' was de_a.l t with in Article 24 
' in con;nection with approval of -~he merg0r by .i;ha Gener·~l r~e.ting 
JArticle 24(2) and (3)) .. LogiC?a.J.~y, it is :pr~ferab~e .th~t these provis~ons 
should precede the Articles dealing with tr.:.e - newly-introduced - discussion 
of the effects of the merger with the employees' rep:resentatives ,(A~ .. ticle 
23c) and the approval of the merge1"' by the shareholders (f1rticle · 24)' .. 
. .. \ '. . 
The new version·· recvgni'Ze~ that··she.reholders should not have ·to .pay 
for ocpies of the documents relating, to· formation (see Article 5(5) of 
the amended proposal for .a third Directiv.a ). _SirJ.ce t~is also. applies 
to employees of thfJ fou.11der compa.nie3 and to othe!~ persons whose interests 
are· affected by ths merger (debenturE;. hold~rs), provi~ion hafj!. been· made 
for tt1e draft docurnen+. of oonsti tu·tior~ to be· supplied fr0e of. phe.rge. 
hrti~le ~ 
1. J3y ana.logr With the rule contai.ned in Article 6 of the· amended. 
proposal for a third,Directive; ·provisiQn ha.s.been made forth~ effects 
I 
of the merger to be d.iseussedwith the employees' represe:p.ta~ives 
( ~a.ragraph 1) .. 
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2. ·!::1 addition, p~.ragraph 2 re::fers to those orgam.zations or representatives 
w~1o undC?r the la.N ap:;:..lica.ble to the fou.!1der companies m·.tst be consul ted in 
t!-1c event of a me1·gcr. · 
In tne case of co~panies incorporated under national law, this means 
tiwse 'pE:r:~ons or or,sa,nizatiom:: which the Member St<.::tes will •1Gsignate for 
the purpose, ·under Article 6 of the third Directive, or which they. have 
J:f one of the founder companies is an S.E., the European Forks Council 
must be co:r:sulted (where establishment of the latter is required under 
Artic;le 100). 
3. :By an:1.logy with .ci.rticle 6 of th3 proposal for a t~1ird Directive, 
parP,Z:,'Tc-,ph 3 l~y£: down that the governing bodies and. the employees' 
rep~esentatives must open nebotiations with a viaw to r~aching an 
agreement on measures to be taken in respect of the employees in the 
event o? a m·.n~ger (paragraph 3). The governing bodies of the founder 
contpanit-s rr.-_~;:d; always open such negotiations where the er;ployees' 
. l'<.:'presenta.ti ves consider that the i1•terests of the ~mployees might ba 
affe~ted. Any agreement reached on the measur)s to be taken in respect 
o~ the employees m\lst be set down in writing. 
4· If no agreosHnent is reached as a result of the negotiations, par(';tgraph 4 
enables thE. employees' representc.tives to p;J.-!; forward in writing ~heir 
views l)l'l the effects of the mere-ar on the .. mployees and on the results 
of the t.;onsul tat ions :::tnd neg-otiations. Under paragr"l-ph 5 these views 
are notified to tbe General Meeting by the governing body of the company 
concern•:d .• T:'lus, the Ckr:.erF.l.l Meeting reaches its decision in full awareness 
of the views of the governing bod;'t and of the employees. 
In any case, under paragraph 5 the General Meeting receiver! a report 
by the governing bod;v on the results of the discussions and negotiations 
with the e~ploy8es' representetives, if the latter have requested such 
nogotiaticns under parae;r·e.ph 3. 
I ... 
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Rafemnce m'»lt bo mc.\d.e in the report either to agre001ent reaohad (:;r 
to feilure of the n~~sot.iations, or the reasons for the lik(~ly oontin::.:.1ttion 
· of ne~tia.tiorte Jm.:at otlJ,erwise be·· stated. 'lhe wo~ing of the General 
Meeting is llot dependent 1 U..'t}der theee prOvisions, on the ouJ'come ot the 
n~gotiations. 
The rap.ort must also contain any agreaneut roe.ohed (paragra,ph 3) or 
the wri tter ... vi a-18 of the employees (pa:-agraph 4). 
---·-
I, ' 
'I 
... 
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Article 23d 
1. Nhere no agreement is reached on the measures to be taken in respect 
of the employees in the event of a merger, the question may be referred to 
an arbitration board. Arbitr~tion proceedings are necessary in such a case 
to prevent the m~nagement deciding unilaterally in the last resort· on ~he 
measures to be taken in respect of the employees, for failure to re~ch 
agrc_ement does not prevent the merger. *) 
2. In such a ccse therefore, the arbitration board, after heal·ing the 
parties, decides on the measures to be taken by the particular founder 
company or, later, by the S.E. where the latter acquires legal personality 
during the proceedings. The provisions concerning arbitration proceedings 
contained in Article 23d (2) and (3) are modelled on the corresponding 
provisions in Articles 128 and 129. 
3. Paragr~ph 4 consists solely of a procedural provision intended to ensure 
the continuity of arbitration proceedings where the S.E. acquires legal 
personality durinc such proceedings (Article 19). 
Article 24 
1. As-regards approval of the merger by the General Meeting, paragrRph 1 
no longer refers to the rules applicable to the winding up .of the founder 
company but, as a general rule, to the provisions applicable in respect 
of mergers. lffhere an S.E. is a folL~der company,_the provisions·which 
apply are contained in Title :u. 
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 24 of the old version are incorporated 
in 1\rticle 23b. 
3. Par~graph 2 of the new version takes account of the fact that.nnother 
S.E. may participate i~ the formation of an S.E. The former reference to 
"national law" was imprecise. 
*) See also .Article 8 of the Proposal for a Directive on the retention 
of the rights and advantages of employees.in the case of mereers, 
takeovers and. amalgamations ( COM/74/35l final of ~9 I1Iay 1974:. O.J. No. 
Cl04/l of 13th Septamoor 197 4~ 
0 
• • • • • 
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4. The last sentence of paragrL'.ph 4 of the new ver3ion tc..!ces account of 
the fR.ct t!1C~.t non-sh:1relwlG.ers C'tre also intere.3ted in obtaininf; copies of ' 
the minutes of the General F.1eeting (see the notes to Article 2.'l,b). 
!~rticle 25 
l. The changed wording of par:1gr1.ph 1 defines more clearly the scope of 
the rule::; concerning the rir,ht of r::har0holders to chc.llenb'e resolutions 
of General Meetir.gs. The period within which application may be made to the 
Court has been extended. 
2. Par-"l-ern.ph 2 sets out mnre succinctly th::m befnre the conditions 
under which the European Court of ,Justice ma~r exercise the right to 
grCl.nt shareholders a specinl extensi .:m of time in t.:rhich to challenge 
resolutions. Prima fucie evidence must be produced to the Court of 
Justice that: 
the shareholder malcing the applic::1.tion was unable, thrvugh no 
fault of his own, to comrly ~,Ji th the conditions of par<?.grr>.ph 1 
and 
the resolution of approval is invalid. 
Under the previous version of thiB paragraph, the r;roduction of 
prima facie eviderce was required nnl:r in respect of the invc>.lidity 
of the resolution. However, the Court of J~1stice should n.lso be relieved 
of the necessity for a protracted cxqminc-.tion o~ the !J1'ltter v-ri th regard 
to the first condition and it would thus seem proper to allow the 
production of pr·ima f;J.ci.;; evidence to suffice here also. 
3. P~ragra?h 3 ensures that the S.E. is not registered before the 
expirntion of the periods for commencement of proceedine:s for cancellation 
or declaration of nulli t~r. This addition would :1.ppear nec0SS.:'.ry to ensure 
that the shareholders' interest in prot2cting th~ir leg:1l rights does not 
become unenforceable due to the S. E. hn.vint:r acquired legal porsonali ty. 
f.rticle 26 
----
1. Article 26 of the previous version has been supplemented ·.:::y the 
re·quirement in paragraph 1 of the new version that the governinc 
bodies of the founder companies inform the· European Cou~t of Justice 
.. 
... 
• 
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whether the resolution of the General. Meeting has been challenged. This 
may enable the Court under Article 25 (3) to postpone registration where 
appropriate • 
2. Parngr~ph 2 corresponds to Article 28(2) and (3) of the old version. 
To avoid legal uncertainty provision hcs been made for the founder 
companies to cease to exist on the day following the date of publication 
of the notice of formation of the S.E. (in this connection, see also 
J~rticle 19 (1).) 
.h.rticle 27 
1. The system for protecting creditors contained in the original Article 
has been replaced by a system which no longer makes it possible for 
creditors to delay the merger until the founder companies have given 
security. However, creditors receive the right to require the S.E. to 
provide sureties in respect of their debts. 
h similar system is contained in Article 19 of the draft Convention 
on the International Merger of limited compenies. It is an improvement on 
the previous system since, on the ·one hand, it affords creditors'sufficient 
protection but, on the other hand, does not delay the merger and thereby 
endanger other interests. 
2. ~aragraph 1 extends the scope of the system of protection - and in 
this it goes further than Article 19 (1) of the dr~ft Convention on 
merge~s - to cover all creditors whose claims stem from the period before 
the founder companies ceased to exist (Article 26 (2)). 
3. Paragraph 2 is based on 1~ticle 19 (2) of the above-mentioned draft. 
However, the time limit for negotiations concerning the security has been 
extended to 14 days to bive tho parties concerned:greater room for 
manoeuvre • 
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4. The content of paragraph 3 corresponds to th~t of Article 19 (3) of the 
above-mentioned draft. 
5. Paragi·aph ~- incorpor"l.tes the rules in respect of loc:.n creditors contained 
in !1.rticle 20 of the draft Convention on mergers in the rille;:; gover-nin5 
protection of creditors so f':.s to achieve a coherent syste'll. 
J~ccordin£,ly 1 loan creditors r:1ay apply for security if they haYe not, 
under the terms of pare,graph 4, approved the mer§"er, i.e. the l'ights and 
measures proposed in respect of themselves in the dr.·1.ft document of 
constitution (i..rticle 22 (l)c). 
Th,is n.mendcd ~.-er:::ion of pnr~gr<1ph 4 t2..kes pccount of the wishes of the 
Furopec.1n Parli ">:Jr.ent. 
6. '.i'he rules in •~rticle 27 rtppear sufficier.tly flexible to :leal with 
individual cases involvine, the protection of croclitcrs. In particular, it 
appears possible with their help to extend tc the S.E. qs a·whole ~ny 
special security existing in respect of one founder comp~".UY or to cre?.te .":tn 
equivalent substitute. 
· This 1'1-pplies, for example, to the fl)ating charges existing in the 
United T{inc-dom cLnd in Ireland for the benefit of debentu.re holders or other 
creditors. The board of directors of the British or- Irish compc.ny concerr,ed 
will in tho draft document of constitution propose the ri~hts or measures 
envis~ged in respect of such persons. If the latter aro not s~tisfied they 
m~y require the S.E. to provide securities of O(juivalent financial value to 
t, floating chc-,rge. 
:,.:rticle 28 
l. This J..rticle regulates situations where one of the morging comprmies 
owns shares in another. The rul(_s cont<J-incd in Lrticle 28 in the old 
version have been incorporated in Article 26 A.nd Lrticle 26 (1) hP.s been 
dropped as being redundrmt. 
2. Prorar.raph 1 corre~ponds in part to f..rticle 42 ( 1) of the draft 
Convention on the Interne,tione.l P~erger cf limited comp'1nies. 
.. 
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It lays down rules governing the conseq~ences which flow from ownership by 
one of the founder companies of shares in anther founder company. Under the 
draft Convention on mergers, this situ~tion was governed by the national 
law applicable to the companY concerned (see the Goldman Report as regards 
Articles 5 and 42 of the draft - published as Supplement 13/73 to the 
Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 47 and 91). 
The Statute must lay down rules on this subject. Under the law of 
universal succession the shares become part of the assets of the S.E. 
Consequently, the slL~res and the ~ssets to which they· relate merge in the 
legal person of the S.E. As is usual in cases where such a merger of 
claims and oblig~tions occurs, provision can be made for the shares 
received by the S.E. to cease to exist. 
. 
3. In the event of one company owning all the shares in another, 
par~graph 2 waives the requirement contained-in article 15 (1) to appoint 
an auditor for both companies. Although, in order to ascertain the 
share exchange r~tio the audit must extend to both companies it is only 
necessary to appoint auditors for both companies where outside share-
holders whose in-ter.ests must be protected are affected. This is not the 
case here. 
Section three - Form~tion of an S.E. as holding company 
Article 29 
1. f..gcinst the \Jishes of the Economic <1.nd Social Committee but with the ' 
approval of the European ~~rliament, the rule in paragraph 1 remains 
unchanged. 
The Economic and Social Committee is opposed 'to the· exchange _of all the 
shares in all cases and would like shareholders of founder oompemies to be 
3blo to retain their shares. 
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However, the financi:l.l objective of forrnirgA. holdint;; compan~r is to 
enable sh0reholdors of the founder comp~nies to .share not in the 
respective individuA-l profits of the lat-ter but in the profits rf the 
holdin6 company. Jn this c2.se, the cxch:"J.nge of the shares helps to.cb.rify 
the relationship. 
2. Par~>.graph 2 hr-.s been supplemenh:d by ::1 rule similf'.r t0 that cvntainE:d 
in I.rticle 223 ( 3) of the Gommissior,' s ori~in<>.l prop·'>Sal. On the forr:tation 
of nn S.E. ~s holdinG company, when the latter· owns all sharec in the founder 
compnnies, it_,appe?l,!'s desirable -to specify expressly th~.t, c..ny nationr>.l 
provisions uncter which the founder companies must be wound up in such 
C3.ses do not a!lply. 
Lrticles 30 -~ 
l. ~he rules on formation of an s.r. ~s holding company h>ve been 
strengthened by alignment on the like provisions c::mccrninP.: fcr•a:-;tion by 
m3rgor. 
2. The interests of shareholders are Fimilar in both c~seR, since thby 
lose membership of their former companies and through tile exchange of 
shc::.res become: shareholders in a new company. 
3. The employees of the, founder companies have ·a direct interest in being. 
informed on the effects of the formation of the holding company and on 
an;;r mcc>sures em;isf'.ged in respect of them - such as prcposed r<J.tione.lis!l.tinn 
projeCts. 
Yfuere: employees' ropresentdives consider th:1t form:ltion of the holdinG 
company will advsrsely affect the interests of employ-3es' 
provisi0ns protecting the interests of employ~Jes al)plicabl0 to morgers a.."ld 
contained in Articl3s 23c and 23d must 
be applied by analogy. ( *) In thi a· case acc.ount . must of course be taken 
of the fact that the founder companies continue to exist following 
formation of the holding company and are not replaced by the S.E. 
·4· The interests of creditors of the founder companies, however, are 
not the same as in the case of a merger. 
Since the founder companies continue to exist following formation of 
the holding company, formation of the S.E. has no direct legal consequences 
requirin~ special regulation. 
In the event of the formation of a purely fin~ncial holding company 
the f0under companies in fact remain financially independent. However, 
where the founder companies are managed in a uniform manner by the 
holding company followin5 the latte~'s formation, the safeguards of 
Article 239 applying to undertakings within a group take effect. 
5· The new provisions take account of this situation and also regul~te 
the formation of an S .• E. as holding comp~ny as regards the position in 
law of shareholders and employees from the point of.view of form, by 
making more frequent reference to the like provisions concerning formation 
by merger. 
By such reference, account is te.ken of the comments of the 
European Parli~ent and of the Economic and Social Co~mittee on Articles 
30 - 34 and the corresponding Articles 22 - 26. 
(*) See also Article 8 of the Proposal for a Directive on the retention 
of the rights and advantages of employees in the case of mergers, 
takeovers and amalf;,"Mlaticns ( COr-1/74/351 final of 29 May 1974::. 
O.J. No. 0104/1 of 13th September 1974~. 
Section four - 7or~ation of c joint subsidiary 
!.rticles 35 - 37 
l. It has been necessary to recast rmd to qdd to the provisions on the 
formation of ·a joint subsidi~ry because in this type of constitu~ion not 
only may p~rts of the founcer companies be combined but restructuring 
having a financial effect very aimilar to other forms of constitution 
can be cnrried out. This is especially importGnt in the case of under-
takings which, al tho".J.gh unr>-ble to particip1=1.te in nther types of 0onsti tution, 
me.y t1.ke part in the forrrn.ti'Jn nf a join-t su"tlsid.iary. 
2. Lrticle 35 accordingly refer:::; to the sc::.me particulars as f,rticle 22, 
with the exception of th0se relating to t~1e exchange of st.e.:ccs or to the 
legal status of holders of securiti~ other than shares. 
3. Lrticle 3)a (1) and (2) a and b corresponds to ~rticle 22a (1) (sec the 
explanatory note to the latter). 
f,rticle 35a (2) (c) contains the provision in l~rticle 14 (3) of the 
origin2.l Coramission draft, which applies only te> the form:..tbn of e. 
subsidiary. 
4. il.rticle 35b corresponds to Article 23. However, the prc-.visiuns con-
cerning the contents of the auditors' report have been tc>)cen from Article 15 ( 3) 
of the old version. ThC; verification provided for in subparagr1.ph c cf 
this article reg:1.rding payment in full of the whole of the c;:;..pital has 
been deleted as redundant, since this is alre~dy effected by the security 
referred to in subp~ragraphs b. (valuation of contributions in kind) and 
a. (opening b~lance she8t). 
5. /.rticle 35c on.::mditing in the event of roforme.tion corresponds to 
t.rticle 16 of the original proposal. However, a simplified procedure was 
propnsed for the ::>.ppoiutmE;mt of auditors. 
6. l.rticle 36 specifies v-rhich l~ws apply to approval of the d.ocument of 
constitution and the Statutes. 
.. 
• 
As regards companies inoorporat0d under nativnal law, paregr~ph 2 refers 
to their respective national laws. 
Provisio'ns ofnationa.l law which protect the shareholder, employees and 
creditors of a company in the event of its p~rticip~tion in the formation 
of another company are wholly appJ.icable. This applies in- pr.:,rticular to 
provisions such as those intended to be introduced pursuant to the Prop-:>sal 
for a Directive on the retention of the rights and advantages of employees 
in the case 8fJmexgers,10tK@over$ and am~lgamatjons)(COM/74/351 final of . .._ • .NO"" c L). 1 or· 13th Sep11ember 1974 • 
29 May 1974,- ·Should the ormation of the joint subsidiary result in the 
trr..nsier of an este..blis:t>ment the provi_sions of national law adopted in 
implementation of that Directive or the provisions of national law 't'rhich 
aro alrecdy in axistence apply. 
Paragraph 3 contains special provisions which apply where an S.E; 
participates in the formation of a joint subsidiary. The require~ent,. clready 
contained in li:rtic1e 36 of the ori€·inal version, that the Supervisory 
Board. tive its approval is insufficient to ~ff')rd adequate protection cf. 
tho interests of the parties. In particul~r, the employees of the S.B. 
must have the opportunity to state their views on t~e formation of the 
joint. s~bt?id.iary and the consequences thereof ( subparacra.ph c). 
tt.Jhere the total assets of the S.E. are transferred to the joint 
subsidiary or where its fo1~ation affects the competence of the General 
'Meeting under Article 83 in any other way1 ·the formation of tho joint 
subsidiary must be epproved by the shareholders of the S.E. {subparagraph d). 
Nhere the interests of the employees are adversely affected by the forma-
tion of a joint subsidiary the Boe',rd of Management of the founder S.E. must 
prepare· a social plan, which is subject to approval by the European Horks 
Council (I.rticle 36 (3) e).· 
7. l~rticle 37 h"\.s been supplemented .• 
Section five - Form~tion of a subsiaiary by an S.E. 
Articles 38 and 39 
~s before, the rules make frequent reference to the provisions of 
Section four. 
TITLE III CAPIT..tU. - SIL\RES AND DEBEHTURES 
The changes in this Title relnte to the rules on the increa~e of 
capital (Articles 41 to 43), acquicition by the S.E. of its o;vn shares 
(.Article 4G), and reciproc2,l shareholding. (.Article 47 ). Further, the 
rules on disclosure of shareholdings, fornerly contained in Article 47(5), 
have been extended and are not1 incorporated in n cpecial provioion 
(f.rticle 4G a). 
There have been no fundamental changes to the other provisions of 
this Title. The requirement that the capital of the S.E. muEt be fully 
paid continueo, in particulnr, to apply (;~rticle 40(2) ). 
The provisions regardinG the increase of capi tc"l h::we been trans·· 
posed. The di'stinction between an increace of capital and approval of 
a future increase of capital is notv clear • Tho rules on shareholders' 
preferential subscription rights have been consoliduted. 
The rules on possession and acquisition of its O'IV!l shares by the 
S.E. have oeen extended. As requested by the ~uropean Parliament, ~ch 
acqu.isi tion is nmv possible if the shares are to be issued to employees. 
In accordance 1·Ji th the t;eneral wi she!:? of the European Parlimnent, 
the ne'lv text of the rules on reciprocal shareholdin& taken account of the 
llork on the preliminary draft for a Directive on the harmonisation of 
la\v on groups of companies. 
The more stringent rules on disclosure of shareholdines in Article 
46 a, take account of recent trends toHards greater clarity in the company 
latv of IIember States. 
Certain ad.p,ptations have, further, beon raade, p.:'.rticularly to 
conform with the amended Propo.sal for a second Directive concerninc the 
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alterr1tion of their capital, of 30 October 1972 (COL (72) 1310). 
Section 1 - Capital 
Article 40 
1. Although it was requested to do so ~J the Economic and Social 
Co~ittee, the Commission is unable to delete from its proposal the 
requirement .in paragraph 2 that the capita~ of the S.E. must be fully 
paid up. Th~ Commission has also examined the request of the Legal 
Affairs Committee of the European ParliaLlent and of the Economic and 
f.!ocial Committee o.s to 't'Jhether at lea~t certain companies auch ae:: 
in8urance undertakings miGht not be exempted from the requirement that 
capital murrt be fully pnid up. 
This requirement is one of the fundamental features of the rules 
.governing thv S.E. and it hac been introduced quite specifically to 
ensure that the S.E. enjoys maximum credit·-'trorthiness and that its 
registered capital is fully at the disposal of its management. 
kny exemption from the requirement that capi t~l must be fully paid 
up prejudices these goals. !foreover, formation procedures which 
inv~lve an exchange of shar~s, such as mergers or formation of a holding 
company, can in practice only be carried out by companies with a fully 
paid capital. On the other hand, where a joint subsidiary is formed, 
the minimum capital has now been reduced to such an extent that there 
~rould no longer appear to be any real need for an exemptin8 provision, 
especially since only companies already Xn existence are· allowed to 
form on S .. E. 
MoreoYer, if only partly paid shares vTere allowed, comprehensive 
rules would be needed to cover situations where full p~ent of shares 
Nas not effected subsequently. It must therefore be ensured that the 
declared riSk capital is in fact available, e.g. by means of rules on 
the compulso!"'J withdrawal and transfer of such shares. 
2. In paragraph 3 the definition of capital subscribed in kind has 
been slightly altered. As before, it relates to intangible assets, but 
it is tied not to the concept of "value" but to the concept developed in 
private law of the "article". 
The deciding factor is not uhether the article is transferable but 
whether it is economically saleable (of. e.g. l..rticle 10 of the Propocal 
for n second Directive). Unsaleable contributions, such as an obligc..·--
tion to carry out Hork or provide cervices in particulnr, would be 
impermissible under paragraph 3. 
3. The special ruleo on transfers of la~d requested by tho Economic 
end. Socic..l Committee in view of nationnl provisions which exclude 
cuch transfers (a:J they do the trc.nsfer of other rights in immoveable 
property) to companies not yet formed, appear unnecessary. The concept 
of "oubscription" or the"contribution of capital subscribed in kind" 
may be interpreted as covering the legal position in tThich there is 
nothing further to prevent the company that has been formed from 
acquiring the article contributed. 
4. In Article 48(1) account h.J.s been te}cen of the amendment requested 
by the Econonic and Social Committee that the sh.J.rc capital should be 
di vinible. 
1. This provision nov-; contains a comprehensive :::;et of rules for 
increasing capital by 3Ct'ip issues or by the capitalization of rcser~ec. 
In cubstcnce it correspon~s to the oribinnl rulec contained in para-
e:raphs 1 and 2 of P..rticle 41 and in parat,-Tnphs 3 and 4 of ... 'l.rticlo 42. 
The creation of approved capital is now dealt with comprehensively 
in Article 42. 
.... 
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2. Article 41(1) in the new version consolidates the provisions prev-
iously contained in paragraphs 1 and 2; ~.t the same time, the wording 
has been redrafted end two points ;have been clarified. 
Increase of capital b,y capitalization, as an alternative to increase 
, I 
of capital b,y new issues, no longer relates to a,Tru.lable reserveR but to 
dispo~able reserves. This dovetails into the terminology used in the 
·model balance sheet in Article 153 (item II on the liabilities side). 
At the same time, on a point made by the Section for Economic and 
Financial ~~estions of the Economic nnd Social Committee, it has been 
made clear that not all available reserves may be capitalized but only 
those specifically uisposable for conversion.(l) 
Further, the new wording I!k'lkes it clearer than the orieinal Commi:::sion 
td~d, . 
proposal/thav an increase of capital requires an .alteration of the Statutes. 
3. Pe..ragraph 2 contains the rules previously contc::.ined in Article 42(3) 
on the examination by experts of the value of assets subscribed in kind. 
At the request of the European Parlbmertt, more flexible rules now govern 
the appointment of these experts. 
The examination may, as previously laid down, be carried out either 
by experts appointed by the court or, Cl,lternativoly b,y the S.E. 's 
annual auditor. Which alternative is adopted will depend on the merits 
of each particular case, tho final choice being made jointly by the 
Board of 11anagem::mt and the Supcrvi sory Board.. 
As regards the professional qualifications of experts appointed by 
the court, reference is no longer made to the rules in ~~icle 203, which 
apply to the annual auditors, but only to Ar·ticle 15(2). This makes no 
fundamental diffe.rence since, according t'o tho new version of Article 15(2), 
the requirements of the former f~ticle 203(3) as to tho independence of 
annual auditors now also apply to expertn. 
The experts arc no"t>J also subject to the same rules regarding liability 
(Article 15(3) as formation auditors. (Article 209 contains the rulas in reaP'--~ 
of anr1ual auditors). 
(1) This paragraph concerns the English text. 
4• Paragraph 3 corresponds with tho second and third sentences of the 
former Lrticle 42(3 ). These provisions 0nsu.ro that the general pu1lic 
nre nade a\-rare of tho report on the assets subscribed in kind and that 
shareholders can acquaint themselves of its contents (re c~lling of a 
General F-leeting, cf. Article D6 ). 
Under Article 94(2), this report must further be deposited, qua 
annex to the minutes of the General I~IcetinL;. dcciC.inG on the; cc.pi tn.l 
increase, vlith the European Cor:1lllercial Register. 
To this extent the provision equates in substance with /~ticle D(3) 
of tho amended proposal for a Second Directive. 
5· Paragrnph 4 contains tho rnles formerly contained in Article 4?(4) 
t..rhich go'vern the increase of capital b;y- capitalization of reserves. 
In accordance with th .... request of the European Parliament the rules 
have been added to in order that th0 S.E. may distribute shares to its 
employees in respect of the capitnl created by c2.pitalizing reserves. 
Article 42 
1. Thic provicion contC'"ins all the rule~; which apply to tho legal 
concept of "approved capital". This a2pect t..ras prov'iously governed 
by Articles ~2(3) and 43(1) and (3). 
2. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of tho no~J version correspond to a considerable 
extent ,,rith tho ruleo p-roviouoly contained in Article 41(3). 
Hot..revor, it hcs been made clear in paracraph 1 thn.t cpproval of a 
future increase of capitn.l constitutes an alteration of the Statutes, 
to >vhich all the provisions of Title VIII apply. Thus, directly after 
the General Meeting hno adopted the :resolution, tho approval ic 
oxcminod by the European Court of Justice, and the eJnount of thu 
approved capital o..nd the period for which approval is given are then 
recorded in the Europeo..n Commercial Recister. This ensures tho.t the 
approval is usod and the nevT shares are issuecl on a firm legal bc.ais. 
-; 
This change, which serves to facilitate financing of the S.E. by 
improving this meanc of procuring capital, is based on fi:nanci<ll considerr:.·-
tions, in line ~~th sucgestions made in financial circlec. 
.. 
3. Paragraph 2 lcys down the limits set to the approv.s:.J. of a future 
increase of capital. Theoe were previously contai~ed in f~icle 41(3) of 
the original proposal. It has not been necessary to include in the new 
text the exception then made where the creation of a~roved capital was 
linked to an issue of· convertible debentures, since the latter is now 
' .. 
dealt with comprehenGivcly in Article 60, quite separately from .~icle 42. 
4• Paragrn.phs 3 to 5 govern the utilization by the Board of r.l'anc'l.g'ement 
of the s.E. of the approval obtcined. In contrast to the provisions of 
Article 43(1) and (3) 1 a decision on the ~anner of utilization b.Y the 
. . 
Board of Unnagement requires tho agreement of the Supervisory Bonrd. 
Further, the di:mlosure· formalities incumbent upon the .Board of Hanageme.nt 
have been made more specific. 
1. This.provisicn now deals comprehansively with shareholderst sub-
ncription rights. 
contained 
Paragraph 1 contains the rules formerly/in l~icle 41(1) of the 
or~ginal proposal on nhareholders' rights to scri~ on a capital increase 
by a new issue. It has been made clear that this right exists in the 
case of cash subscriptions. 
2. Paragraph 2 contains the rules on the wi thd.rawa.l of subscription 
rights and oo1•responds. in oubstance, with the first and second sentences 
of ,Article 42{2) of tho original proposal. Pa.ragreph 3 con-tains special 
rules for th~ ld.thdra110.l of SU.oh rights tihen e. fut·.tre increase of capital 
is npprovcd. In accordance with a suggestion mn.de in the report of the 
Section for Economic ~1d Financial Questions of the E9ono~c _and Social 
Comr..1itteo it is now possible to authorize the Board of ~fune.g~ent to 
withhold. tho right to subscribe in order to provi.de the S.JE~. with greater 
f~exibility in ~eeking potential sources of finance. The r~ght to give 
. . . ' 
such authorization is also provided for in ~icle 2~(3) of the amended 
proposal for a Second Directive. However, a condition of granting the 
' ' 
authorization is tho,t the Board of }.~ana.gement justifies the need th19refor 
in writing. 
ll.rticlc 43 a 
This provision contains rules concerning the linbili ty of the 
BOc.rd of Managcnent of the S.E. They r..re modelled on those in 
f.rticlo 20 reln.ting to founder companies and the members of their 
governing bodieG. 
Rules of this sort relGting to liability are necensary not only in 
connection with the formation of the S.E. but also when its capital is 
increasedv to cn~~e that its declared capital is at its disposal. 
ll.rticle 44 
1. It is now made clear in parao~nph 1 that a reduction of capital 
rcqu.ircs an alteration of the Statutes, subject to all the relevant 
conditions in Title VIII~ 
2. By comparison with the originc.l proposal, pnragraph 3 extcndn the .. 
prohibition on using the :unount of the difference between the o.ssets and 
liabilit1ea of the S.E., rosultins from a reduction of cnpital, for the 
benefit of shareholders. The ruloe correspond to Article 30 of the 
proposal for a Second Directive. 
Art i s.l e .45. 
Pnracraphs 1 to 3 contain the rules under which creditors are 
protected if tho cc..pita.l is reduced; they arc similar to those in 
f.rticle 27 rolnting to the fornation of the S.E., to the explnnatory 
notes Olfi w:'t~~.ch Article reference may be mc.de. 
ParagTaphs 4 an'i 5 correspond to Art-icles 29(2) a.nd 30(1) res--
pectively of the amcnclod proposal for a Second Directive on comp<:my lc..vr. 
1. A"t the request of the Europea."'l Pnrlirunent c:'.lld the Eoononic and 
Social Committee, the prohibition in Article 46 on tho acquisition and 
posseGsion of .its own shares by the S .E. has been relaxed so as to give 
the s~E. the additionn.l right to distribute its o>vn shares to its 
employees. 
-
• 
The Economic and Social ~ttee has asked for f'urther r~laxa.tion 
of this prohibition in that it ~shes the S.E. to be allowed to acquire 
• • • I ' :. 
its own shares to prevent the company sUffering heaV'J losses. T:P.c limits 
to such an exception arc difficult. to define; they may render the pro-
hibition meanin€less and thus· endanger the financial basis of the company.-
There would, moreover, appear to be no overriding need for such a rule 
on financial grounds. In the United Ki~om, companies do not ha.ve the 
right to acquire their own shares and this would not appear to have 
erected ~ difficulties. 
Neither i.s .arJY e%ception justified ~n the case of an .exchange of 
shares in connection with the giving of guarantees to the minority share-
ho:J,ders of o. dependant company within a ~oup. In such cases the share~;~ 
~a~ bo acquired through the more straightforward s9lution of an increase 
of capital. 
Lastly, by Article 44(2), a reduction of capital may be effected 
by reducing the nominal value of the shares so that here, too, an exception 
is unnecessary. 
For these reasons ·and especially considering the fact that the 
European Parliament ha.s expressed its opposition to a:ny such exception, the 
Commissio~ has not complied with the Economic. and Social Committee's request. 
2. At the wish of the European Parliament, paragraph 1 prohibits acquis-
ition of shares in the s.E. not only by undert.akings controlled by it, as 
previously' laid down, but also by undertakings in which the s.E. holds a 
majority of shares. By trtiolo 6 there is only a presumption. of dependence 
in the latter situation. It ·must, however, be included within the 
prohibition, to prevent a major part of the shares ·tn the s.E. held. by ·. 
the othc;}r undertaking from fl.~ng back into the assets of the s.E. 
"t;hrough the medium of its majority holding .in the a.see1;s of .that under-
~· ~ ~ . . ' 
tpking. .This vlOUld indirectl.;y' red:uce :th~ cap::l.tal of the s.E. 
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3. Paragraph 2 contains the substance of the exemption requested by the 
European Parliament enabling distribution of shares in th,e S.E. to its 
employees or to employees of undertakings belonging to the group. 
At the request of the Parliaoent 1parogrcph 3 extends the prohibition, 
previously contained in the second sentence of ii.rticle 46(1), e.gdnst 
pledging the shares of the s.E., to acquiring any right of usufruct or 
any other beneficial rights over them. Having regard to Article 92(1) 
whereby the usufructuary is entitled to exercise the voting rights 
attached to a shcro, such an extension is necessary to remove the dcnger 
of abuse through the exercise by the S.E. of voting rights attached to 
its own shares. This prohibition is aimed only at the S.E. since, other 
than where shares are acquired, there should, in practice, be little 
scope for nominee transactions using third parties or dependent under-. 
takings acting on behalf of the S.E. 
4• Paragraph 4· a corresponds to paragraph 2 of the original proposal. 
~t the request of the European Parliament, the duty to dispose of shares 
1'11i thin one yew has been extended to eightoen months. In future, in 
accordance with the rules in po.re.graph 1, an undertaking in >-Jhich the 
s.E. is a majority sho.reholder will ~lso in future be obliged to dispose 
of its shares in the S.E. 
Further, at the request of the EconorJ.ic and Social Cor.'!Illittee 1 it has 
been made clear that although the s.E. is not under the prohibition 
conto.ined in paragraph 1 where it ncquires its own nhnres by way of uni-
versal succession, such shares must be disposed of >-Ji thin the eighteen 
montb .. period. In addition to mergers, already referred.to in the previous 
Article 46(2 )1 .universal succession covers other forms of transfer of 
assets, such as inheritance. 
5• Paragraph 4b contains special rules for the transfer of shares 
acquired for distribution to·employees •. Care has been tclcen to ens~e that 
such shares are o.lso disposed of by the S.E. within eighteen months at the 
latest. 
• 
• 
.-· 
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6. At the t-eque·st -of the European Parliament, paragraph 5 contains a. 
rule to prevent· the shares to which pa.ra.g:ra.phs 4(a.) ~d 4(b) rel.at o 
from 'b'eing wronBfillly dealt with before they are disposed of and, ~t th¢ 
same time, to secUre compliance with the duty to dispos~ of them under 
paragraph 4• 
Article 46 a 
,I . 
1. Article 46 a imposes a duty to disclose all holdings of more than 
. . ' 
1Q% qf.the capital of an S.E. and all holdings of an S.E. of more _than 
lo% pf the capital of another compally. The essential aspects of .. this 
obligatiQn were ~eviously ·contained in Article 47(5). 
The obligation has ·'been incorporated in a separate provision since 
it is important not only as a basis for the rules in Article 47 governing 
reciprocal shareholdingse It is rather the expression ·Of a desire which 
has developed inor~asinzly in the legal poliqy of all the Member States 
that· dominant relationships in 'a.n·undertakine should be clearly ~evea.led, 
In ·aimine towards this, the provision is also an important part of the · 
system by ·Which the Commission wishes to ·prosecute the stoclcrnarket' poliqy 
goal pUrsued in Ital:y through· registration. ·of~ This 'g<>a.l is to 
identify every shareholder who is· in a· posi-tion to exert influence in a. 
• I 
·public limited·compa.ny (cf •. the explanatory.-.notes to .A,rticle 50).· 
Article 82 forms an~t~e~· part. of this system, .a~ re&'ards shares quoted on 
a Stock Exchange. 
2. Pcra.graph 1 ext ends the duty to provide the required information .to~ 
every: .shareholder who direotly or indirectly holds ftlOre than lo% of the 
' • I I ', ' • ~ • ~ "" 
capital of an.s.E. The previous rules in Article 57(5) of the original 
proposal- in the context of reciproca.l.shareholdin~s- covered only 
companies. In addition, the period within which notice must be given of 
\ 11 
' ' )'' . 
the shareholding has been fixed at eight ~~s. This period commences 
when the person required to make notification is in a position to do so, 
i.e. as soon as he has acquired a holding or has'received knowledge of 
an acquisition attributable to him. 
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3. Paragraph 2 retains unchanged the rule previously contained in the 
first sentence of Article 47(5) under which an S,E. holding more than 
lo% of the capital of another company must give that company notice of 
the shareholding. Such a rule is necessary to enable the system laid. 
down in Article 47(2) for dismantling cross-holdings to function. 
4• Paragraph 3 provides for a system, in line with the above-mentioned 
goals, for disclosure of shareholdings notified to the S,E. in accord-
ance with paragraph 1. Previously, under Article 191~4) 1 such share-
holdings were pttblished only in the notes on the annual accounts of 
the S.E. However, this does not adequately provide the general public 
with a sufficiently clear picture of the various interests held. The 
new rules seek to achieve this by requiring the S.E. to give notice to 
the European Commercial Register of all shareholdings of more than lo% 
of its capital and of any relevant chance in such shareholdings. Any 
increase in a shareholding in the S.E. which causes it to pass steps 
of 15%, 2o%, 25%, etc. of the s.E.•s capital is regarded as of relevance 
to the general public. The same applies where a reduction in the shar~ 
holdings causes it to fall below one of these 5% steps. Thus, for 
example, notice must be given to the European Commercial Register of an 
increase which causes a shareholding of 29r~ of the capital to rise to 
31% or a reducti$n in a shareholding causing it to fall from 18% to 14%. 
Steps taken to publish notice given by an S.E. of its sharehold.ings 
in another company (para.e-raph 2) must be governed by the law to which 
the latter company is subject. 
~. Paragraph 4 contains the provisions previously contained in the 
third sentence of Article 47(5) guar~teeing· implemcntatio~·of the 
duty of notification, though with two alterations. 
The suspension of rights provided for now affects only those shar~­
holders of the S.E. who have failed to discharge their duty of notifica-
tion under paragraph 1. 
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If on the other handt. the Board of Management neglects to make 
tp.e notification that the··s.E. is- obliged to give und~r paragraph 2, 
suspension of 'the. right e attaching to ·the shareholdings in other 
companies affected thereby is not a suitable sanction, ·as the.S.E. is 
not immediately protected in this w~. 
Protection of the other company, for its part, is a matter for 
its local legislation. 
The Board of Management of the S~E. will however, also be ·oblt~ 
to discharge their duty of notification under paragraph 2 by the threat 
of criJnina.l proceedings that has-been provided (see explanatory notes, 
paragraph 6), ·lest ·the S.E. suffer harm due to their failure to act. 
' ' ' 
~uspension of rights now ~pplies in respect of the entire holding 
I . - , . . . . -· . - . 
in the S.E. subject to notifica.ti.on under paragraph 1, insofar as 
it may _not have been notified. 
" 
Under Article 47(5) 3. of t·he original version, h(:twever, .the. 
provision affected only that part ~f a holding which exceeded lo% of 
the S.E.'s capital. With a restriction of-this kind, the effective 
scope of this provision would have remained too'' circumscribed. 
6. To ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Article 46 ·a; 
the Annex t~ the Statute provides (in addition to the-.·sanctions under · 
civil law of paragraph 4) that Member States must penalise .a. :wilfu.l 
breach of Article 46 a by criminal proceedings or in some other w~•~-
Arti,cle 47 
1. The prohibition on reciprocal sharehold.ings in exoess of lo% 
between an s.E. and another com~ has been retained-.· Although approved, 
by the Europeo.n Parli-.a.inont it has· --been Tejected· by. the Economic and, 
Social Committee ~s being too wide ~n its scope. · • I' ' . 
',,;. 
'· 
595 
The Commission takes tho view that ~he usefulness of cross-
holdings as a means of· cooperation betlV'een .undertnkings, which the 
Economic and Social Committee has c~ted, cannot outweigh the dangers 
inherent in such holdings in excess ?f lo%1 of concealment of the 
proportions of capital held and distortion of the decisions of the 
General Meeting. 
2. Paragraph 1 determines the yardsticks for cross:...holdirigs for the 
purposes of the ensuing provisions. 
3. Paragraph 2 governs the dismantling of cross-holding in excess of 
lo%. An effort has been made to make these simpl~r and fairer than the 
previous rules in paragraph 3 of the. original proposal. In p~inciple, 
the company which .. first fulfils its obligation under nrticle 46 a may 
retain its sha.reholding. This means that the company \-thich first receives 
a notification un~er Article 46 a of tho existence of a shareholding 
must reduce 'its holding. 
Where both companies receive sucli notifico.tion simultaneously, each 
must reduce its holding t~ lo%. 
However, as previou~ly provided, the companies m~ still raaoh 
agreement on an alternative method of dismantling the cross-hold.ing. 
At the request of the Economic and Social Committee, the period 
within which the cro·ss-holding must be dismantled has been extended to 
eighteen months, in line with the period laid down in Article 46(4), to 
reduce the danger of outside shareholders suffering losses due to e fqll 
in share prices. 
4. 'Para,eraph 3 states that rights attaching to a holding that is to be 
dismantled will hold good as from the creation of the oblit;ation to 
transfer and not merely as from.its expiry, as ,.ras originally provided 
under paragraph 4. 
In this way the riSk inherent in a cross-holding of the decision-
making process of the General r.ieeting being distorted is mitigated 
actually before the period during which this holdine is to be dismantled 
expires. 
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5• In oontrast. :t;o paragraph 2 of the. original proposal, the rules on 
dis:nantling the reciprocal sh~eholdi~ n~· longer take account of the' 
extent of each holding. 
However, an exception must be made in cases of reciprocal s.hareholding 
where one company' holds the majority of' the shares of another company or 
the other company is controlled ·by the first oompa.ny. The rules· contained 
. -
in paragraphs 4 to 6 ineke this exception. 
' ' ,~, 
It appears unrealistic that the rules on- dismantling a cross;_holding · 
. ' ' { 
permanently deprive a oontrol.ltng company· of the chance of possessing a 
' - ~ -
majority shareholding and thus to exercise sole management as provided 
'I.Ulde~ th~ rules governing groups in Title VII even though· the: .-aznount of 
'the ;holding acquired wol:.ld~ in certain circumsta:ncos, ··enable ··economically ; 
juStified sole management to be exer~ised. '. 
6. l'lith thi~ in mind, the rules in para.e;Taph 4, whioh are in line ·_with 
those in Article 46(4) o.. and (5), apply where an s.E. has such a majority 
boldine. The rules in paragraph 4 have been expanded to avoid uncel'taurty 
of interpretation since a stipulat.i~t£:l that the rules in .Arlic~e 46(4). ~ 
and..(5) take precedence over those in Article 47(2) arid {3) would .result 
. . 
'in a technically complicated solution and~ in view of para.grapta5 and 61 
one dif"fiGU.lt to understfl.nd. 
7. In contrast to paragraph 4, :_paragraph 5 contains rules whicl:J, ~pply 
where another oompa.ny- i·e able to control the s.E.· In line with. the .rules 
in pa.J:lagraph 4, it is provided tha~ ;tp.e S.E. must- dispose .of ·all :L.t;:r .: 
shares in that pompa.ny. · In this- ·WZi\Y. the crQsa-h<;~ld.in.g_ is dismantled and 
the -Other _cOmpany retains the right tQ form a .group - in the same way 
that the s.E. does in· the case .. governed :by pa.raera.ph 4.. · ., 
8.. Paragraph 6 cont-ains rules which apply whe:t:-e, exceptionally, each of 
th;a two' oompames With cross··holding' co:b.trols the other or h6-lds a. majority 
' of th'e other's shares. 
; . 
' ·, 
~ch a. situ.ation<m~ perhaps arise where a company controlled b,y 
another company-merges with a third compaciy and thereb.y acquires a majority 
of the sh~es oi the ·. ;ontrolling . ~~pany. 'Both compani e~ must %'educe their 
shareholdings to lo% within the :Peri6d specified' in paragraph 4 of ei~hteen 
months from.the ·date.on~which the.dependant:rela.tio.nship comm~ces or the 
majority eliareho:tding is· acquired unless· they reach agreement on a., d=!-'ff-
erent procedure for reducing the croGs-holding• 
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'·Section 2 - Shares 
gticle 48 
In parc.graph 1 the .request of the E~omic and Social Committee that 
the nominal value of the ehe.res of on S.E. should be divisible by ten has 
been met. 
~icle 49 
1. Paragraph 3 makes it clear that no shares carrying restricted or extend-
ed voting rights other than the non·dvoting shares providGd for in pr.rn.graph 
2 are permitted. This applies not only to shares carrying multiple voting 
rights which were expreosly prohibited previously but, in particular• to 
shar~s carrying the right to nominate candidates for appointment to the 
Supervisory Board. 
2. Paragraph 5 regarding changGs in the relationships betl'Teen several 
classes of shares had been adapted to Articles 22(3) and 28 of the amended 
proposal for a Second Directive. Holders of a particular class of shares 
must be protected not only against alteration of the relationshi:p of one 
class to another, ?u~ also against any oth~r adverse effects. 
Article 5Q 
1. The rule under which the European company m~ issue shares either in 
bearer or in registered form has been approved by the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. 
The Commission is aware that this rule onuses difficulties in Italy 
pecause only registered shares are allowed there. HoHever, it believe's that 
it is possible to achieve the stockmarket policy goal of clear revelation of 
' . 
the controlling interests in a company, pursued in Italy by the share reg-· 
istration requirement·, by other means in the case of the s.E. The rules in 
Article 46 a and 02 of the new version lay down even more strictly than was 
the case in the original proposal that every shareholder ablo· to exert influ-
ence in an S.E. must be identified. These rules are· supplement~d by the 
reqUirement in Article 89(2) that a list must be kept ~f persons present at 
General Meetings and by the prohibition in Articles 88 and·38 a of the exer-
cise of voting riehts by secret proxy. 
The other goal pursued in Italy through registration of .ehares, tha~ of 
proper taxation of shareholders1 can likewise be achieved in other wuys (de-
duoticn at source, bordereau accounting) •. 
It is therefore unnecessary to require the shares of the S.E. to be reg-
istered, thus making it more difficult for them to be dealt with on the· sec-
urities ma.t'kets of most Memher States. 
2. Paragraph 2 requires an alphabetical register to be kept of the leeal holde~s 
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of registered shares, accessible to all persons. This appears to be a more 
practical way of listing such sharehclders than the keeping .:>f :J. slmre 
register, as previously pro,'idado 
1. 'Ihe rules in 1Ja.ragraphs2 and 6 cf the origi!lal proposal conce.r:r.L:lg 'the 
issue of provi.sional certificates :prior to the prepa.ce,t:'~on of sha.t·e· cer+ ·· 
ii'icates have been deleted since t:1ey cause unc..;l~a.inty o.nd because there 
c.ppea.rs to be no compe:.ling need for them in :pract:i..Gcc 
2J< Paragraph 4, which co:rrespond.s to pa.ra{~T<:>.ph 5 of the previo'.l.s vz~rsion, 
now contains all the rules which apply -t.o ca,~cellatinn of share c·.::rtifica·~eo 
by the court and t9 t}leir e~feyt as o.gainst tl.e S.Ji: ... , _so that the f'~mner 
r<"lfc:rence t:) national laT>J' is ·.:·ed1 nd.a.nt. 
The scope of the ·,re-v"i·ous ru.le has been cut down so t!ul.t it now go'lerns 
'JYlly tr1e effectiveness of a transfer of bearer shares as aga.in3"!:. ·r.he s.F • 
The law applicable to the relati-:mship be::tweon the transferor and the ·trans-
f--:lree uf.. the share is not 'thereb~· anticipa"ted. ·S';;..ch la'!l may~ as in Germany, 
lny clo•m that certain further requirements, su.ch as oonse.."'lsus on "!:he b.'B'lsfer, 
must b( met in addition to simple delivery of the share, for a.cqu.isi"tion to 
take effect as against the t.rnnsfero~ •. 
A.;-.ticle "'-::. . 
-.... .. m c~
l~t The amendmoiits to paragraph 1 a:r:-e the result of eae;nirr.8nt:J to A!'ti.cle 50(2) 
end 52. Thd reader is r€ferred to the explanetory notes to these Articles. · 
2. P;.;.ra.graph 4 has be'en redrafted so as to establi ::;h more clear::.y 'the r.i'g1-:.if-
icance of the prohibition on reg-:. steririg transfers sho!'tly 'before Gc.::1e:-r ... l 
. . 
Meetinr~£.. c.f a the ne"t-T ~1ersion of .Article 86(1) on -'.he coverine :.>f "tr~e General 
Ueeting, 
Section 'l. - De'bent'.ll'es --~~~---........... 
This Article has been reworded so as to take account cf the .new .Article tO a, 
rcga.rdin~ the 1.s~:rue Of p.rofit-shar:tng deben"tiures. 
A+, the request of the .&.'uropea.n Parliament t the details to be inoluded in 
the no·;;ice of a public issue of de-bentures have been expanded,. 
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The text of paragraph 2 has be en revised. 
1! Paragraph 1 now makes it clear .~6hat upon .a pt.tblic issue of debentures 
the J?oa.rd of Management ot the s.E. will as a general rule appoint the 
representative of the body of debent~e bolde:rs.:, 
2o · In pa.r~~aph 2 :i.t is made olea.r that surety iri reSJ}ect of t'he issue 
in que·stion mey be transferred by the company to the represent~-ttve of 
the body of debenture h.olders in his oape.oity as their· •'trustee'·'· ·In-
ad.ditiont the rights which may be exercised by the representative. of t]1e 
body of debentn.re holders at Gene:val Mee~ings h~ve been more precisely 
defined. 
· tastly, at. the request of the European P&"'liamen:t., deben·ture holders 
mey have acoe.ss to the :documen-ts to which sh~ohclders have access. 
1. In paragraph 1 the percentage of debenture holcters who mq: have 
a meeting of the boey convened has been increased from 5 to 10. This' . 
is tq n.void the risk of abtJ.se. of this right by de"benture :1olders uho, in 
g~ex:al, a.;re aclequ~taly protected by the ;ep;esentat_ive of the body. 
29 At .the ~eques"t ot; the European Pe.r,l~a.men-t, the qu.o~ laid do~ for 
a meeting to be v~lidly held ha.s bee~ .redu~ed. to fif~y pat'cent,. of ·the 
··hol:t~rs of oebentur~s isfm:ed ,'and o:ut~and.ing. fu:~ther, the original' teXt 
of p::,rag:;:aph 2. has been r·et~ined. in Ol'de~ to ... a.void misunderstazld:ir~gs 
reg~ding validity of the meeting. 
3. The text of paragraph 4 has been revised. 
The text of pa.ra.gra.ph 2 .h~s been re""i sed •. in its wording_. 
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1,. The I"lA.lee concerning questions connected rrlth t~w issue of convc::rt-
ib1e de'bvntures have now be<;}n r.onsolilated. 
2, P~·agr3.ph 1 maJws it clear .that the issue of converti"Jl·.3 debentures 
r0quires an altern.tion of the Statates6 T{:tis 1 in part~cular, enstU'os, to 
the benefit of su'!'>sequont holG.ers .of such oon-rertibls debentures, that 
t11e E..:.ropean Court. o~ Justice 1dll duly Dr.d. in accord1.1Ilce wit~ the rele-
\-ant p1•ovisions of Title IX examin9 whc:ther the forrr:al conditions for 
isE>'Ue have been satisfied and, espacic.lJ.y, whether suff:i.cient ap}::roved 
capital is :'l.vailable to cover ·t.he subsequent exchange of debenturer;., 
T~1e convertible debentures mey then be acq-uired on a legclJ.y ser;ure be.sis. 
The ame:op.ment is based on economic considerations similar to those 
u.."1dorlying the corre8ponding situation gove.rned by Article 42, \~here 
shares are issued comwquent upon the crea-~ion of appro·-1ed ca.pital. 
3• Pa.ragrar,U1 2 of the netv version limits the a:ncunt of a.p:1roved 
capital which mey be made a.'.raila"ole for the issue of convertible ;~ebent~~s 
andl!D!Ikml it independE.n:t of the a."".lount of app.~. ... ov-ed cap~tal created in 
p'.<rsua.nce of M·ticle 42 .. 
In both cases, the Commiss:i.oll still considers it neccssart that "'che 
cree.tion t•f approved capital sb01..:ld bo res·tr;Lctec .. in order to protec·~ · 
shareholders. However, the isr.uc of convertible debentur9S is gov~rned 
by diffe!'ent rules B..nd ser..res different purposes f::·om nn increase of 
capital effected in accord&1oe with the new ve~sion of Article 42, so 
that e. ccrmnon limit for both methods of financing dces not a;::pear justified. 
4& Para~sraph 3 of "the ne~r version correflpondf'l to pa.ragraph 2 of the 
previous version. At the request of the European l'at>liamont, the rules 
g-overning shnreholclors' J'J""i..bacription rights have been extended. an,i 
restriction of such :rights has been made subject to the guarantees 
contained in Article 43, 
· Pa.rae.,~a.ph 4 corresponds to paragraph 3 of the previous version, the 
WOrding of Hhi, oh has . been ~ re'V'i sed., 
Paragraph 5 lays dO\m the publication form~lities to be carried ·out 
·by the Board of kila.nagement i these ·correspond with those in Article 42 (5 )• 
Article 60 a 
~~- '1'_.. 
.. 
The Commission has complied with the ·request of the Economic a..~d 
Social cOmmittee that the s.E. should be able to issue profit-sharing 
debentures • 
. In ord:3r to protect sha.r·eholders, it a.ppea...~s appropriate. that i;he 
,; I ' , • 
·issue should be based on a resolution which meets the requirements for 
aitering the Sthtutes and that Shareholders should be accorded. sub-
scription rights, as is the oase where convertible debentures are 
issued. 
The isSue of· profit-sharing debentures is now parmi tted ·under Article 
qO a, so that it is clear that these do not fall Within·the prohibition 
in Article 61.o 
Thet;l':i appears to be no compelling need fer e.nY f'utther exemption 
' . 
from the prohibition in Article 6i~ 
. \ 
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T:t tle IV Governing bodies 
~........ ~~ ......... ;; 
The previsions rE:'.lgar~in_g "t;he govern:i.ng bodies of the S .E f) a.nd the 
distribution _ot ':their powers ~on~ the S.E. ~ s General Meet:.n,5~ duper--
v:t~ory Boa.:r.d a.nd Board of }1a.nagerJent have b~en _appr:)Yad in pr.·in.,;.:Lple 
both by thf; Eu:ropean Parliament and by the Economic and S.ocial Com:1i ttee. 
It was recognised, .:.n particular, that a division was desi:r~ble between 
the functions of the Sup~:"Visory Board and those of tha Bo~rd of H'.1.1.'1a ... 
g~went in ord~r t.o afford th~ S ~E. every opportuni t-.r of conduoting its, 
affairs effective~ and .at the same time ensure that these were ~ffi­
c~.ent::.y su·:Jervised,. The 'l:Jasic principL~s of title IV have therefor.t=:l 
b;_'en left ~mal tered. 
Substantial changes ha.Ye, however, been nude in the ·;:rovisicno in 
the second seotion of this t:itle r(:garding the composition cf the Su.per.;, 
v~'-sor.r Board,. 
The questior~ as to whether and how em})loyees should :pa:!'tic:;..pate in 7he 
' 
composi +.io:n of tl1.e Supervisory Board lay s, t t:1e cent:re o.t: · di 3·::us~d:ms 
on the· European Coml>a~y right fro:-:1 the o ta-rt. 
Since the CorlW.iSsion submitted its ·proposal in 19'{0 there has bean 
a certain conve:rgen-::e of a ttl tudes as ragards the ge;:;eral viewp::>int on 
. empJ.C>yee part:i.cipa.tion on the gove'!':1ing bodies of thei;:- coopany (i) •-
Evidence of tl1is r.tay be found not only in the deliberations of the 
European Parl i.amen ·b but also in th0se _of the EoonorJi·.;, a.nd Social Coo .. 
tlittee. llp:proval has i.n the mean t.i~:~e been U.."lauit:l!)USly given tl") tile 
p:rin,~iple of representation on th~ Super't•isorf l31J&rdEI of the p .E_, ;_ 
unanimous, tor, was thd demand for a unifot'mEuropean .solut~on bhat 
wouh~ not be forced to rely 1,1pon d::.fferent dcraestio ~.egi~lations· nor 
per~ t of di:v•~:rgen~ models. 
As regarda its composition in detail, there ~as agreement in 
European Parliamcmt t!1at the Supervisory Board shculr? comprisE. an equa). 
nunber of sh'='l.rehvl1er~' and ewpJ.oyees' representaJ:.ives wh-o will in tu::"Z·i 
jointly co-opt independan·li persons representing general inte'!'ests o 
(1) Tb9 Commission enters into detail in its docuoent on Employee 
P!3.rticipation and Company Structure in the -european Communities. 
I' 
1. ' I. 
· Views differed on this point. i.n the _ Eoonomio and Social Committee, so 
". . , ' .... 
. . . 
The Commimsicn.'s revised proposal is baaed on'· th~ Opi:njon 'of the European 
Parliament. fllhe Coimro.scion :feels that equal' weighting. of sharehold9r.',e..nd. 
employe~ l~preo~ntation on the SuperViso~J Board c~~not but contribute towards 
' ·, ,· I 
the oreation wi"'.;irl.n the s.E •. of a new relationship ·oetween t!:e, S·~E .• and its 
employee's. Employees are given the op:portunity .of autive /participation in an 
undert~..ing of a t:n>a new in Europe not only in · tr~.a:t they rua.y sa:fegua.1"d their 
rights an"- status but also in that they contribute toward~ shaping a oorpora:~a 
policy dvly eva.lua·~ed to take the interests of all parties concerned into 
acocunt. 
The provisions requested by the Ew~opea.n Parliament ensure that deadlock 
· in the deoision-.zn'lkin.g process within the S.E. is a.voided. The Commission- further 
. ~~rds. the fact that interests 1'.ridar th~1 those. of the sha.l"eholders ·and. 
: employaes d.ireotly affected are represented on the Supervisory Board of 
. a !.\\ro'pc:m' u.."ldert~~ under these provis:i.ons as a positive element. 
The compreh.ensi ve provisions sought by th.a European Parliament rega.ro.ing 
the oo:npoai tion of the SupeMtisory Board .in fact, in logical sequence, 
f:t t better among those of 'l'i tle IV a.nd not in Article 1371 which forma 
parrt of Title V regat·ding employee representa·tio~'l; M. thin the S.E. They . 
h.avo there~ore be~n included- atrD!lg the provis.ions of section two ot T.i tle . IV 
_Without· this. sipif;vtng arry ·mterial oha.ng(3• The new provisions of Articles 74 a, 
75 a and 75 b serve this purpose. 
In line with the tenor of the European Parliament's Opinlont :the·~ l5~e oondi-
; - ·- ~ :·~ •. ·. ,. ·-.. '. '~: ::· · · ... :' -·~-~ ·. · granted to members of the Supervisory Board in the -t~onb ha•e also ~een . . 
regtlla.tions concerning the term of' cffice and premature expiry thereof. 
In 'this c'ob."leotion. reference ·should be made to Attioles 74 c and d, and. ti1e·. 
oorraaponding e:icpl8.na.tcry notes. With further regard to this Opinion, a 
. pro .. :isioi'l tor removal from o~fice by court order has been introduced, to 
~~ply to all members (Artiqles 74e). 
'~:he other ch:el.ngee to tho provisions of Ti 'cle rJ ·are more technic<..1.l in 
na.·t.ure~ :O~r ro-gra1.1.ping a nu.mber of provisions, the f.!.n:t sectlonv en ';h'9_ 
Boa'!"-1. oZ ~-'hna&.,renent, was -irts.d·~· ·more succinot; t:he info!'Il.ation ·to be passed 
on by thi~ ':9oa.rd 'to t~u S:1per.Tis6ry Boa:rd is nc'w t,"Cverned: coll!:):rehensively 
by the ne\~. Arti..~le 7 ~ a. 
At the r~q,iesi of ·tt .. J European ParJ it~I,r:mt, the· ~i.nfltancos :i.n l'Ihich t!.e 
co~1rt may in ~ervene ur::lo~~ Al·ti<,le 99 hu.ve been e:rpa.ndef. in oection five, ;-~hich 
desls w~th special controln. 
'~''ho p.c.;ovisi~r.s. 'Jf -Title rJ' itl gtne~:l-1 n3.Ve been adapted in c;.c:Jor-i~.rJ.ce 
~·i th th-..: l\lropo3-'l Parliam-e:1t 's wi ~hes to tr.-:J Com.nissicm.' s pro?03a.l fo-:.• a 
fifth Dir-.-Ntive· of 9.lO~lJT2(l) l'ngJ.rding t.he st~c-;ilre ~f li:t!lted comp:Jl:ics4 
!].'his pa:..~-ci .. culP,rl;y- concern:~ the lic.bi.lity of l'JlE'l!:'lbers. ci.: tnt1 no.1.:rd of Ivls.r.Lf.l{;ement 
and. Sup .... .rvieo1;r .Bo.s.rd a.rvl _the exercise of \"0ti:ng right.s ir.. tl:a G#ne.:ral ~lieeti:..g. 
(l) Official Journal c 131/4) of 13 .. 1~,.1972 issued ':nth explan3.tory notes 
a.s s~:z.:ppl·:.rr:.ent :. 10/72 t.o the "3u.Uetin of the r~uropean C-:J~.w..i tie:J .. 
I 
I· 
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Seotio:n one 
I 
~~.L?_§l .. 
1. Pa.ragra.pll l reg~;Ln.g the ~ppoint~~nt .. ot memb~;ru·· of. t4e Boa.rd of ~gement 
has be~n e~tenQ.ed to includ~ e. ·Cl~~f:i.oatory oom~ent· (of .A:rtol3~ •. · 
2e '!'be new paragrnph 2 specifies tha.t members of the B:oard .of Management. muS't 
be appointed fpr a. restricted periQ~• T~s see~s n.eoossary>to th~ Commission 
in order to give the Supervisory .»oard a meai?.s of: ~newi:ng -':t.h~ Board of .. 
. . ~ . ., . "· . ' . . 
Management in all oiroumste,noes in the cornpa.r~• .a tnteresta, td. thout ;r:esort 
to the Pl"Ooeaa. of dismiafJ!?..l under pal~agraph 1 t wht.ch could be p19rsona.lly 
distasteful to ·the pa.rlies ·a."ld. possibly c~stlY. fo~ the~ comp~..y~' 
~ .,~ . . ' 
· Tha_,_period· cf. appointraent can be fi~ed in a fl~JrJ.bl~ manner within the 
presc;,rfbed ma:dm~. period of six yea.ps. · 
3.~ The requirements as· t<:> the nati6na.l:J.·~y cf members of tlte Board o:t Man%-ement 
pravioualy conta.inod in paragraph :: 3 have be·en deleted. 
Kcile the Eu.ropean Parliamen·c ha.d :tlO'fJ in fa.ct qU.t3stio.ned this provision, 
ita Logo.l Iffairs Committee having expressly rejected a proposed amen1m.ent, 
t:t.us Econo~c a-r1d Socis.l C·jmmi ttee nevertheless r3.ised objections which 
the {jom~dssion faels are justified. • 
. The provision rLtns counter to the possibility e~isting ~~er the Statute 
-for eharea :i.n an S ~Eo to be hel~ by non-community ·aharehcld~:rs. The 
work. force 'of the S.,E. may originate as well- from u6n-Member 
co1mtcl.es. The prov-'"ision. is therefore a. dead letter without real effect 
on tha at:J"l.loture of the EuJ.--opea.n Company, a.vd. merely gives the u.nj".lstified 
impression of a restrictive or disoriminatoz~ posture. 
,:,r, . 
I 
I 
·I 
; 
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4., Pa:-az:-~ph·· 4 Mt~'.::rding th:) ciroUi.llst3llc~s in which the office of member 
of the :e.:,a ·"r1 .. )f Ma.i;..~r:eoe:1t may not .. ta ~J.erci.~ed has been I\"?:li·af'tcd. Particular 
:~Gc.·::·;.::1 ~ tJa.a tcdcen c! discu.ed.ons within· the E~;,)ncmi., and· ~ooial. Con:m'i ttee • 
'l'ha fire f. g~'Ourld fvl' d.Ls<;:ualification cc.vers every kind of incs.,eci ty of legal 
. ' 
'JI'ii':in affecting the Board member ovrJcerned. The lack of legal capal}i ty 
!',.~fe::-red to preViously ic in3J,Jtied in this co,tegory. 
;i.lhe sc-:.:onJ. cate50l"Y 'CovA-rs d.isqualifica·!;ion by t":.e cou;:-·~. tf.>w.·t is 
required is a. deoisiml of thf::l O),lrt, irrespoctiv"=l vrhet1ar the proceedi;,gs 
/ . 
were c:.v:n, crimir...al or :procedural in m·ture and. brought within or beyvnd the 
Ccll!!liUni ty., as a result of w!lioh, U::lder the l9.w of a. Member St;a.te, the person 
o:ff,,ctc:i tb.e!'eby is tenpororily or parmanent1.y prevented tram holdi:1g office 
,"J.•; ;:;y.:;!1ber of "tl.;a Boa.rd of Iiis.m:.gemP.nt or in ::;,i.e~ similar capacity, T:w instancec 
of l1CW:cru~:ty and criminsl con'triotion referred to previously e.re· iucluded 
in this cat.:g:n-y:!> 
),. In pa.r·.:.sra~:h 6 the pro\·1.sion rega...rding Yesponsibili ty for persor.al r.J$-ttars 
ha-3 b0en de::..eted and has boen transferred in a:11<.:nded form to Article 64 (2), 
to the e:xpla.-:.a.iior:r note to which ref <:l:re:nce n:::;.y be me.e.e o 
' . 
6., Pa.c~.gr..;:)b l r.E'.s been re\~·.:rda'l an:l hao ~ s.:: elu,_-;ids.t.:>ry aent.ence a.U.ckd .. Tho 
inte~tion set o·.c.t in. paragraph 3 of the cxp.:.a.na:tory nJtes tc;:> the first. draft 
of e;iving U.-afinitiYe eff-.'Ot 'to disrrdasa.l in all circumsta.nccs receh'Bd irwrlequa;.J;r 
expressiou in tho earlier text. 
1 .. li'or the E"ake of great9r clar:i.ty paragraph 2 now de:--.la compreh(:m~ively \'fi th 
7ha diatrfhution of res::>Onsib!litiea within ·the :Bu&ri o! i>l.1.nageme:.1t. 
Rospon~ibi~;ies were previouoly d..tlalt with in Art:i.dos 63 (6)2 fl.nd. 64 (2l. 
TJ:.Lo f'mctieo:1ing of the lbard, ea.rli~r also covE>re1 by AI'tiole 64 ( 2), is now 
daa: t with sepa.:ra:tely in paragraph 3<~ 
According -::.o Article 63 .( 6) 2o of the ,ori.gina.t propcaal a roombe;r- of til!? 
Board cf JYia.nagoment W<.:J.s to be entrusteti with rerpotm'lll matter13. This pr{)'?"ieton 
he.s been a:.~ended t'J e:;::.tel' for tl'le fac'!i that, in holdir..g co:npruties in p::1rticularc 
Board dutlas are f~quen~ly delegated not on ~~partmantal but on divisional 
1 • 
. -l.nes,.. 
-, 
Each member ,Jf the ·Board of l~k.,_~ga~1nt a.ooordi::;.gly becc;nl!as l"~3ponsfble fol" 
all. m9.tte·ts rela:tL"lg· to a. specific·· group 11nderta.king o~r for· .. ~11 mat~e~·s 
within a. d.~vision. of a.n u::~riaJ.~t:;Ud.ng, An .arrr.~ugement of this kir,~.d sho·~ld. 
I ' '; •; ,• 
not be ~;:led .out 'thro~ .any statu~ory p~vision f.or compet~nqe . in person.r;el 
matters. 
Determina.t:l,on of respon£#ibili ti~s in pE:r·scnnel nn ... tters remain~ as .before t a· 
ma.tt~3r to:r the' S-u.pezyi.scry Bo.:u."'<i. This wilt enE:iure t!la.~ 'the solutions found 
\'li~l be tho~o doing just.. ice to a.ll. iil'!;~:n:·eatn •. 
'llhe .only statutory I'€;quiremeut is that uompotance in perso9el matte~s sho:1ld 
·be clearly defined. :within -~he :Boa..~."-"d of .lv.Iar .. a(~amettt• ; 
3,; Pa.ra,graph 3 eont.ains a redrafting of the· pre~Tit>:~.~~,.provisioll for the :!.rl·ti;;I"na.l 
fu.."let.toning of. the Bocird. of. Mann .. ~eutant, · a.t: it stood in par-?..graph 2 ( 2 )' of 
the original proposals, as des:!.red by the E'l.tropean Pa.rl.iam9·:'2~ ~ 
lo Repre~entation of the corr(p?~~ in dealings with :third. pe.rtief?, f::.;:~nel;'ly . 
governed· by Al'ticles 65 and 67 t iB r1ow d.aal t l'Ji.thJ..u011:9l"~henai:'>;ely 1~. Arlicle 
. • • '*• • 
. 6)~ ~ t'- d:t:.G rsgtt:~··;).-ftoi tnS: ·.~!J.C?T4 proViSiOnS Oll. publicity Of .~,;rticle 9 a~ .. 
2. T'!le pr1,::wiple of :lndi~iS.al. ~preaent<l,tion.laid clown in ~a~~,.g'!~S:Ph l ~·itl.S 
apprG\l",~d by the Econom.i.o and Social C':'mrU.ttee ~':ld. "'ias. r .. o·t qu;.~otioned ~n 
. . ' . . . ~ ' .... 
debate ln the European Pal'lia.m-ento Industr.ia.l represvnta.tic;ll n:~ces fQr 
clf-;~.r-eut relationships in :fortr.::~l transa.ctiotlS :a.r;.d is therefore l:'et·ained 
lmC himge do 
~ ;) P;ai"a.graph . 2 hafJ. bt~an .~ritici.sad r 'both by·. t.h~ Europt1~l). Pe.rlia.m;:;;nt 1.s Le~l 
" Affairs Co!ll.lni,ttee o.rv:i by the Eoonomio and Sooi.al Committee, particularly 
~.'r~x· its 'uoe of 'the concept of •"Sr~nts Wi.th powet· of proourr-tJiiic:na t l-ill:ich -~~ 
has 'l\O standard meru:.ing wi thl;rl the · Comnr~:L-~;y. 
' 
Tlte rlEHJJ ~rding takes ac'cou..~t Of discussions hold 'by ·both b.Odies • 
. ·'~,;· 
\. 
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4.. H i:J : ·ytEmdeC:. i.ha t; th.e 3..:.:;-..rd. of' k'.a~ment re"!io.ir." th~ ospz.city, pravim.tely 
p;.•ovi:~.nd 9 l.:) del~r.:-" •;a s;ecif~·i.c r:u.ties a:nd pv-we:r.s to persona having ito. 
oor.fid-:-n0e,. who Will act en. it.c~ reHponsib:Uity .. ·I:h.;;.re is no need to ~lee 
cpecia.l p::.'"<>vis:!.on for -~he delego.Uon of powers wt thin the ~ompany. 
Ur.C.cr Art:!.ole: 62 7 there is r.:.o 1.'00tr(;-<5ti~R 15'.r. t~'l(!; .J.;ca.r...ie· ~ 'f.'imtrti.ons of!' the 
Joard of M.1na.gement~ For this :i."ea.son, too, the!':_; i~ no call within the 
scope cf tha St~.tute :for the introduction of ·~:t:.a Corup:my S9c!'eto.ry~ 
whose s.ppointment is gove!7.!9d b.j" lati in Gr.:at Bri t<di.1 a.~ld Ir.ela.nrl., There 
:b-1, hCIW$ver, Ctn·ta.lxU.y no ba: to the Board cf rhna.gerecnt delegating apeoific 
d::::tiea to persons aoti:r.g on its reopcnsibil.ity. This al~o v.pr>lies to tho 
duU:·.c performtcl by ootnpa.."lJ secretaries in .:::•mf.:l:rics in :Br:t tn.!.n a.'rl.i 
I.rola.ndo 
l'l1;.ere persons entrusted by the :Board of ~.a.nagem;;ut wi tb tb.e p(:lrf'orm.ance 
o: sp~n!.fic tasks n.bAll · ~! ·.~:!"~C ~ reJ;resent tile com1.)~'1Y gez1erally :md 
m:reut:rict,:;~dly in dealings with tll~rd parties, hc·:.:cvsr, theN is a case for th.ei;r 
pc··~rc of representiation, to be r.:;.eula.te.d Ul'ltle"C' the Statute .. Such pow~ra 
-::~P . .::~rzoed lli'1Jer ~l:.e c:rdiun.ry law are insufficient for this }-:!!'pose, R.u the:i.r 
oont0::ri; wc't< . .i ha ;re in general t) be verified l'rcm one ca.t:Je to +.he ne.J~ .. 
Gem..}ra! rep:r::'l'!aeutatives of this ki.n~ cann0t -~herefCi.'•:) enjoy the confi.dence 
i:u t:.,l:lii' powers in the nc•I'flm.l C·-:>urse of busin9<:!3 t.tat is due uneter .\r-l;icle 
65 (2) to persons having ganer.al powers of rerresantation without li~tation 
'l'he a.pp~,)intr.tcnt of perscns wi. tb £·:meral representa.ti.ve pollt!ers. itt ~ependa.•Tt 
upon t.te com>ent of the S'4p~lrviSOJ!7' !;.Card, a.s was thf.t ease in '!ihe ot'igi.nd pro-
?~:t~ The Board of. .YU>-"Ul.gEnoont m~ Nv~ke the ar.pointmont at auy +.il!l!3 
wi tl:ou t :::-t: gard to tha contract of rsernoe tha~ s-r.oh persans may h3.\pe with 
t'!:l.e s .. .r. 
~e cffecta of the appointment and revoc:1.tion vis~vis H:..:trd parttas are 
dt'ls.J. t with in pa.rc.g:'a.p~.:. 5 .. 
'·I 
.-
·5o Para.gra;.m 3 contains the provisi.on previously m::lda in Article 67 rege.rrling 
acts of the Board of ManageDl',~llt falling outside the com::>&..."lY' s objeo ts" 
The ·last senienoe of Article 67 ha.s,- ho.w•3"Jer,· been dale.·ts!d as s(~ .. p'diflv.hn$ 
· {cf. Article 65 (1~) supra). ·Tha r~le ::.-1ow app1ien to repreeen'tativea wlth 
genaral po\ters. In accordance 1\'i.th. tlie aims of the provisions of paz-agrc. .. ph 21 
- tht; effects ·or the ·representative t:owers o'! such pers0.aa vis-A-Vis 
thi;U partie$ will ·De £\imila.r in· every respect to those of lnf;;mbers of 
the. Board of ~l...l'le.gemen:t • 
:.::-
\ 1 
7., T!19 firs 1: senten.•)C ~r pc:a..ragra.ph 5 of th<d new ver~dcn replaces pa.ragraph 4 ...,_ 
-:;.t ·!;h,e ·: 1 rl • ..:i th a. r::1f\~7-exwe tc t~e geno:rsl rules of Article 9 a. rogard.ir..g 
:;>ara.graph 5 .. 
Art.S.cle 66 
-· ....,........,.,.... 
1. ':ll:e act::: enumerated in Article 66 (1) contin~lc to be: ;TJtject to approv-.11 by 
·t!le S•.rpcrv1t.;)T'.J Board, td t;1 ·j;;.,e agreem~mt of tha Euro!)ea.n Pe.rli.::utant and, 
in esssnee, -~ha.t of the rcc.r,)rr:io and Social Co!mtittee. 
In ~mb-t,par~~a9h ~.. th~ conc''.!:?t of the "etrta'Jlishmont!1 a.s a techlJi.o11.l 
imrti.~utit::~n 11.a.St at the rec:'.l.esi; of the ~~~:l!'Opaan Pa.rliame~~' been uaed 
· i~ste~d of th:~ lass ooncr:e-':.e term ·~undar"licldr.g" • 
Sub-pa.r"-t',l"'apn :!?.• will in f\ttll.I'e Ul"Jni staka.bly i!l,;:.ltJ..ie modifica:t::l.ona in -the 
f.urictiont~ of the U:.nderta.king. 
Prov5.e!.ons for ~l SoE. tha.t ccntr-...>ls a grcup i.lav·e been E..dded to the for:ner 
pa.re.e;ro.ph 1. .. Decisions of tha S.,Eo 's Boaro of V.!ane.ger..eut in their ~Japa.ci ty 
a.~ n,r .. ne.g~,:I;o:::~t cf th<> grvup will acC'ordir..gly ~"equire Snpe:t"'Tisor;r :3-J·?..rd 
_,.. em: :~en~ ir~ tZ.:e c2.ser.: set out in Ar·ticle 66 whcl'e tLey af'fectt a &a pendent 
group ~r.:.der~ald.r4.s. 'I'his is an im:;?licit consequence cf m~n.aging ·the group 
as an eco~Jmio urJ. ~o Stip:.1.la·::ion of a d,.1ty of consent l:f illiteU: to th.:.' 
:::r;ha::.~ of the S.E. w·ould lia.rdl,:;r btl expec.ient if the s~ ~£~ is forwed as a 
holdi;1g compan~~., T'ne additior. Ill<'lk:es for clearer interpreta.t:ion in this 
'. 
2~ Parae;'ra.:ph ;;;: has been added at the NC{'.:.ellt of th• ia.r<J;-..:m Pa.rlia..'!lant i11 or!er 
to E.et up c:."i terla. for determin'ir.-.-5 the caoos referred to in the first 
paragraph an1~ in po.rtiouJ~Jr9 for .j.nte;;:preting the TJ.r .. lt'l..~lt.fied t~rmr: 
. I 
"appreciable'l'< £md. "s-~.tbsta:n:~;ial'' u.eed in the text .. 
}., Pa.ra~p~ 3 co:rr'3spond.E wt th the fi·rst sen"teucF.l of t1'l'.J p1:-0vious par;.•g~ph 2 .. 
In order to a.vcid ar<Jf mimmd,}rsta~ding it ha.3 1>•Jen ·ma.d.a cL•a.:." "tf'..at 
paragraph l does not liet exhaustively the ste.tutorily p.:."'escribed inota:1cea 
Whet".~ cons-ant is zo~q;;.iredo Supervisory Boa!\"! a.pp.t'Oval l.s also mandatol'ily 
prescrL1ad. j_n Clther ~arts cf the St:t.tute (e.g. upon th~ forna'tior. of a joint 
subsid.la.ry- Art·.)6 (3)b~); utilisation of .e.prrov't'l.<l oa.p~.tal (A:rt.43);.iss-.J.a 
cf convert~ble debentu1~~ (Art.60); confirmation of thg Jtanu~l Ac~o-~ts 
(Art~ 213); and transfcrvation and merger (Arts. 264 (1) and 270 (2)). 
_r, 
.• 
;· "'. 
i.· 
I. 
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4o Pa.rctg'.;.'aph 4 cor~usponda . td th the sec:)nd eentell;;je of t-:~e pravious pa.z·;.7.:g!'3.Itl 2<$. 
Tb~ pro..;i~i:,ns· re-late tc· pa~ph 1. a:rtd 3 ~·.have -~Leref~re· been giv~n 
;: sepe-ratn · ·sta·~uso Th:a p:.l.ro.graph haa been adapted to- Al'ticles 12(3) a.ni 10(4) 
of the proposal for a fif·th Di:r~ctiv0Q 
·5· Pa.:ragraph 5 includes $..:'1 expla..ootory com,1]lent~ at the J.--equest of the E:41.ropean 
P~rli~..mente. The~ is :r.o need ill ·this i.nstanoe for an c.Yaot description of' 
the poHera _c(,~.np.er·ned.~> 
Arttole ; §.1 
The provisions of Article 67 have' bee~- at~FUt-ned i.nto Article 65 (3). 
lo The contont of paragraph 1 oor~spon~a to: tha.t ot Ar~iole 21l: and the forme:t~ 
can therefore be d.eleted~ 
2~ The Board of ~.[ana.gemantG! duty of inforo:t.ng the Sup~rviso~y Board has_ ~en 
· deelt with oomprebei:1r~ively j_n the new A-~tiole. 73 .:\o The _earlier' provisions 
of Al"ticl.es 68 (2) -~nd ( 3) and 73 (1) led tc overlap:fd.ng., 
!!ll£!! 69 
l. The Ec9n9m.i..o and ~aoial Commi tteo_ ;recom7nenQ.a(l .. that the e~baxtgo~s on taking 
np .credit contained i~ pa.ra,r;ra.ph.l be. split up. 1:.he·,~U"'PPE:H~l Parl:!.-e~entps 
I - • 'o ~ I ' • ' ~ ' { • ~ • • • • : • 
L·agal. Affairs Cc~ni.-ttee, hoi-teverj ~xp.res~ly. ~UP?Orted. r"~3~eu:ticn of 1~h~ Comm..ts·e~.t.\~.'~ 
•. •· •. • • . •' J .. • ' • 
v~rsion and thi.s. ,ro.s .a.ocepted by the ~l.er.lW?o· The Com:nicaio:n con!Sequ,e:n.:t1~:r- ma,de 
no al tet:'l.tig.ns in this l"nt;tpeot., 
; .. , I 
2o Para.g:J.~a.ph 4t r(;;gard.ing ~SZ"ae~nts affecting ~he interests of members of tha 
Board t.;f Mculag'em~utt h~s been £:1,~api:ed: to the pl"oposa~ fer_ E.\ f:i.fth Directive .• 
ArtiolaJQ 
The Zcononrl.'~ and Social Committee c~nside1~d .that it was up to 1ba Board of 
~~c~"l.agement ·~o pr:Jmote the oomp~-ny'.s wel.l-~bei~, inoJ.~d!.rtg that of its employeE!! a~ 
t:r: .tp.e gane:-al i,ntarest.t After ·c·a.retul: ·disouea:1.o':..'l ·in· the' ·La·~ Aff.@.'irs C0mmi tte;;, 
tha f\u~:·or·ea...."l Pari.if'..rilent-, howe-ver,· approved; ih&' Commiueion version. T}1Grciforc 
thi~ point was .r.~.ot oha.ng3d.·. · 
The p::-1~noipl:e tha-t. the ·company's ·aot-i"iit.ins ~ be p:iraued o1ily ·within the,·· 
linrl.i:s of, th$. con~ti tutiona.l law o:r the Me1uber. st~l.tea i!.nd 'of .. tho:· Comnrmi ty' 
Traaties doee not t i:-1 the Comndssio1;1' s view,· r.equ.i.re ·pa.rtio\tlar n1antibn • 
• t' ~ . 
l ·I 
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fo:- ne~be:rs of the Board of J.VT..a.nage.mBnt h:::.1te bee:n. 
. ' 
Social Ccir."::i r.tecc Thsy ha7e ther-efom been retn.i,.i.ed. out have been C:.u.ly adapted, 
at th"3 requ.efri. ot the ~uropean Pa.:rl.iamont, to the proposal for a f."if'th 
DirectL·e (ArticJes 14 - 20 '::f tnn Proposal~ 
Arti.!la 71 no;{ deals 6.:ly with the prer'or..ditions fo:' lia':1ili.ty ar:.i Article 7~, 
in. conju...'lc:U•J::l, .-d. th the brL:.,;;ing of liability procee..ii:=.ga., 
2d. F;J.r<:.g.ro.?h l, regardi~ the cri 1ieria on which J iabilHy is taaad, :i.s no lo1~1ar 
a.ligne:-:d on "·r-~rongful acH:" of & . .::A.ro of Management m<:::mber:3 i 9in the course of their 
~.m.~n:t!:rtr.!!itlon". 'i'he in4 • .:mticn ie 7 rather, to encomp~ss th9 w~1ole range of 
c~:ligat:i.one th!J.·:; Boar'<!. me::1bei'S r:.ust diachart;<:. in th3 co.urne of their dt~ties. 
'I'b.e cc~oep~ .:~ 1.>:;.--eac.!\ of tluty seems to seJt'Ve edequatoly as a gan-ara.l cl'i te:f'io11 
en whioh Ilo.bil:t ty may be based within the SC(Jpe of the St.:>.tute :for tl>e S.E. I"t 
is giWJil ful~ther ~b::.pe by t:i:l-9. prc•vtsio:l1s of t}1e s.m. t U.~ld of Art.~.cle j;) 
in pa.!"ticula~, the . t:Jtatutes of the s.E. a."ld the contract of serv:i.c:e for 
meml:3rt·! of '!:he .Eo.ar\i of Msr;.age::ne!}-t. 
P>-o:'~:L·<l:-cl t·:~ o't.st£·:;:-va t:.e provisions of the Statu·te <.•r the s-ta·~t~+.es of t!1e SoE., 
already alluded ·t;o pru~r:t::m.sly, appeer, in tr.J.s l.ie;J:rt., as parliic:Pllarly promirvmt 
cases of bl:")a.C:ih ">I' oblie;ations, 
3. 'l''h12 firat p,.;.ntenoc of paragraph 2 governs J~he ways in vilii.cil. mam~::rs of the Boa:M. 
of ~P.f_-ement nay. b~ hald liab:t.<J:. Th.e sec0nd sentence contains the provisions 
f·.:>rm..;rly. fmm:::l iJ1 pai. .. agra.ph 2 as to procf of :i.nnoce:noe in ihe cb-:;ance of 
f'&.u~,t cr negl!g.:;T.ce. J.t !;he roqut2oat of th~ }.;urope'lll Parlirunea.t it was rna::la 
clda!' that c....v me•n1,'3r of the :Bo.ard of J.Za.na.~m.en-5 r;,ay Nlieve t.5.roself o£ M.s 
indivic.ual linb.l.Uty (cf. a.lso, Article 1.:;.(2) of t!~t: proposal for e. fi~th 
Iliracti ve). 
4-ct.,Para.g:reph 3 has bee:.1 ~da.pted to A:t·ticle 14(4) of the propc~al for a fift~ 
Directive, 
5· 'I'.he new -paragraph 4 m•br:.ta:ntia.lly :!.nc.::rporates krt,l..cle 14(5) of the propor:ed 
Direc·Uvt.;;., 
6. The furme~ par~graph 4 becomes paragraph 5 without changeu 
1. The former ps.N<4ra:?h 5 has bee:n taken in a.c A.c·ticle 72(5) as it concerns 
actions in rn:peot of lia.bili ty a..l'ld therefore ha.s its lo.g:!.ca.l place there. 
,. 
' 
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···. ;.Artiole 1:i. 
'·~.ft..; 
lo Para.t;r~ph 1 now deals c:n.ly ni. th the de()ision ll>rhet::~er proceedings should .bG 
brought iri rer.;pect of liability~ It oontcun;s .:Vha fi:;:-st aantenca of the 
pre\~OU.S paragraph 1 and a. prc.vicion' on the major:t ty reqUired. in th~:. Gen·aral 
M:oating for auoh a Mso1L.ltion, whl.ch subutB.nt;allJ:· coz·respor...ds with Ar .. t~i.::le 
. . 
15 '(2) of the propoGal fer a fifth Directive~. and contains a lim1. tatisn o:::· 
A:rtinle 91(2)" of thP. ·Sta.tute. 
2., Pa.z·aeraph 2 df~a.ls in reclrafted ·fo:'m with tha ptpseou"t~,pn of an a<'..rtion re.sol ved 
by the Supervlaory Board or General Meeting, fol".:JDrly gove1--ne1 by the second 
·u1d thir:l sentences of pa.rag:r·aph lA> 
)e P~ragraph ·3 retu.ns· 'U.£1.cha11ged the provisicna of the previc.u;a paragra.ph 2 
regr~rd.ing tb& ina t.i tu ..t~on uf li~bili tY: p~c,~edings. by t"{ha.~holders. :Th~;;a. 
P:f-<JVisions have been a.ppl'~)Ved by tb.e bu.l"opea,~] Parliament. They correspond 
to A:.-tiele 16 o£· the :prcposal for a _fif·~h D,;.rective* 
4o Para.gi;oapll 4 regarding liability proceed.in[;s brought by -creditors is subst~"ltL~:u.;; 
e<fdi\i?:lent to Ar·tiole 19 of the proposal for a. fifth. Direo·tiVI9o· 
5., P~~o.ph 5· oor?:·~~pollds with A:rtiol~. 71 (5)Q 
6., Pa.ra.gra.ph 6 ie .a revised ve·rsion of the former· para:ira,h 3• , 
1" Tb.H earlier par::~.g:re.ph 7 is deleted; j.t e:r:oroS.ehcs u.pon ·the !'!rocedu.ra.l la'H' of 
Mevi'~~r St~.:aes, whieh· ca~ lead to u.n;;leoessa.J.-.:.1 oc:mplit)ations. 
v1hile A1;"tiolee 71 and. 72 deal with conp~·nsation ola.ims bro1ight on ~eha.lf of. 
i.h~l ·.company 1 · the nel'l !~rticle "{2 a. g'C>VBJ!'T.lS tk:a injUI"'J that. can be done to 
aha~hoidr;ro ar...d ·chix--d. parties_ as ·a· 'direct result of a bre~ch of obli.ga.tlons 
·by t!:a Boar~"l of l~~me::::rt iu the' course o_f admi:-dstel"':i.ng the oompa.n;.r-. 
TLia provisiori cvrre.::(ponds wi ·fth Art.icle· 20 of the proposal for it :t~i fi;b 
Directive. 
:-. 
..·, 
, ·'~ 
'\ 
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Section two - Superyiso;r Pgard 
Article 7) r 
1. ~-re ·:baa·, '9-~h the agree~t. o~ thtt ~pe- Parliame!Jt anQ. the ~omi·c..:and 
J., 
Social COIIIDli, ttee, been little substantial o~ ~- ~he po-..ers Qf the : 
'o o I '.Jo o 
Supe,rvi,sor.y Board. 
:· .. ~.. . . .: ... ' . . . 
.. , Tbe Board of ~ment' a duty to prorida 1nfol'll&t1on and the correaporlding 
rigtJ.t~ at. the Superviso:ry .Board haft lfeen taken ou-t· ot til& or1gi.Ml' verilioit 
of Az:t;io~e. 73 (_1). As a ~impl~fi.~tion me~, tJ;aey have- been :l.ncorpoJ~&ted 
into the new Article 73 • together with the pravisiona of Articlea·68 -and 78. 
' ' . . ' ~ 
' 
2. ~aragraph: 3 has- been cor:recte~. The Statute. provides no inaianc~ w!Wre the 
_ Sup~~aor, Board can i~terve._. directly in the · admimstfttion · ot the 
comP&Il3'• ~tu.aa:l of the :co~nt requizoeA UDder the: Statute for a propoaed 
"act of MarJaBementn (Art.66) coastitu'ks onl.7 indirect ·tntervell'tion• 
, . .( .~ . . ' 
3~.Pa.ragraph 4 has been deleted as there are many other ways t~inp~irarl-iy f'Jt'l"ling 
- .-. v-.oancie• ·ori the Board ·of lfallagement. It is 1till .perfectly p<)saible for 
meiDOe" at: the. SupervisolfY Board· to resign· fl'ODl aemberahi~ a.M· be~ome· ·, 
membere ot·the BQard. of lfUacement. Repruentation pro.· ra-b. ·temporla· of' a 
Superviaor.y Board member does not, however, seem -the ideal solutiOn :for- this 
new cono'ept :in ·Europetm, law, hav:blg regi.rd· to- the &saooiated· sits~Jenaion of the ' 
separation ~f powers as between the Mi~lftF Board arid the aariagement. 
. ' 
4· • ··suaeation ot the. Economic and Social Co!lliii ttee that the Sllpervlsocy Board 
• • • ~ ' I 1 I I : . , • ' ' ~· • • ' 
be required to draw up .. detailed rules of procedure regarding ~ t_s supervisory 
. ~ ·. ... 
activities in order to avoid conflict with· other governing bodies of the 
compan.J •bu not ··-~en. adopted.. · · · · 
. . , •' ' . ., •,' . .-. . ': ., . . . . . : ; . . ·- d The powers or the covermng 'bodies have been statutorily d~_termi~e and ~an 
; ... · ! . ' . . . ' 1 .·- : • '-' . . . 
- except -111. the ·oaee ot the "freedom in drawing up t)le statutes allowed 
under Arti~l~ 66- be·~ither. ert~nd~d-~o~ .redu~d by lnte~ .Ni~~ •. 
The Supervisory Board ma,i, however,' regulate 'its inter.na.l f'!lnctioning by 
. . . ' '. .. . ' . - . . •' 
such a set' of rules without the need for specific provision ~n this 
reapeot • 
615 ·. 
!_!tic1e 73 ~ 
1~ Paragraph 1 combines the provisions of Article 73 (l) 2. and those of 
Article 68 (2) concerning the quarterly report by the Bo~ of. I~agement . 
to the Supervisory Board. It is oriented towards the oonduct and progress 
of the affairs ~f the comp~ and undertakings controlled by it {Article 73 {l)i 
Article 68 (2) ). Tile terms "subsidiaries'' and "divis:l.ons" used in Article 
73 (1) were superfluous and· could· be deleted. The present wording subs~a.ntially 
corre~ponds with Article 11 (1) of the proposal for a fifth Direotive. 
2. Paragraph 2 contains the pr~visicn~ of Article 68(3) of the original proposal. 
As a result, it was possible to eliminate sub-paragrap~ 3 of the previous 
Article 73 (1) which had a similar content~ !t is for the chairman of the' 
Supervisory Boa.rd to decide whether the information given to him shpuld 
be passed on to Super\~sor.y members before the actual quarteriy report 
is made and whether there is ~ need for a meeting of the Board to be 
. called. 
3i.Paragraph 3 in essence corresponds to the former Article 73 (1)2oi.·Th.a·duty 
of providing a re.port has been extended to controlled untertakiilgs ·1n 
parallel tri. th the general provisions of paragraph 1 {Article 68 · ( 2) of the 
. original ·.draft). ' · 
4• Paragraph 4 contains the sUbstance of the former Article 73 (1) 2~2 •. The 
duty of providing information has been extended. beyond the ·terms of the 
latter to apply to all dependent undertakings in accordance with the general 
' . . . ' 
intentions of Arti~le 73 a, irrespective whether they are uniformly subject 
to the group rpa.nagement or not. . 
The limitation, previously imposed on the right to obta.itl informatio':nt' to· 
events ~hat might ~ve a "euhstapti~l infl~ence upon the position of the 
company" ra.n c.ount.er, in its i.ntrinsic intant, :to the unlimited. .ri·ghts 
of inspection and suspension ~ooprded to the Supervisory Board UL~eT 
. ' . ' 
the earlie.r Artiol~ 78 (1 ), the.se rig1lt,s having been expressly -approved. 
' ; . . 
by the Europep.n Parliament. The J.imi tat ion has therefore been deleted. 
J I • ' ' ' ' ~ .. 
• 
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5· At the general wish of the European Parliament, ~ 4 has be~n 
alig:n.e4 1m Article ll(4)< of ~he pro~•l. for a tifth,Directive, ao 
that not .. only the· supervi~orj '&aro out als~ one_ ~hird. ~f its ·membel"S, 
•' ' 't ~ • ~ I 
mq make the request for· information referred ·to. These· membe~s may. " 
avail of the right to information of the Supervisory Board . as a whOle 
and it is therefore ID8et that the information and particulars requested 
lihould in any· event be passed to all ID8mbens of the Board t'r into:rmation 
simillta.neously• ;. 
6. P~h 5 _deals·· with the· Supervisory Board' a risht of uoesa tc;t the : 
documents of tb8 b'laineu. lt con~ina the eubataaoe of Article 78 (;2) 
of.the ori@inal pro~sal. By way of adjustment to Arti~le 11(4) of the 
proposed fifth Directive, proVision is now made for both this right and 
'tlla.t ·to· l.ntorma.tion wader ~apti. 4 to be exerCised by one third of ' 
the members of the Supervisory Board on the latter's behalf.- 'On pra.c'J;i'Cal 
09.nsiderations, delegation of the right of access to a sllall nuab~r pf 
D:nii~'rs baa. to be pertDittel. . 
.. 
, . 
' Provision ia f\lrther made for tbe Supervisory Board or bne ·thi:£'4 ·of its 
. . . . 
. ' ' 
. •mbel'B . to nta.in the se~ces of' a confidential expert to eDmine 
:techni~'-Y ~omplex fat--era. sb.t1ar prortsion't"' made 111 .Arttole ~1· (4) 
• I • 
·~ t~:·PJ.'9po&a.l for a fifth Direofive •. \,• 
. . ' 
7 •. Having' re~rd to the joint res:Pohsibili ty of the Supervisory Board, . i 
pal"agraph ·6 prevents a.nY unequal. treatment of its members t ·· · 
in the provis1¢n of information to. the Boa.Ird.. n aarrespon<ls w1 th Article. 
11(5') bf' the pl-9poaal for· a fifth Directive. 
1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 74 now govern the conditions of Supervisory 
Board membership. Paragraphs 3 and 4 re~la.te the l).Wilber of members. 
I 
2. Paragraph 1 contains the J?revious provisions of pal'B.graph 21; ~ according 
to which only natural persons could be members of' the Supervisory Board. 
This has been approved by the El.lropean Parliament and the Economic and 
Social-Committee. The Second sub-paragraph of' paragraph 1 limits the 
number of Super9isory Board appointme.nts that mq be held si-.ltaneously, 
in line with Article 9 (3) of the proposal for a fifth Directive, by 
members of' the Supervisory Board of an s.m. 
--- ~17 
An exception has, however, been made in the ca~e of Supervisory Board 
appointments within ~.group. The special conditions obtaining within 
~oups justify tr.e nu~~er of such appo1nt~ents- eounting as only two · 
within the totaJ.. 
Article 69 (1) provides that a member of the Bo~rd of Managment may not 
serve on the s.E. 's Supervisory Board. This prohibition .-lllllst be extended 
to membership of the Supervisory Board· by member~ of the nianagem~r.t 1:- _,dy 
of an undertaking on which the s.E. 's Board of Management can exercise a 
controlling influence, as the latter could otherwise :tn:',_il.enoe the S.E.'s 
Supervisory Board through the managing body ot the dependant undertaking. 
This is not now possible. 
3.Paragra.ph 2 repeats the provisions of Art'icle 74 (2) 2. without specific 
reference, for the sake of clarity. 
·' 
4.Peragraph 3 (1) contains the principle previously enshrined in paragraph 
2 ( 2) that the number of Supervisory Board mem~e'I'S shall be. spe-cified. in 
the statutes. As previously provided in paragraph 1 (1} of Artiole ,74, hot'iever, 
' . . . . . 
their number .must be di"';isible by 3. At th_e . .request o~ the EJ.u-ope~ Parliament, 
the nwnber ~stt additionally, be, an .odd on~, so .. that majority dec.isions 
• ' ' t • ' ' 
can be reached not only within the. Super,vraory Boal'd as a whol,e but also 
with~n the i~ividual groups of members. This ~s i~portant, having regard 
both to the appointment of Supervisory Board members repr~centing neither 
the shareholders. nor 'the employee~ (A.rt.icles 74· a,' 75 a and 75 b) and 
to employees' rights on transformation aqd-merger (Articles 268 (4), 272 a 
and 273 a). 
.. 
'. 
'"1'..... '· •• 
... -,l. ' (' . .: · .. ' ';- ' 
. The .l!d.JP.JIS!.UD figue1 ;pre.vio.~sl,x l[tq.ted, .in. Article 74(1.) 2. has .consequently 
• ' • ' ' - ' ~ • '., ',. .. -<. • ,.. .. ' • 
. been ti~d; ap.t 9, at th.e requ_e~ 9! tll~ E_uropean .Parliament •.. 
• ' \ • t- • I • ' ' • • • '- ~ • ' " ). " ' ' 
··This prdrision bas been ertended, .having regard ·to .the participation .of 
employees of group undertakings dependent on the S.E. in. electinc employee 
rep~ee~'atives to the S.E. 's Superv;sory Board, by ~ atipulat.ion __ including 
• ' • •• ' f 
establi$ments of group undertakings for the purpose of assessing the 
minimum· figure. 
," 5· p&ragraPh '4 contains a t~a.risi tion&l ~ment ~ereb\Y' the oonwm.n8- of 
the General Meeting ~rely' to elect 'members to the Supen-isory Bolird is 
~ 
·avoided • 
. Tbt Eoopomic.and Social Co~ttee ~gbtly criticised the ne~essity .of 
- . . . ' .. . . '• : . ' . 
calling a General Meeting. in .the com~rable instance of the former 
Artl.cle 75 (4). 
Article 74 a 
t • 
. : . 
'I '., 
111 -·~«~.:P~~sfon ~oncerns :the composition of the Supervisory .Board. P~agraph l. 
corre~p0J4s t9. the wol'di~ proP,:)sed by the EuxyPe_an _Parl.ia.r.uent tor. .Article 
. .. . s . ' ' . 
~t7~~). ~e .Commission ~p~rts .the. Pafli~nt view,on_ .the: oompoatti~n of the 
_"Sup~eyisory ~ard for the reasons . set out in . ~he i~tfOduction to tJ:ds 
· · ·- · /text prouosed by +'he· · · · 
... T~tle, 'l!le' Europe-~ :arl~amentTS .. · ~- . . governs the compo"Uion o~ the 
Supe+Yisory Board. i~. Artic~e 137 as a whol.e •. A logioal4' bett«?r pla.ce 
. ' ' -~ ' ' - . . 
for this is among the provisions of this section and not in Article 137, 
wM~h. t~rms ~··of the Title on "~presentation. of EmPloyees,;;. Article 
137 ~ll ·a.ccoroingly 'in tdture .contain ·o:nl7 the rUle~ applying sPecifically 
to-~ the. representation of . e~loyees wi th!ri 'the scope ~f . the "general' provisions . 
. . of Art~cle 74-a (Articie 74 a (3))e bite .iow.es are in con~ext with the 
. ' . : . . ' . '" \ ' . ·' ' . ~ . ~ .,. ' . ' ' . , '• 
electoral provisions ·appl)'irig 'to the EurOpean ·worka Cotincll, · and the general 
• .. • • •• '· c 
provisions of Title V1 and should therefore ·remain in TitlEi V~ .. 
I 
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3. Provision for electing or appointing shareholders' representatives can still 
be made fn' Article' 75 within·t~~ t~~ets ~o~ Arti~le 74 a(l)._ As rega~s the 
.. t ~ • • ' ' ~ 
cooptive third, the pr~visions of Articles 75 a and 75 b have been intro-
duced and 'the'se materially correspond 'With Article 137(3) as propose.d .by the 
European Parliament. 
4• Paragrapil 5 contains a procedural provision prev~ously in Article 7'5{5). 
Article 74 b 
Thia prov:ir:Jion. e~sures. that the ~.E.'s. Supervisory Board can fulfil ~ ts· t~sks 
even if not all !Its m,embers have bee~ elected. 
Paragraph 1 oorrespon~s to the wording proposed by the European Parfiarnent 
for Article 143 p) which relates b~ck to Artic_le 142 of the original _ 
proposal.. Paragraph 2 cont~ins a.na.l~gous prov~~ions fo~ the .time le_~~ng 
up to the election of the third third of'the membership. 
Article 74 c 
1. Sti,ulations as to the Supervisory Boa~'s term of office were q~iginally 
left to the statutes. (Articie 74 {3)).- In order: to' faoilita~e ·~t~ltaneous 
holding of elections for the EUropean W~rks Council and for employee· 
• •, ' ~ : • • I ' ' 
representatives on the Supervi.sory Board, the European.· Parliamen~ ha's,.however, 
asked for t~ marlmum period· under Arti'cie 74 (3) to. be reduc~d •from .five. 
' ~ ' ~ 
yeal·s to four a.nd fixed the, employees' represe~t~ti· .. ·es' term ~f ~rric~:at four 
' I ' .' • 
:raa1s (Articl'e 144 of the text proposed by the European Parliament·). 
" . ~ . . ' - : .: 
Supe~.is,ory Boa~ electJo.ns shall take ~s simple ·a form_ as possj.ple il.l 
.r~H;pec:t .of all categories of ~mbers Qf· Boa!'d; 'I-Ii th due re~:rd to this 
. prqposed text; at the same time,- hc>Wever, all .members of the: Supery.isocy 
Board. shall rank equally on the. Boar.d~ ·Diff~:rent~e+ .terms of office would 
be incompatible with thi~ and.it ~herefo~· seems opportune to ~pacify a 
standard period of four.years. 
f.e-election was already permitted previously, under Article 75(1). 
.. 
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2. Pa.rapaph;;2,.matChes ~p- ld:thtfi>piOp()eal·-·laade b7·'the· EUropeaa. Parliament. 
in .orcl.er te --prevent. a·Y&canc;Y arieing wheri ail employee represen'ta."tiive's 
. ' . 
. ( ' s ) term of otfi;ca· espireir-. ·lrtitle-·r43{2) of the Parliament· terl • :·· ; 
ln. v.ia, of the pursuit of eft\ia;l.ity ~ngst members of the Supervisory · 
Board;. there -i-a juatittC!ation :to~: e:dendil'lg this provision te' ·apply · 
geDerally to all. 1 ta · member,s.- · -
• • ~ • ~ • '' ' ~ 1, • • • '. ' , ' ' ... 
IJi :order to avoid ·aey abuse , it will be possible to bridge over a vacancy 
a~ising from delqed -eleo~iona '~n},: to~ ~ limited period of· ti~e .. ·•· ~ · .· 
}. Paragraph 3 is a simplification. The terms of office of all members of the 
SUpervisory Board should end at the eame time. 
Article, 74 d 
1. This provision contains a standard provision for the premature termination 
of a member's term of office. Formerly, such a provision applied only 
to employees' representatives, to which the provisions of Articles 108 
and 110 were to apply, in accord.ance with Article 144{2). It seems desirable; 
however, that the provision should also apply to the other categories or 
Supervisory Board members. 
\ 
2. Paragrapht 1 has been drafted on Article 108 (1). 
3. Paragraph 2 corresponds with Article 108(3) which in turn replaces Article 
110, though in distinction to- the latter, it has been decided not to have 
alternates step in in the event of only tempor&r,y incapaoitYl the provision 
regarding representation of absent members b.J those present (Article 77(3)) 
seems more appropriate here. 
Dismis"a.l by the court, which '\he Europe~ Parliament has provided for in 
respect of employees' representatives (Article 144 a of the Parliament text), 
is intended under Article 74 e to apply to all members of the Supervisory 
Board and to be available fin the same legal grounds. 
6?.1:· ; 
4. Paragraph 3 contains provisianQ fo;r, :tbe.<-··.~vent"o£. no al tenla:te. being /able · · 
to step in. [Ibis may arise because .no al tin1~:mte' has "been' e'leoted· or beoc.use 
the al terna.tes elected, have become: ·~v~ilable ·in-· the- meantim&. · 
The ~conomic. and So.cial Commit.tee ·rightly~ poi:rt~ed o.ut in. connection with 
the provisione of Article 75(4) of' the or:tgina1.proposai 1 tha.t :i:'t W,ouldl 
be inordinately expensive to carry out the nox·mal "voting-procedure for·" 
the remainder of tll~ term of offic~ •. On j,he other h~d, the Superv,i,~ory 
• l' • • .. ' ,. ~ . ' . ' ' . .. . • 
Board's via~oi+i ty d.epen4_s decisive.ly on,i ts ~aying a. bala.11ced compvsit;ion .. 
' . • 7 ,, - ' 
•, 
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Article 74 L 
. ';' · .. ~ 
'• • I • 
1. i!'his Article'"· itrti-oducea'· a legal expulsion procedure for all members of the 
Supervisory Board in respect of gross 'dereliction· of duty. The Europeazr · 
Parliament ha.d sought a. procedure· of this kind for employees' representatives · 
in Article 144a. ot its Opinion. The concept underlying the Statllte-; · a.ecordtng 
to.- which . all members of the Superviaor.Y Board ha~ equal rights and 
obligations (Article 80) t is in fact ;~swered by the fact t_~t all marobers 
ca.n be relieved of their office by the court in the sa.t!le oircums·~ances 
upon gross deralictio~ of their duties. 
. gationa 
2. ~e. substantive ground for dismissal - se··rioua· b~oli ~'bf -obl-i~:· - correspor:.ds 
. . . 
with . the EUropean Parliament • s· Opinion on· Article 144 a. The court ·JDa3, however, 
_interve~ only on application• Ex officio ·intervention as requested by the 
,··EUropean Parliament' is f~reigtl .. to the ·procedure~ of Illa.ey' Member St~tes. 
In accordance with -the intentions underlying Article 7 4 e, the right to 
t, ' I' • ' • t •,. ' . ' ..& l ' 
make application has been granted both to the General Meeting and to the 
representative 'bo~ of employee·s in the s .. E. 
In defining the employees' ·representative body 1 it proved·possible to t11rn 
'to the .provisions of'Al'ticle 15 a :(2) .re~rding the nomination rights in 
. :respect of the o-o-optive third. The~ p~vi!!Jions for- their ~ relate back 
.. , . . 
to Article 13~ of the· Europ,an· ~rliarnent 's Opinion~. 
. . The ~mp~oyees' representatives on the Supervisoey Board who in certain 
circums~anees have' subsidiar,y nomination rights under ~rticle 75· a(2)b,~ 
have however bean excepted 'in 'this· case. Where nelther· a EuropE::an· Works 
Council nor . an· el!lployee ~presentative body wi ihin the , meaning of Article 
75.(i)~•!!.'and ~eXists within the S.E., employeG interests will be· sufficiently 
prote'cted in this case by. one quarter of elector employees being granted, 
under the subsequent provis'i.OllS~ . ci. right to apply to the OOurl ·fo~ all 
ex.PUlsion otder ... Thi.s _right to ~ppl;y on the, part of the, emplo~es apd tha.t 
- . . ' -- ' ... . 
of _the ,Supervi .. or;y Boa~ itself relate~ back to the .. Europea.n Pa.rlia:cent•s 
' ~ . ' . - . . ''~- . ' ( . -
Opinion on·A~icle 144 ~· 
Pa.r.f passu ·to .. the empbtees' right of appl~cation, tM.s has also been 
.granted to shareholders.. In view of the complex nature of such a procedure, 
.• 
• 1 ,_ 
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more particularly stringent conditions have been laid down, worded 
analo3'ously to ~hos!) for special supervif?ion, than e .• g. in. c9xmection 
with bringing a liability action • 
. Article 75 
1. The appointmen.t of shareholders' l!'epres.entatives to the Superyisory 
Board is, under paragraph·l (1), .a matter for the Genera1 Me~ting, as 
before. 
The second sentence includes an ·elucidatory reforenoe to an exception 
in the case of the Supervisory Board of a newly forme.d S.E. (of. Ar-
ticle 1:;). The reference to a.lterna.tes was added at· the suggestion 
' ' . \ 
of the Economic and So_cial Committee s9 as .to give the General .Hea-
ting a simple means for dealing with vacancies on the Supervi~o_ry 
Board. Where the General Meeting has not elected alternates, ~rticle 
74· d (3) will' apply in the event of a vancanoy. 
2. Paragraph 2 has been introduced to enable a mi~orit,r of shareholders 
to be represented on the Supervisory Bo~rd. 
·' ' 
It can be important for a founder c~n:rpany with. a ;rainori ty. holding in 
the S.E. to hav.e representation on the Superciso.ry ;Board guaranteed, 
particularly wbere an S.m. i.e· f~rD~d as a. joint 11U.bei·d'iary •. There 
would.be no suqh guarantee under t~e ~enera,l application of the rule 
'. "' . 
_in .Articl~ 91(2) to the election of Supervisory Board members. Ao• 
cording to. this, resolutions will b~ adopt~d by the Gene.ral Heating 
by .a majori;;y vo:t;e. If, on the other hand, the opportun:ity und~ar 
.Article 91 (2) is availed of and a larger majority_ is prescribe~ under 
the sta tu~es, the. majority woul_d then enoqunter too great a d~fficul ty 
in electin_g their own. representative~ •. 
Under Artioie 75 (2), therefore, the pbssibili ty e-xists 'for· the sta-
tut'es to specify an 'electoral· proced'ure ·.t-hat would do j'us'ti'ce to all 
interests in such a case.. Introduction of the practice 'of "cumulative 
voting" current ¥1 th~ US for example -migh~ l;>e contemplated. 
3. Article 75 (3) regardint; dismi~sa.l . o.f· ~har~holde~s '-~epresentativee 
corresponds substantially with paragraph 2 of the original proposal. 
This right of dismissal guarantees that the majority shareholders 
at any particular time can be represented on the Supervisory Board 
on a sudden change in share ownership. 
'_., ')I, 
........ 
:-~, . . .. 
,.,. 
. -. ~ ", : ~.,. ~. •, - . .; .. 
4. ParagraPh 3 ol the .. oriB!nal proposal ·Js¥ been retained~ altered. form·, 
i~ Artlcl.e 75 -C4.).· : . ~.... ·· ~- · 
. . 
' . ' 
.. ,
A:ra age limit m~ in fUture be specified only for the .... a.r.eholilero.' •, 
representatives. Suoh a provtaion dqee ~not seem p~i0t11~ly neeeas~ . 
for othe.r memb~ra of the SUp~isoey Board owing to .th~ pro~fJ~d .. __ ,. :.. . 
~ < L • ..- ~ .l,• 
eleotim pro~ed~. It .w011ld m~re0v~r:- be improper tor an .age limit 
. ' ' + ' . . '. ' •• 
~n respect of the latter to be imposed by the s~rehol.ders alone •. -. 
... .. . ' . ~. : 
; t ~· ! ~ : •. 
~ prcwiaio~ .ot. the former pa.r86I'a.ph 4 have been deleted ~-;super-: 
-· ' . -. ~ . . ~ ~ . . . ~ -
tluous in view ot the new Article 74 d,. : 
' ' .. { " ~.,. f " ' { ~ I ~ ' ! • '' ,. .. ' '.~ • • . ' _.. ? J i;. • I. '• t ,f ,, . 
'•J . 
. ' ~ ' ~ 
The earlier pa.ra.gra}D 5 hu now becane Article 74 (5). 
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Article 75 a 
1. Ar~ioles 75 a and 75 b contain without substantial change the conditions 
put forward by the ~~p~a.n Parliament for ~he ··appointment oi'; the .thiro 
third of the Supervisory Board to be co-opted jointly by the repi·esentatives 
of shareholders and employees. Article 75 a covers the nomination procedure. 
The elections themselves are covered by Article 75 b. 
2. Article 75 a 09rre.~pop.ds substantia!ity with Article 137(3)1, of the text 
prottosed. by the European Parliament •. The right of nomination could not, 
howeyer, be restrict~ to the European Works Council (in addition to the 
• ' ~ I 
General Meeting and the Board of Management), as proposed under the European 
Parliame~t's Opinion, since a European Works Co~oil.~eed be formed only 
when the terms of Article 100 apply. It is in line with the basic thinking 
behind the European Parliament~~ext that nominations could be made on the 
part of employees even where no European Works Council has to be formed. 
Article 75 a(l) takes account of this fact and extends the right of 
nomination to ''the employees' representative body''. This body is defined 
in the subsequent provisions of paragraph 2 analogously to the wording 
of Article 131 as proposed by the European Parliament. · 
As regards the cases that could quite conceivably arise in an S.E. with 
a small establishment where neither a European Works Council nor an 
employee representative body exists pursuant to sub-sub-paragraphs !! and ~' 
reference is made in sub-sub-paragraph 22 .. back to the employees' representativ0u 
on the Supervisory Board :in order not to over-complicate the issue. 
If the S.E. is the controlling company of a group and is required to form 
a Group rlorks Council under Article 130, the latter too will ba an employee 
representative body entitled to make nominations for the purposes of 
Article 75 a. The employees of the group as a whole have an immedate interest 
in the composition of the Supervisory BoardJ under Article 137 they also 
participate in electing employees' representatives to the Supervisory Board. 
When an S.E. is being formed, it would be too burdensome to convene a Gene-
ral Meeting for the purpose only of preparing a list of candidates. There-
fore paragraph 4 in such a case gives the right to put forward candidates 
to the bodies of the founder companies which decide upon the formation of 
the S.E. (Art. 24, 32, 36 and 39). 
/ \ .. 
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3. Paragraph. 3 states t~ qualifica,tions for nomin~ted candidates. It corre-
S9onds ~th Article 137(3) 2. of the 'EUropean Parliament's proposal. 
- . . . ' 
The apprQWl has been kept. very general. The requirements a.re intended 
to facilitate the election' of' suitable, ·independent ~mbers. Too strict 
a formalisation of the rules would~ on the other hand, militate against 
the clesired consensus amongst the parties. 
On the positive side it :l,s provided that wilder interests than those of 
the sha.reholde~s and employees most closely concerned in the deoision-
l!la.king process in the S.E. should be given a hearing. 
The co-opti ve members are expected, beoa.use of their personal and pro-
. '• . 
fcssional qualifi~tions, to be able to contribute towards solutions 
~atist,ying all interests in situations of conflict in the enterprise. 
J.urthermore the requirements set out to establish a qnasi-t~1stee role 
<m. the part of the oo-optive members towards the undertaking as a whole 
,by makin&' them independent 'or the interests represented by tt,a· othor two 
thirds of the membership. Additional guarantees on this score are given 
by the voting procedure of Article 75 b. 
1. 'lhis provision governs the appointment of ¢o-optive members of the Super-
vis o;ry _Board. 
Par~aph 1 'cont~l.ns the· e·ssential provision made by the li.'ul'opean Parlia-
ment in Article 137{3)3.1. Under it, a candidate is elected only if he 
receives two-thirds of tho ~otes cast. 
2. Paragraph 2 substantially contains Article 137(3)2. 2 of the European 
Parliament's propoeal. 
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3. Paragraph 3 contaL~s provisions for the new nominations required under 
paragraph 2 in the event of inconclusive voting. The~r are intended to 
avoi~ the necessity of convenine a General Meeting and the employees' 
representative body referred to in Article 75 a for the sole purpose 
of submitting nel<T nominations. In order to simplify the procedure it 
appears fitting that both bodies be given the opportunity of entrusting 
to a smaller circle of persons the work of see!dng fresh nominations that 
will have some likelihood of success. 
The General Meeting and the employees' representative body may reject 
this course, in which case the elected representatives of the shareholders 
and employees on the Supervisory Board shall be considered as authorised 
to submit new nominations of their own accord. 
4. Paragraph 4 makes provision for the European Parliament's wishes regarding 
a decision by ~n arbitration board when the election fails to take place. 
5. Paragraph 5 governs the composition of the arbitration board on essentially 
the same lines as Article 137(3) j. as proposed by the European Parliament. 
Articlct..J6 
1. Paragraph 1 has been extended at the request of the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
2. The wording of paragraph 2 has been changed to avoid the impression that 
the Supervisory Board chairman is required to verify whether the application 
to convene the Board is justified. It has, further, been made clear that 
the application can be made only by the Board of Management and not by 
its individual members. 
• 
·.,, ' . 
. _ r 
·" ' ~ ~: . . ,.;' 
.. 
" ' ' .. ~ 1 ,. .. 
' ' . 
Artie~ 
1. The wording ot paragraph l has been revised and a proviaiotl- c~·~bg 
. - . . ~ . 
'additiou to the .•sanda was attaohed •. · __ . · 
- t ' ' f 
2. 'lhe 'sequ~noe of pt\ragra~ ~and 4 haa becm reverBed, -u.'\her~"isions 
,. 
. of.tb.e earli~ &rag!'S.ph 3 logieall.y develop fJoela titeee of - ~wlier 
···~4. 
.,, 
3. · The ~thority given under ~ph. 3 t:l tb~- new version h&s be·-. Pro-
. \ . t . ~. . -' . . : . : ' . . ' .. - •' ~ ·-· ,_ 
! Yided in aooorcleoe with.a prc)posed !llleir!m<mt of 'the ~.'Parlieznent 
... '>~o.~~~~.4._.o~-~~.:.ortgi~-~~~ .:·. ~ .. ··. 
' ' 
4. _At tho req1.1est ot the European P~liamont, paragraph 4 now takes acoount 
•• _,, ,.. ~ ' ' :· .. :· ' ''\"'' • ,. • ' • • ~~ • - • - : 4o 
_,. :: ... 0~ the -~~i~~i:ty ~t. p~~ voti~ -~n ~~o;r.da.n~ .~tJ! *• -~oe~ng 
... ' .: ')~·~·~~P?· .:.. ' . ''' . . ' •:' . '!; 
. 
·,5:.· .·p~ 6 baa bee a~lif').ed.,.,..-t .. the ~~t .ot,~he_-Euro~an·P.a.rliament • 
'I • ' 
. " ••. .:;_ .c. ' 
, I 
. . .~ , :. 
.. 
.. -~ ... 
. •.•' 
. · .... ,• 
. :· ~ -· .... Pal'agra.Jb :3, nsarti.~a~ e.gnaaents attecttng ·tbe interest• ~t a me:ub~r ot the 
8Qervia.ol7 BoaK, 'bas· ... l:ike·. Article '69{4) -~'been adap~ed !to Article ~0 
ot ,the ·~&tal' fQJ- ~:fifth Diiie~tive._ ::~~·· ... · 
.. ! :· . 1 ,-
The !liability of ~e~~re ot -~h~ atper+i:.O~ ~a~:oOtitt~ ta; ·u_k~ a fom 
I ~· • ' ', ,' : ~ . • •: • •' I '• ... • • • • • : t ' ' ' 
parallel to. that of meubere of the BoM"d. of' r.fanagem&t. The ~lllges to Article 
• ,I, - > ,;o. • ~.' ' • ,; , ~· ~- .: t •t• .. , I , ,._ ', ,: , ~ ! •"• t. • f , ~ ~>~ , ~ • ,I', ." ~ • 
81 take a.oo01mt ot 'these to !rti·elea 71 an~ 72. ' 
Article 81 a corresponde with Article 72 a, to the explanatory notes on whioh 
reference s~ould be made. 
Section three 
(Special obligations applicable to members of the Board of 
Management, the Supervisory Board, the auditors and principal 
shareholder~) 
1. The incorporation of provisions regarding priviledged access to information 
on the S.E. into the Statute for European Companies has been approved 
by the European Parliament and.by the Economic and Social Committee. 
The Economic and Social Committee wishes, however, to delete principal 
shareholders from the group of persons concerned. The European Parliament, 
bas, however, approved paragraph 1. The d&sired ~ndment .wo~ld run counter 
to present-day trends in company law, particularly in Great-Britain and 
the Netherlands. No material changes have therefore been made. 
2. The formal provisions of paragraphs 2 to 4 have been considered as over-
subtle, particularly by the Economic and Social Committee. It the provisions 
are to br:tng insider d~aling out into the open, however, no deletions may 
' J ' ' ~ -
be made from them. Practical difficulties should not be over-emphasised, 
given modern methods of information retrieval. 
3. The provisions regardir~ transfer profits under paragraph 5 have been 
generally criticised as too inflexible. The. Economic and Sooial C?mmi ttee 
would like to see the legal effect of paragraph 5 restricted to speculative 
profits. The European Parliament's Legal Affairs Committe~, on ~he other 
hand, (·onsiders the .Pro_visi'ons do not goi .-._ f'ar enough and has asked the 
Commission to investigate the setting up of ·a vetting committee. This approach 
is, h.ol.zever, on the institutional grounds· alre~ put forward by the 
Legal Affairs Committee, hardly a viable one, at least for the limited 
purposes of the European Limited Company. 
~ ~ 
The ~roblems surrounding the utilization o~ insider knowledge are at 
present under keen discussion in the Member States. For this reason• 
and in view of the wide rangihg'opinions expressed, the:Commission has, for tho -
time beingt decided against alteri~ lts original proposals. 
' 
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Section four 
~ . ~· '·' .. .\. 
The General Meeting; . 
. ·' 
'. .. ( 
Article· 8} 
... l. The list of attributes falling to t~e General Meeting in parag.raph,.;r has 
• 
been improved upon at the request of t~e Europea:n Parliament and of t~e 
. • ' ' . :t 
Economic and Soci.~ Committee. 
The discha.rge ··of members of the Board of' Management pro.posed by the. European 
Parliament has not been included in the list as it, has no legal effect under 
·the' system adopt~d by the Statute (ct. Article 71(4)· of the new version) 
and wili not therefot-e in fUture- 'be ccv.erec.· under Article 218 (2) and:· (3)~ 
2. ~e q.o;n..tracts ~ferred to in i~em! on the .. list 'in:·paragraph 1 hav~ ·been 
. . ' ' ' 
expressly made subject to approval by the General Meeting at the re~es~ 
of thla European Parliament.· It ha.a 'Qeen emphasize4.. t:t.t.at such approval is·· 
. . l.S . . . 
. ,&as.entially e~f'ective via-l-vis 'hird.- parties, as th~ case under Ar;ticle 66(4). 
• • ~ • ~ • ,t -
ThiS'. prbVision; · !'eg'arding third 'l)arties, Jca.nnot apply to merge~. Olf: .t~ansforma.­
t·ton ,.-of the s.:E~ leading to alteration in ·its· structure. Such· cases ·must· 
therefore be retained in the list under paragraph 1, contrary to Parliament•s 
wi,pb. ,(. : 
. . 3. 'ParagraPh· 3 has been added by- way or· c1arifi"Ca.tion, at the ·request of· the 
European· Parliament~ A detailed description of the powers is unneccossary 
in this c::>nte:xt. 
Article 85 
. ~ . , . 
. Paragraph 3 has been deleted. ·~e.nsion of the' ·a~nda has been inc~rporated 
.. tnto ArtiQ1e B6(3) which,previo~sly'dealt ~nly. with the publication of amendment~. 
. . . •' . . ' ' . .; . 
In th~ ~ase of extensions to the agenda, the~ in fact·seems no justification, 
~I • • • ' ' • '• ~ ' -(' ' • ' ' ' • 
con-trary to the posit'ion as regards convening.of the· General Meeting·imder 
' ' - ~ 
paragraphs 1 and 2, for subjecting exercise of minority shareholders' rights 
to supervision by the court. For this reason, no limitation of th~e kind 
w~ .Provided. ei~her under Article 25(2) of the proposal for a fifth Directive. 
' : • ~ ' • • -\ .... ', • •••• """ 11 .. 
'·I, 
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Article 86 
1. Para.gra.ph 1 regarding the calling of a General l'deeting has been extended, 
at the request of the European Parliament, by a provision concerning h?lders 
of registered shares. 
2.. Paragraph 2 has been rewordeda 
3. Paragraph 3 now covers extensions to the agenda in the same way·as it does 
. the introduction of amendments (cf. the explanatory notes to Article 85(3) 
supra). The Limitation on the publication of amen~~en~s has, furt~er, 
been deleted at the request of the European Parliament, The provisions 
rorrespond substantially with tbose of Article 25(2) and (3) of the 
proposal for a fifth Directive. 
4• Paragraph 4 has been changed at the request of the European P~rliament. 
Article 87 · 
1~ In accordance with the European Parliament's Opinion, paragraph 1 now 
states clearly that shareholders do not lose their voting rights l'rhen, 
e.g., they become members of .the 1o~rd of I~~ment or the Supervisory 
.Board. The provisions of paragraph l apply only to member~ who are not 
shareholders. 
wr~re members of these bodies are ' . shareholders, they will ipso factg 
fa.~.l within the restrictions on voting rights of Article 91(3) (formerly 
Article 92(3):;. This is wi1y the provision additionally proposed by the 
' . 
Lur0poan Parliament on this point is unneccer.sary. 
2. Holders of convertible debentures will not in future, at the reque~t of 
the European Parliament 1 be admitted to the General Meeting. This gro"up'" · 
will be kept adequately informed by thel.r representative, who has partici-
patio::l rights u.."ldar Article 57(2}. Nor are holders of dcposi ted ·shares now 
entitled to participate. They may· deal through the person exercising' th~ 
right~. attaching to their shares. 
Article 88 
1. The provision€ regarding the exercise of voting 'rights by' proxieS' have 
been adapted to Articles 27 and 28 of the proposal for a fifth Directive 
on the structure of limited liability companies, in accordance with the 
general wishes of "'Jhe European Parliament. 
2. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 continue to be inelig!.ble. ·as .. proxie~ • 
. The Economic and Sc~tal Committee asked that an exception be . made in 'the . 
case of salaried empioyees· of "the company. In the cases that it mentions, · 
however, there are sufficient alternative modes of representation not 
likely to lead to the kind of conflict referred to in the explanatory 
• 1 •• 
notes to A:Micle 88 of the O:t?iginal proposal• The addition to paragraph 1 
relat~s back t~ Article$ 27 and .24 (e) -of the propo~al for a fifth .. Dire~tive. 
. . ' ' ... 
3. Paragraph 2 has been revised and ext-ended in accordance t~ith" Art.icle. 27(3) 
·.of'· the abov-e mentioned prppoAal for a directive .• 
4• r:\ragra.ph 3(1) has been amended by analogy with A.rticle 28(1),! of the proposed 
Directive. Delegated proxies ~ve ~en permitted· at the request of ·the 
Ecbnomio and S~cial Co~ttee. 
5• Paragraph 4 has, in view of its general purport, been incorporated as an 
independant provision in Article 88 b • 
. •. 
Article 88a 
~ '· ' ,; 
1. py .~logy with Article 28 of .the proposal for a fifth Directive, this 
~~ticie co~tai,ns ~rovislo~; addi 't;ional .. to thos~ o.f Arti~le 88, re8ardtng 
. ' . .. . .• . ' . : . . . ' . ' ~ .. .~ ,, ,· 
cases where shareholders are publicly invited to grant ~ proxy. 
I ' • • 
2. Paragraph 1 contains the particulars required in the circumstances referred 
. · 8( ) .rmentiol'led to 1n Article 2 1 !}.-!, of the above1 proposa.J.. The provisions corl,~a~ne:d in 
subi-para.graphs ! ·and.!- hav:e already been generally co~fed in Article 88. 
Paragraph 2 makes it clear that financial institutions are alw included 
- ·.Unde~ the. provisions of pa~ph ~·if thet eeek pro~es only from. customers 
· having deposited s~re aertifioates •. · In· this· wa,y a.ny doubts , will be. a.vqided 
as· to whether an invi ta.tion directed towards a. JJpecific .ands :distinc:~ group 
of perAons· is public within the.meaning of JKcr&gr.aph l• The. general provisions 
.: of paragraph l':.must. heweMer conform with those' 9f ~graph :2 ·:to the ex~ent 
that an invi'tation to -act u proxy 1llaY be add~ssed o~y tq ·the depositor 
custom.)rs of the financial ittsti tu'i'On. , .: · ·- . 1• '· ..; •• ::. • ., . 
Articl~ 88 b -~:;,;;.,;;......;;..;;_.-
In view o1:its gene~al application, the prohibition urider Article 88(4) has 
been incorporated into an independent provision following after those regarding 
exercise of voting. rights. 
Article 89: 
Having regard to the· European Parliament~s Opinion, the attendance list 
required under paragraph 2 need no longer be prepared by a notary. The 
numerous ~ractical objections against t~e attendance list have consequently 
been largely removed. In the case ~f large companies with many shareholders, 
preparation of such a list can inde~d lead to some difficulty, but this does 
not justify abandoning this requirement 1 which makes for open dealing and · 
legal caution. Large companies of this kind can as a rule avail themseives 
of data processing equipment to overcome this problem. 
Article 90 
1. Paragraphs 1 and 3 a have been redrafted. In doing so, paragraph 3a has been 
aligned on paragraph 1 at the request of the Economic and Social Committe~ •. 
2. In the compa.l'l.Y' s interests, proceedings regarding a ref~sal of inforr2tion 
shall be heard in private. This is now expressly stated in paragraph 1, 
in the same way as in Article 22o(4} where similar considerations apply. 
Arti(~.2l 
1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 regarding the pass!.ng of reiloluti"n by the company have 
peen combined for drafting reasons. 
2. The former paragra.pl). 3 of Art~.cle 92·, :relating to suspe~sion of voting rights, 
has beceme paragraph 3 of Article 91 as it is closel~ linked with the provisio···3 
~f the latter. The wording of.this provisio~has.been ada~ted to article 34 
. ' ' ( 
of the proposal for a. fifth ~irective, thereb~,. also taking account of the ·-
Economio and Gocial Committee's obj.ections. Discharge of sharGholders is 
no longe.r dealt with in ~he new version as. tho .Genez:rl. ~eeting no longer 
grants this under Article 218, ~s :re.drafted. 
Arti~le 93 
1. Under the new version of paragraph 1, no agreements r.egarding :the. 
exercise of·votlng rights as directed by tpe governing bodies of an 
' I • .. ' • • - ' 
und.ertalq.ng oontrolle,d by the ,~.E._. shall be .peruli tted. If such agre.e~nts · 
were to ba·allowed• the prohibition as to the exercise of voting rights 
. . . 
on the directions of the S.E. 's governing bodies could .be easily eire~ 
vent.ed. 
2. The procedural provisions of pa~aphs 2 and 3 applying to voting ~ements · 
have been criticised by the Ec;:onomic and Sooial Con;mittee but approved, 
. ..; . . 
in substance,. by the European Parliament • > · ,:-,-. :..·. Having regard to the 
. . . ~· 
European Parliament's .Opi,pio~1 only d~t~ng alterations were theref~_re 
undertaken. 
·' ':a 
!_rticle 94 
Paragraph 1 continues to require that the minutes of the General ~e~ing ·, 
shall be··. kept by a notary. This has been suppo~ted ,by the Legal Affairs 
" . ~· : . ' 
Committee of the European Parliament in view of the value of the 
documentary evidence· • 
.. 
Reference on this point may further be made to the explanatory notes on. the 
~rafte~ Article .12. 
Article 22 ., 
1. The right to seek cancellation under paragraph 2 has bee~ made subject, 
on the basis of the Opinion of the European Parliament, to proof of an 
.. 
interest in the due performance of. the provision infringedG This is 
the mandatory basis for any aotio~·brought by shareholders or ~y other 
interested party. This factor is not,however, sufficiently oloarly ex-
p~ssed;-:fh iheParliament 's ·-proposal • 
. - . .. .. 
It was stated in the explana~~ry notes to'article 95(2) that breach 
of the provision mu.st have influenced the General Meeting resolutidn' 
in question. This idea ha.s now been assumed into the text of pa~agraph 2 
in the forill' given it by lhe· European Parlta.me~t in the similar· cas,e 
where '&lections to the European Works.•Council (Art'icle .20(1) of· Annex·- .II) 
t .. 
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or to the Supervisor,y Board (Article 22(1) of Annexe III) are challenged•What is 
in .c-ue.stion he-re.,,t is therefore not an actual effect that may be_· h9:rd ·ho 
prove, but only a potential one. ~ 
Paragraph 2 in its present form also emb~aces with general effect all cases 
where a resolution of ·the General Me-eting may be impugned under th~.ml:00f4.:in Art .. /': 1 
of the proposal for a ·fifth Directive• without, however' its scope being 
thereby . 1 '; • .• 
If defects have occured in the m~tion !or a resolution Qf the General Meeting 
of the s.F.. of the kind referred to i.n Article 42(a) to (d) of the above pro-
posal it must in all events be assumed, in accordance with·Article 95 (2), 
that a shareholder wa.s in a position to influe·nce . the discussions and 
. ' ' '. 
the resolution by properly exercising his rights. 
Defects under Article 42 (e) and (f) of the proposal for a fifth Directive 
are further covered ipso facto by Article 95 (2). 
Arti6le .2§. 
This Article has been deleted on the basis of the European Parliament's 
Opinion. 
The industrial and commercial activities of an S~E~ are subject, under Articles 1 
(4) and T. ( 2), to the public policy of the r.rember States whose national law applies 
to them in each particular case. There is no justificntion for providing ·for 
exceptions, with ambiguous preconditions and disputable effects, in respect 
of resolu~io~s of the General Meeting. 
SP.ctton five 
SI?ec:ial supervisJ.~n of Governing Bodles · 
The provisions laying down the conditions.for a special investigation and 
for jurisdiction hav~ been reworded in view of the Opinions of the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Sooial Co1nmittee, who approved them 
in pi'inciple. 
The Economic~and.Social Committee•s suggesti?n that the General ~~eting 
also be given a rieJht of app~ica.tion has no.t, how~ver, pa,n adopted. 
It suffices if this right is aocorded t:O :tne. :sha:J:'(\hold.ers··thems-elves. 
. . 
!J'ticle 98 
At the request of the Ellropean Parliament, paragraph 2 has been clarified to 
state that it is enough for the court to consider the application as 
~rima facie. justified. 
If the court rejects the application as unfounded, costs will be awarded 
in aocordanoe with .ordinary pi,dce-Wa:'l law .. This need. not, therefore, be 
regulated under the Statute. If the petition is succesfuli provision must 
then neeessarily be made regarding the cost of the spe-cial investigation. 
The first and second sentences of paragraph l of the former Article 99 
have been assumed into paragraph ~ in order to ensure that.., as before, 
int~rested parties will be informed of the results of the special 
investigation. 
!nic1e 92 
1. Ar~icle· 99 governs further procedures after submission of the special 
commissioners' report. It has been rewo~ed on the basis of the 
European Parliamen't 1 s Opinion. 
2. Paragraph l now makes speoial provision for the closure of ·the proceedings 
if neither of the parties calls upon the court and applies for measures 
in accordance with paragraph 3~ A decision by the oourt- as to closure of 
proceedings and putlication thereof in acco~ance with paragraph 5 is in 
the compaqy's interest$. 
3. The new paragraph 2 contains proc~dural rules for the application 
of measures under paragraph 3, at the European_ Parliament's 1-equest. 
4• The new paragraph 3 incorporates the earlier paragraph 2. At the request 
of the JUrope~ Parliament, the court•~ powers have been widened considerably 
: I I , 
beyond the original proposal. The court is given ~ wide measure of fl--eedom 
' ' 
to lay down measures to suit the circumstances.. · 
5· The former paragraph 3 ·. · · :: ~-., becomes paragraph 4 unchanged. 
6. Paracraph 5 has been revised in accordance with the European Parliament's 
Opinion. 
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TITLE V 
REPRESENTATION OF Ei·1PLOYEES IN THE S .E. 
The Statute for the European CoMpany proposed in 19?0 provide~, 
in Title V, for three types of legal rr~chinery for establishing the 
representation of employees and for fac{litating'the regulition of 
terms of employment and remuneration within the S.E .. : 
1. The European "7orks Council; representing the employee.:>; 
2. The representatioJ,. of employees in the ·Supervisory Board of 
the s.E.; 
3. The possibility of concluding collective agreements between 
the S.E. and the trades u~ions represented within its esta-
blishments. 
This m:lchinery was 'discussed in great detail·. by the -European P~;irliarrJent 
and the Economic and 3ocial Committe~. European indus~;;ry. 
and the European trade unirms have als.o fully expressed their opinions 
on the subject. 
Both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee 
agree riith the principles underlying this process of regulation •. 
Views within the Economic and Social Com ittee differed, howevert as 
to the details of the machinery end therefor~ it liruited itself ·to 
preaen.ting the. varions at t.itude.s .. of its mem~ers, so as to avoid 
self-contradictory opinions on the indiviual points arising from 
shifts in the pattern of voting. 
•. 
The creation of th~ European ~arks Cou~cil as a body representing 
. ' 
all the employees of 2n S.E. with establishments in different Member 
States was widely approved. Its composition and competence, however, 
are the subject of debate. 
• 
) ' 
The European Parliament has proposed the ~irect election of members of 
the European ?lorks Council according to a un:J.,form set of electoral 
rules. The previous solution, that of holding 'direct. elections governed 
by existing national provisions on employees' representation in the 
establishments of the S .E., was no longer tenable., since no ge-neral 
statutory or :f'~ly agreed syste_m of employee representation to 
r ' •\. 
which reference could be made exists in the United Kingdom or Irela~d. 
The Commission has adopted' this new concept.and the ele~top-a_J,. rules 
based on it. They are contained in Annex II to the Statut.e, which is 
incorpor~ted _._ht::r.ein by virtue of Article 104 of the _new ver_sion. The 
Commission, like the European Parliament, believes that the direct 
··· · accordance with 
election of employees' representatives in/democrativ principles will 
increase the European Worlw C.ouncil' s ability to operate at a supra-
national level. 
.. , The .provisions on the t~rm. of offilae a-nd the ope~t.ion (, of the 
European Works Council have been rearranged to render them more 
coherent. 
Where ther_e is doubt as to the extent of the obligation of secrecy 
imposed on members of the European Works Cou;n.cil under Article 114, 
this will in future be dec.ided by the court and not, as hitherto 1 by 
the Board of Managementa 
At the request of the :E:uropean Parliament and the European trades 
unio,ns, the compe~ence of the European \Vorks Counc il has been more 
narrowly delineated in Article 119. It is now laid down in paragraph 
two of this Article that the com_p~tence of the European Works Council 
ext~nds only to matters that cannot be settled at plant level. So as 
not tc:. er:cc r-oach on the province of the parties involved in the 
collective settlement of conditions of employment, the European Works 
-.: ' 
Council is expressly prohibited from concluding agreements concerning 
such conditions. 
The rights of the European Works Coucil to be kept informed on 
the position of the S.E. have been extended at_the request of the 
European Parliament. Likewise at the request of the European Parliament 
tha European Works C01.;.ncil' s co-determination rights have ,in p~rt:tcular, 
been extended to cover the detrimental effects on employees of the 
closure or transfer of an establishment. This is the object of the 
social plan introduced in Article 126a.If the Board of Management of 
the S.E. and the Europe.;:n Works Council cannot reach agreement concerning 
the plan, the Arbitration Board provided for in Article 128, on which 
the Board of Management and the European Works CouncD_ have equal 
representation, decides the question in issue. 
The economic decision itself on nhe actual closure of an establish-
ment is not affected by these provisions. The decision is taken, as 
before, by the Board of Management with the agreement of th~ Supervisory 
Boal'd, after consultation with the European Works Council pursuant to 
Article 125. 
Section two of Title V deals with the representation of employees 
in undertakings in a group controlled by an S.E. The provisions in this 
section aave where necessary been adapted to the amendments to the 
first section on the European Works Council; otherwise they remain 
essentially unchanged. 
The composition of the Supervisory Board has already been dealt 
with in section two of Title IV,(Articles 74 to 75b). The introductory 
notesto the new version of Title IV state that the Com~ission, in 
formulating Articles 74a, 75a, and 75b, has closely followed the 
Opinion of the European Parliament, and its version of Article 137. 
As regards the principles underlying the composition of the Super7isory 
Board~ reference should be made to the introductory notes to Title IV, 
and in particular to Articles 74a, 75a and75b. 
In accordance with fu8 position of Article 137 in the scheme of 
Title v, the new version of this Article deals only with the appoint-
ment of employee representatives to the Supervisory Board. 
.. 
• 
As a result of the Opinion of the European l'arlia.ment, persons 
employed in a group undertaking controlled by ~he S.E., whose registered 
office is tituated within the Community, now also participate in the 
election of employee representatives to ~he Supervisory Board of the 
S.E. The reason is that, in acc.ordance.with the provisions relating to 
groups of companies, these undertakings are under the sole management 
of the S.E., with the result that all the employees of a dependent 
undertaking belonging to the group are affected in the same way by 
decisions taken by the S.E. 
The previous provisions on elections contained in Articles 139 
to 142 are no longer practicable, siuce no ewployee representative 
boards of the kind they presuppose exist in the United Kingdom Dr 
Ireland. The Commission has therefore adopted the electoral provisions 
contained in Annex III of the Statute as proposed by the European 
Parliament, and incorpora te::l into it by Article 137 ( 1) in the n.ew 
· version.- According to them,. employees of the S .E. and its dependent 
gro~p ~ndertakings elect a number of electoral delegates· for the 
establishment in which they ar.e employed, along the principles 
.. . ' . 
applying in the case of the .European· ':larks Council. The electoral 
college in turn elects representatives to fue Supervisory Board of the 
S.E., by proportional representation. Since it·i.s important that 
employees should also be· -reprt:sented by persons who are capable of 
viawi~g -· the undertaking of the S.E. both from the point of view of 
the .. pa.I·ticular industry and in the ove,rlll econQmic context,. a minority 
of the employee representatives may , in accordance with . 
Article 137{2), be persons who are not ~mployed in the under-
taking_. 
The European Parliament particularly welcomed the possibility· 
offered in Section four of collective agreements being concluded 
between the s.E. and the trades unions represented in its establish-
ments. The relevant provision was therefore retained without material 
alteration. 
' ' 
. ' 
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Se~+ion o~e 
The Flropean Works Council 
SUB-SECTION. ONE 
.P...rticle 100 
1. The principle has been maintained that a ~ropea.n Porks Council shall 
be set up if an S.E. has establishments in more than one of the Member States. 
The case. has indeeq. been put on many occasions that . a. ~~p.ean .t·-'ork~ 
Council shoul.d be formed $Ven ~f the S.E. h~s a.n establishment in only one 
· 1 it is conal.dered that · . ·· · · · · 
Member State But the des.ired uni.form representation of the S.E. empl,yees • . 
• ,• • ' c ' • 
iJ:lt~rests can in. such· cases be .achieved _through the instruments. of na.tion~l" 
la~1. t-Ji t.h this in mind, both the European Parliament and t}J.e Econonlic and 
Social- Cornmi ttee have lent .:their. s~port to t!Le present solu~ion •. 
2. The wording of .the. Article has been clarified to meet the views of the · 
European P~rli~ent.Proyision has been made in-particular to e~ure that 
the· two. establishments in various Member States concerned in ~he formation 
of a European Works Council shall have sufficient employees to enable 
representatives to be eleo~~d on to the ~opean Works Council in acc~rdance 
' 
with the new Article 103. 
.. 
;. 
. .. 
• 
. 
" Article 101 
The feeling has been voiced in various quarters that the competence of 
the national boMes representing employees should be left quite untouched 
and that the F'uropean to.rorks Council should be given only subsidiary powers. 
This view has, however, been expressly repudiated by the European P'arliament 
· ·as it conflicts with the idea of the European Works Council as n body. 
whereby the :i,nterests of the S. E.'s employees can be repre_sented on a 
uniform ·basis (Article 119(1)), Article 101 has therefore been left unchanged. 
Article 102 
1. The European Pa~liament has proposed that the national orcanizations 
representing employees referred to in the following provisions of this 
Section (and of the subsequent Section) should no longer be specified in 
the body of the Statute but in a spenial appendix (Annex. I), .. to be kept up-to-date 
by the Commission with the assistance of the Member 3tate concerned in each 
c·ase. In this way greater account can be taken ·on a more flexible basi·s of 
the changes occliring in the Member States • 
.. 
The new wording corresponds substantially with the European_Parliament's 
Opinion. 
Article 102 a 
This provision refers to the drrangeme~ts of the Member State in which 
the establishment is situated concerning the ~·ondi tions u21der· which a t'rade 
o:r industrial union may be-represented in an establishment-of the S.E. 
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.'i similar arr3.ngeiilent originally applied undar Articl3 116 (2), 
but as it also in f0.ct applies to a numbGr of oth·al' Articles, 1.l1d 
especially in the cas;; of the olc:ction of ,nombcrs to th.:; Zuropc3n lJorks 
Council, ~ self-contained Article has boon incorporated at the request of 
the furop.Jan Pa.rlia.nont. 
The ~rording of this Article based on the Luropean Parli~mcnt's Opinion 
is thG rcsul t of oxllaustive consideration wi t~1in the Legal Affairs Commi ttce. 
'Yli:lethor or not £'.. tr:~.do union is reprasented in a.n establishm<Jnt will 
accordingly in no "'ray bo oi thGr diractly or indiractly detorminod by th;; 
Statuto. Tho sole criterion vJill be th-3 ::..rr'"l.!lgamonts applying in th-3 Hembcr 
:3tCLt-'l in Hhich tl1c cst2.blishm:mt is si tuel.tJd. 
Article 103 
SUB-d:JXJTION T\\0 
COUPCSITION AND L'L:CCTION 
1. The: '1-Jording of paragraph 1 has boon revised at the Nqu.:;st of the 
EuropeM Parli ".mont. Furth.:;rmora it 11as made cl·3a.r th~t corr·3sponding Hith 
tho provioions of articlu 104 (in connoction T.-ri th article 102) of tho 
origin:1l proposal only ostQ..blishmants 1-.Ji thin the Community ma;y dclGge.te 
roprescntati':es to tho I..uropaan Hor~cs Council. As to tho question of 
..::luctor.::..l proc.:;duN (direct or indirect suffrag;;) ~.rit:1 1·Jnich this provision 
is p'"'.I't1y concGrned, cf. the notes on tha net-'! Artic1.:; 104. 
2. Articl,J 103 (2) ha3 baen redrafted to meet the views of tho European 
Parliamont. It now states in what ostablishmants raprosantativos m~ ba 
appointed and what tha numbar of t~10 lattor \·dll bo. This was formarly 
governGd by L\rticlc 105 1 but is of fundamantal importanco in vi3\'>i of the 
subsJqu:mt GlGctor~l 3.!'rang.Jm-:mts undor Articl3 104. 
Th,3 former provisions of Artic1;; 105 h~we be.:;n changed in that 
vstablishmonts of 50 c;nployeos and over arc novi reprosentad on tho 
:IT:uropc.:m 1iorks Council. The numbor of rcpresentativ0s for establishments 
of 500 cmployaes and over h9.S b..;.:m incrc;ascd. In this -vmy a b0ttc;r 
... 
644 
balance can be achieved -.as the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
E11rcpean Pe.rliame~t ha.s already pointed out - as between the number of 
employees and the number of representatives on the European Works 
Council, and,· in "the larger establishments at lea.st, adequate representation. 
of the various employee groups is made possible. 
3. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the former Article 103 have in part been 
amended and incorporated into the nJw Article 103a in line with the 
09inion of the 1uropean Parliament. 
Arti'C::le 103a 
1. This provision now contains the special measures originally contained 
in Article 103(2) a..'ld (3), in accordance with the European Parliamen·t's 
Opinion. 
2. Paru.g:raph 1 co·rresponds to the fol'!Tier .? .. rticle 103(2)' 
: .. 
3. Under paragraph 2 the additional elections for which provision was 
orig:.r.~lly made on1~r in the cn,se of a merger are e:x:tonded to ap:ply in · 
all similar circumstances, where the S. E. 'acquires or opens establ:i.sh-
ments with at least 50 employees after the European Uorks .Counci1 elections 
have been held •. The E-..1.ropean Parliament has,. hoNever, introd11ced a general 
1; < ' I 
restri~tion in this connection so as to avoid too swift a sequence of 
elections in such es·l <1blishments. 
~ • I 
Article 104 
The proposed direct election of members of the European Works ial 
Council has met with criticism from industr circles. Indirect elections 
through national employee representative bodies are preferred. This 
view has also been put by the European Trade Union Federation. In 1970, 
hol-.rever, the European Federation of Free Trades Unions in memorand·a 
d'3..teJ,A Novemb3r 0pted for direct voting on uniform electoral principles. 
15 A-pril and 
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The European Parliament agreed with diroct elections in its proposals 
and recommended the introduction of uniform electoral rules. 
The Commission shares tha European Parliament's view that the 
European lllforks Council will find its task - to represent the interests 
of employees in different Member States - made easier if its members are 
'l-11 co:l!i:."'med in the same manner by the democratic votes of the 
employees. 
The fear that this wight lead to conflict between the European 
Tfiorks Council and the nn.tional representative bodies appea:rs unjustified 
- p"lrticularly in vie1-r of the new l·rording in Article 119, recommended 
by the European Pe.rliament, of the rule regarding the competence of the 
F.uropean Works Council. It should also be noted in this connection that 
dual membership of the European il>!orks Council and national representative 
bodies is permissible under Article 107(2). 
Under a direct voting system, however, the previously proposed 
reference to the electoral rules applying to the national employee 
r~presentative bodies at the S.E. 's establishments is no longer possible. 
In the United Kingdom and in Ireland there are no general representative 
bodies for .emplo~rees existing on either a statutory or a eontr~ctua.l 
basis to vihich reference could be made. 
The European Parliament has therefore proposed that uniform electoral 
rules be introduced as Annex II to the Statute, and wishes to make 
this Annex an integr~l part of the Statute. The new wording of Article 104 
is based on this concept. As regards the electoral rul'es themselvec, 
reference can be r.;ade to the notes on Annex II. 
... 
Article 105 
an 
This provision regarding the numb~~ of/establ~shme~~ repres~ntatives 
on the European W9rks Council has been incorporated in amended fo~m 
in· '· Article .103(2). 
Article 106 
The date of the elections is now determined in the electoral rules 
in Annex II (of. Article 14(1) in partioul~~); so t~t the .f9rmer provision 
Cl'lJl be deleted. 
The provisions suggested by the European Parliament to take its 
pleoe, regarding the oot:l'?Qe:;.ttol1 of the· T.'\l.ropet~.n Works Council, have been 
included in Article 109, which now.deals With. this·mA.tter comprehensively. 
S~SECTION THREE 
TERM OF OFFICE 
Article 107 
l. 
' 
The term of office of the ~opean ~lorks Council hctS been extended 
' . ·- . ' . 
to four yea~s 
the ~l~ct~o~s 
at,the request of the European Parliament. In consequence, 
for the European Works Council (Article 104) and for 
. . . 
employees' representatives to ~erv~ on the Supervisory Board (Article 137(1)-
of the new v~rsion and hrticle. 1 of Annex III) c~n be held simultaneously 
' I I . ' •, • 
in the est~blis~Jents of the S.E., ~s the Supervisory Board's term cf 
office is now also a standard four years (Article 74c). 
The date of o.ommencing>ffice, originally governed by Article 111(3), 
is now determined in Article 107 so as' to achieve great.er cohesion .and 
· clarity in these provisions. In "order ·to avoid any mi,sunderstq.nding, 
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re-election has been expressly authorised. This was formerly provided 
only in the ce.se of shareholders' representatives on the Supervisory 
Board (lirticle 7:)( 1)). The same rulu now applies to all L1e1.1b~rs of the 
Supervisory Board under ~rticle 74c(l). 
having 
2. The wording of paragraph 2 has been revised I re~,rd to the Opinion 
of the European ?arliament. 
Article 108 
1. This 1-..rticle now c~nt:1ins a cohesive provision on requirements for 
ali effects of termin::~.tion of Europee.n \·forks Council mem-oership. 
2. The_number of grounds under paragraph 1 on which m~mbership may 
terminate has been revised in accordance with the European P~rliament's 
Opinion. 
3. The new paragraph 2 governs the appointment of alternates in consequence 
of the foregoing. This was formerly governed by Article llC. Jlhe wording 
of this provision has been revised, particular attention being giv8n to 
removal of members from the Europe::1n TrJorks Council, which is dealt w'i th 
under Article lOBo.. 
4· Pc;>.ragraph 3 contains a special provision r~.pplying- on expiry of the 
period of office intended to ensure continuity in the representation of 
an establishment on the European \forks Council in the event of a delay 
in new elections. The European Parliament inserted this provision into 
its version of Lrticle 109 as p~~agraph 3. 
1. The European Parliament h~s asked that it be made possible for a 
member to be expelled from the European Harks Council :'or dereliction 
of duty by court order and for a court to dissolve the European Horks 
.. 
Council. ·The new Artiole provides for this proo~dure which substantially 
corresponds !fi th. Article 108 ( Z) ~nd { 3) a~ prq~osed by the Parliament. 
2. 'I'he Eurpp~an Parliament has, further, considered it ~esira.ble to 
int:Poduce a provision whereby the European tiorks Council can cotiu>el the 
S.E.'s Board of Management to observe the statute and wished to include 
a new paragraph 4 under Article 108 to this end~ 
'The eommission feels that such a provision is unnecessary as the 
European· Works Council already has the procedures under Articles 97-99. 
co.t its disposal for this purpose. 'I'he provision that Parliament seeks is, 
. ' 
mor·eover, ·open to objection on legal groUl'lds as the proposed· -imposition 
of a cash penalty.;without a. compelling reas·on,,encroaches upon the . 
arrangements a.ppljing in each Member State for enforcing judgments~ ~ 
this'consideration the Commission diverged from the European Parliament 
in this matter. 
Article 109 
1. F'or th~ sake of convenience this Article now comprises all provisions 
regarding the constituent meeting of the European Works Council. 
2. Par~graph 1 sets out in altered form the provisions formerly 
contained in Article 106(1), regarding the constituent meeting;_.of a. 
European Works Co~~cil elected for the first time. The provision 
corresponds to the p'rovision sUggested by the European Pa.rliall!~nt as 
J~rticle 106(1). 
The ma.xim,llii time-limit for <?O~Vening the European to-forks Council 
had to be fixed at 100 ~~ye from the formation of the S.E. having 
regard to the necessary period in which to prepare for elections. 
Hitherto a time-limit of ~ total of three months applied in thia respect 
under Articles 106 and 111(1). 
It is intended under Article 14 of Annex II that members should be 
elected to the European Works Council within 75 days of the incorporation 
of .the S~E. The p'rovisions .. o~f /4rtiol~ 1.09(1) thereforo leD.ve reiatively 
. ,·: 
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little room for delay in holding elections at the individual establishments. 
Should elections ~t individual establishments be.delayed for more than 
25 d·ws such est1.blishments will not then be represented ~Then the 
constituent meeting of the European Tt!orks r,ouncil is h~ld. This f~ct must 
be aoae;~t~ro 1bearing in mind that too long a postponement of the 
constituent meeting will adversely affect the viability of the Council. 
3. The former paragraph 1 ofArticle 1C9 is deleted; provtsion regarding 
new elections is now ronde in the electoral rules in Annex II (cf. Article 14(1) 
in particule,r). 
4. Paragraph 2 governs the constituent meeting of the ·newly elected · 
European Works Council on the same lines as before. Tho wording h~s been 
adapted to the European Po.rlit<l.ITlent' s views (r,rticle 109(1), P<".r".i "'.m8nt1 s 
version). Delay in holding elections at individual establishments will 
not affect the constituent meeting of the newly elected European Works 
Council as the term of office of existing members of the Council will 
bu extended in accordance with J~ticle 108(3). 
5· Paragraph 4 lays down the period of notice to be given for the 
coneti tuent meeting of the European Vlorks Council. The b'uropean 
Parliament proposed this period under J~rticle 106(2)'. 
f,rticle 110 
This prov~s~on regarding replacement by an alternate has been 
incorporated in arnended form as Lrticle 108( 2). 
SUB-SECTICN FOUR 
OPE!RATION 
ll.rticlo 111 
1. Paragraph 1 of the new version now contains the provision previously 
contained in paragraph 2 the first official action of the newly 
concerning 
consti t-qted European l'iorks Col.Ulcil. The wording has been adapted to 111~et the 
· · · rle~ 
of the European Parliament. 
. ' 
2. ~he original paragraph 2 regarding the constituent ceeting has.now 
become Articl~ 109(1) in alt~red form. The .former para~aph 3 regarding · 
tho term of office has become SURerfluous through the redrafting of' 
!trticle 107(1). 
3. The new paragraph 2 regarding competence to take decisions was.added, 
on the suggestion of the ~~ropean Parliament, in order to secure proper 
conduqt of the constituent meeting. 
4. · Pa,ragraphs' 3 and· 4 regarding decisions taken ·by the European 'liiTorks · I 
. Council contain provisions parallel to those· applicable t·o the Supe::kisory 
Board under Article ·n. These ru:l-es of' procedure are o.lso important for 
the European t·!orks Council as .e; means of f::1.eili t::1.ti:ng the discha.r~ ·of, ~ .. 
its duties. 
5. Paragraph .5 now expressly provides an opport1mi ty for t·he European 
~1orks Council to s~t up committees. This can be useful where there is a 
large number of members. A committee can also be useful to prepare the 
proposals for electing the third Third of members of the Supervisory 
Board 'l,l.nder 1\rticle 75:'!. • 
. Article 112 
1. Paregr~ph 1 regarding security aeainst dismissal for members of the 
European lriorks Council has been adapted to' the Opinion. of the European " 
Parliament. 
. I 
<,' ', 
2. Paragraph 2 deals with a request made by the European Parli~~ent and 
the Social and Economic Committee with reg3rd to protecting candidates 
for election to the European Works Council against dismissal. A time-limit 
had to be set for such protection. Protection nL~ning the full four years 
of the Council's term)of office would appear unreasonabl~ particularly 
in view of the fact that the nomination of candidate~ is a simple matter 
(of. ~rticle 3(3) o£ Annex II). The risk of abuse must therefore be avoided. 
It suffices if cn.ndid.c."'.tes are protected during the run-up period and 
during ~ cooling-off period after the elections. Three months seems 
reasonable for the latter purpose. 
3. The sanction under pc:1.ragraph 3 was put forward by the Europer.n 
Parliament (Article 145) as an extension to the protection against dis-
missal of employees' representatives on the Sup8rvisory Boe.rd. 1~ pA-rP..llel 
provision in the instances under Article 108 seems requisite. 
I.rticle 113 
1. As the Buropenn Parlinment nnd the ~conomic and So.ci·".l Committee 
vrish tho m~mbers of the European Works· Council are no longer cxempt(~d 
from their professional duties by their own decision but only if the 
Council as a whole considers it necessary.-
2. Paragraph 2 was revised at the suggestion of trades unions. 
l~rticle 114 
1. Paragraph 1 has been reworded so as to place greater emphasis on tho 
object of professional secrecy. The oblig~tion of secrecy has, 0t the 
request of the European Parlia~ent, been extended to trade union delegates 
(t.rticle 116) and experts consulted by the Council (t.rticle 117). To 
ensure that this obli~.tion of secrecy under Lrticle 114 is observed, 
the range.of offences set out in Annex IV that Member States may 
penalise under Article 282 has been extended to include a provisl.on 
relating inter alia to infringements under Lrticle 114. 
.... 
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2. The new paragraph 2 lifts the obligation of secrecy in dealings' with 
members of the S.E.'s Supervisory_ Board ~nd of the Group Works Council 
to enable members of the turopean Works Council to work freely with such 
persons. It was possible to allow this without harming any of the S.E.'s 
interests worthy of protection as such persons are already subject to 
a pA.rticul~.r obli~.tion of secrecy under the Statute (Article 80(2) as 
re~.rds Supervisory Bo~rd members, while Article 133 refers to Article 114 
as regards members of the Group Works Council). · 
The obligation of secrecy could not be lifted further to extend to 
na.fional employee representative bodies, however. The range of persons 
in possession of ·a secret would then no longer remain sufficiently 
mrm1.ger:>.ble to guar'1.ntee effective secrecy. This would mean in practice 
that the information :i:'lo~-1 from Board of Management t·o European 
Works Council would not be facilitated and the latter would. encounter 
greater difficulty in fulfilling its functions. 
3. Paragraph 3 offers the European Works Council an opportunity to 
obtain a decision from -~he court as to whether ~he Boa~d of management 
has correctly designated information as secret •. The former rule, which 
\ 
left it to the Boa~d.to d&t~rmine the scope of the obligation of secre~y, 
. . ' 
was unsatirf~ctory in the trades unions' view es the Board, could t~en . 
in certain circumstances unjustifiably have prevented members of the 
European Works Council from keeping employees inf.ormed (Article 118( 1)). 
1-lor did it,, on the other hr,1.nd, appear rigtlt . to make seqrecy ~ega.rding , 
any particular fact a matter for agreement between the Board and the 
Council, as had been requested by the European. trades unions. ~1emb.ers 
of the European Works Council would not normally have the necessary· 
technical expertise to ~ppraise questions regarding the protection of 
. . 
business secrets. Nor, for.the same reasons, do mem~rs of the arbitration 
.. f; . 
boar~ seem competent to judge on such matters. It ther.efore appears 
653 
preferable to seek a decision from a court, which will also be approached 
with such matters in other contexts. A judicial procedure is also provided 
under the Sta-tute to decide whether the 3o<'.rd of Hanagement me.y withhold 
inform'ltio:1. fror.: sh:,re.holdcrs at a gcncr<'.l m0eti!1g ( 'Artic~e 90( 5)). The 
provision in Article 114(3) ia derived therefrom. 
J~rticle 115 
The addition precludes any misunderstanding regarding the cost of 
Furopean lr-!orks Council elections. 
f.rticle 116 
1. The participation of trade union representatives in Bu:ro,t:>a<..l.n v~or·;:e::> 
Council meetings has been simplified at the. requE:st of the E'u.ropec:.n Pc,r-
liament •• lr. c:-.ppropriat0 resolutioll by a m::..jority of the Council rem::-:ins 
necessary for thj.s pur;>ose, though irrespccti V€ of the number of Council 
members moving such a resolution. 
Cooperation between the EuropoaD Harks Council and t:1e trr.des unions 
represented C'..t S.E. establishments on m!:ltters of acknovrlcdged mutua}. 
interest may in cert:"l.in circumstances be prorr.oted by eliminding the 
procedural obstacles previously existing. 
2. The former paragraph 2 regaruing trades w1ions represGnted at S.E. 
establishments has been reformulated and incorpor~ted as ~rticle 102:;.. 
Article 117 
The. circumstances in.which an expert m::~.y be consulted by the 
European T•!o:..•ks Council he.ve been stated more concretely e.t the suggestion 
of the F'uropecm P~rliament. The Soci"l..l and 'Economic Committee's desire 
... 
• 
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that the obligation of secrecy be extended to cover experts has already 
been accommodated by extension to Article 114. 
lcrticle 118 
l. The' obligation to pass information on to the ·European Works Council 
is now specifically extended to include members of national employea 
representative bodies. In this way special emphasis is placed on nec0ssary 
co-operation between the Council and such bodies. 
2. In paragraph 2 the concept of "process sacretn has been replaced by 
that of 1'business secret 11 and contrasted. with that of the "operations 
secret'' as also arises in Article 128( 3). Having regard to the views of 
the Economic and Soci~l Committee, no '1special protection11 is now 
required for such secrets. All operational and business secrets must be 
handled in confidence by the Europec:m ~~Torks Council. In cases of doubt 
as to the scope of the protGction of secrecy the provisions of Article 114 
will appl~r. 
SUB-SECTION FIVE 
FUNCTIONS AND POYlERS 
Article 119 
The competence of the European Works Council has been more sh~rply 
/ hr-..ving delineated reg~rd to the opinion of the European Parliament. In the 
latter's view, the European Works Council should be responsible for 
matters in which uniform re'presentation of .the S. E. 's employees is. 
desirable, but not for matters that can in fact be settled at establishment 
level. 
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}Tor. is the collective formulation of working conU.i tions ..,_, mdter 
for tho European !'l"orks Council. The function of the trades unions to safe-
gu.ard their members' interests \'!ill be left untouched by the Tiillropecn Harks 
Council. 
The now \-ersion of paraP,'raph 2 specifies, h;:wing regard te: the 
opinion of the European PP.rli'1ment, that where collectively arreed 
ar~~angements exist, their provisions "rill be left une.ffected by the 
activities of the Furopean 1riorks Council. The lattGr lns, further, 
been expressly prohitited from settling uorking conditions by agreement 
with the S.E. 's Board of I::1nn,gem0nt. It is hereby intended to foresb.ll 
any possible conflict with the functions of the trades ur1ions. 
1~rticle ~.20 
1. · The import;::.ncu of pc-.ssii.1g comprehensive inform-::.tion on Eerious matters 
regarci.ing the So:T., to the European :Jorks Council at '1n en.rl;y sta[,e in 
order to f::J.cilitate its functions has been extensively acknowledged. 
2. Pe.ragraph l has been revised on the b~.sie of the I-:t~.ropean P?.rlie.ment' s 
views. The su5gestions of the :Sconomic and Soc:.al Com'llit-tee have also 
thereb~r been taken into account. 
3. ParP~grrcph 2 regarding the quarterly rr..;por+. to b<:; made by the Bo::..rd 
of ~ianagement h:c.s been 1:1.mended c-.nd extended to meE;;t Parliament 1 s wishes • 
The first two sen~en:Gs have been d~qfted more succinctly. 
The particule,rs to be included in the report havE) been sub~tantially 
extended. _~cs provided en.rlier, the report must deal in pJ.rticular with 
gener~l developments in the sector of the economy in which the S.E. is 
c.ctive. L cof'lprehensive appraisal of the S .• E. 's position must r>.lso 
include the J.ctivitiee. of undertakings contrdled by it as defin9d in 
Lrticle 6 ; this is J.lso required in the case of the Boa~d of 
Management's report tc the Supervisory Boc.rd (Article 73a(l)). 
I • 
The addition~l,information now requested regarding the S.E.'s economic 
and financial circwnstances was suggested by the European Parliament. 
t true picture is obtained therefrom, however, only if account is taken 
of the S.E.'s rel~tions with its associated ~dertakings in~ group. 
Shareholders' rights to information have therefore been extended 
under Article 90(1) to take this into account. 
The information already required earlier regarding trends in the 
S.E.'s affairs have ~t the request of Parliament been extended to include 
the production ~nd sales position. The particulars to be included in the 
report regnrding.the level of employment have been reformulated. In 
certain cases conditions in a group undert~king under sole managemen~ by 
the Bo~rd of ~~nagement of the S.B. may have a bearing on the proper 
assessment of the Board's personnel policy. 
The particulars now required regarding the production and investment 
progra~me and the other newly adQed information to be included in the 
report are based on the European P~rliement's views. 
~rticle 121 
The new version of paragraph 2 provides that shareholders of the S.E. 
sh~ll, whGre applicable, be furnished with the consolidated and semi~con­
solidated annual accoun+,s Qnd the corresponding. status reports (hrticles 
196-202 and Lrticle 216(4)). 
Article 122 
Paragraph 1 has been ~evised to express more clearly that the Board 
of Uanagement is obliged to provide the information sought. 
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!,rticle 123 
1. 111he European l·Jorks Council's ri,?,"ht of co-deterrr:incl.tion in the 
cases set out in parc.gr<1.ph 1 has bet>n underwritten by tho European 
FRrliament and, moreover, been extended to the preparatio~ of a social 
pl1"'.n in the event of the. closure of 11n establiehment. Tb.e Econc.mic ;::md 
Social Committee voiced no u11i tE;Jd opinion on the question whAthe:c' the 
F~uropoan T,Jorks Council should be granted the b.tt 3r right, -;.~ut 
recommended the CGletion of items (c), (f) ~nd (g) in the list in 
:paragraph l, which it considared "\!cnt too far. 
2. The so0ial plan proYided for under i tGm (h) of the Eu:c~opean 
Fc..rli'"l.ment'::: pr'Jposal has not, however, been included in th<a list 
under I.rticle 123( 1). It is nC't zurhcient in this cc>.se to .'J.ccord 
a co-determination rit;ht; r1.'he B:>:::.rct of IY!nnagoment must be oblie;ed to 
prepFt.re a social plan and to c:iscuss it \Ji th the "!:uropercn H0rks Council. 
[;. new f~rticle 126;;. relating to the social pl:::.n has the:::-ef·)re been 
ircluded to com9lcment ~rticl~ 125, which lists tne cases wnen a 
social pl<n m:.y be required, r:.nd Lrticle 126, which im-poses c.. duty 
on the Board of ivlanagcment to provide inform'ltion in such cases. In 
this ''~'~Y the Eur'pe<'..n p,:~.;ohc-.mcnt's request is substantir.ll;y met. 
3. The Europec:m Parliament's desire. that the E'urope.:.1n \'Jerks Council be 
consulted v.rhen an est0.blish:nent is closed. as expressed i.n i tern ( i) of 
its version of Article 123(1) is met under J,rticle 125(l)n.., oo that 
no provision need be m<'..de in irticle 123. 
. . 
Article 124 
. ' 
1. The Economic and Social Committee objected to this Article as it 
feared that it might anticipate terms of wage agreements. The European 
Parliament, on the other hand, supported its retention and suggested that 
it be extended by a provision re~.rding conirols on workers' performance 
(Article l(c))~ ·In view of the OafiaidGrations made byJthG Social and E6onomic 
Committee, however, Parliament did net adopt its Socio.l ~'..:ff'ai:::-s Committee's 
opinion that the list under Lrticle 124 should be cade subject to approval 
, by the I:uropea.n Works Council, by analogy with the position regarding 
works councils in \~'/estern Germany. 
, . This could in fact lead to an overlap with wage agreement 
arrangements. If, however, the European Works Council is consulted only 
in the cases set out in l' ... rticle 124 such arrangements cannot then be 
anticipated. The Commission has therefore retained l~rticle 124. 
2. The wording of paragraph 1 ~~s been completed, in accordance with 
the European Parliament's views, with n provision re~drding controls on 
employee performance. 
3. ~rticle 2 now avoids tho previous reference. · 
I~rticle 125 
1. The list of cases under paragraph 1 in which the European Vorks Council 
mU£t be consulted has been adapted to the new wording of the list in 
hrticle 66(1) in accordance with the underlying concept of l~ticle 125. 
The European Parliament's Opinion on Article 125(l)a.-d. is substantially 
met there"!'Jy. 
2. The European Parliament has, moreover, proposed th..~.t the list be 
extended to ensure that the European Works Council is also consulted 
,. 
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when the S.E~ is dissolved or merged with other companies. This 
request by Parliament has been taken care of elsewhere. It is in 
fact difficult to fit consultation of this kind into·- the list under 
Article 125~ as _it is not for the Board of Management or the Super-
visory Board but for the General Keating to decide in this oase~ 
Consultation with the European Works Council is therefore provided .f, 
~or_in the new article 248 (2) in the case of dissolution and by 
·Article 23c in the O$Se of forming an S.E. by merger, to whioh refe-
rence is also made :in the new provisions of Title XI regarding mer-
gers. 
Consultation is also provided for when the S .E. i~ transformed 
(Art:i cle 265(2)) and where- the S .Eo takes part in forming a. joint 
sur·:.<,'_~ e_:cy- (Article 36(3}b.). In all such oases the dt;.:;y of consul-
ts-'~--~(,;~ r~ .. 4:s r.:; t+er :i.n to the provisions of the Artivlt:: CO~lcerned 
3e .t.rt·Jc1? 1?5, r:.nli.k0 .A:rati~le 66~ nc-ad not extend to d~;tJisions 
takPr> Ls· ·~l:e Boarl of I:c:~~·-::::_ss::: .:::! l in th9 e-xe::roi.ce of soJ..e Jlc:-nagement 
of a group u.:-:;.:~et·:.:::-.r:· .. ilP. nont·~:olled by ·~he 
.. ' . 
(_~.. i~ 
"'""~ ~.::- .., The Euro-
pean· "vlr:<t::{s Co1;.ncil in fa/' t ·:>.':J""'i':;.;~~·t,ts only t~1e intar8.:;·bs of employees 
of the 2 ":.;. The Board of M.ar:s.gcudnt may, howt-ve:c, be obL:ged to 
consult the Group Works Council in the case of such decisions, under 
Articl-e 135(2). 
4. The ac ·i:i i:ion providing for batter deterr.1:ina. tion .of_ the duty of 
oonsulta~ion in the oases listed in Article 125 corresponds with.the 
· p&ra,llel arrangement under A:.rtl.ole 66(2). For the reasons set out 
above·,. the European Works Council should be consul ted on matters 
regarding the S.E. but not those concerning dependant undertakings 
, wi th:1n · a group. -
j 
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Article 126 
The. requirement's as to the written ·intormation to be supplied by the 
Board of Management to the :Ehropean Works Cwncil when the latter is 
consul ted in. accordance with Article 125 have been worded to follow 
Articles 23-a- and 271-b- more closely. These ·pro\r.lsions are in tum 
based on Article 6 (1) of the amended Proposal for a third Directive. 
on mergers of.!~~_!!!_~!!!.~~.~~ (COM(72} '1668, '4 January 1973).-
The report provided by the Board of Management in accordance with 
·Article 126 is also inte~ded to serve as the basis for th~ negotiations · 
provided for in Article ·126-.e.- on the social plan, if, alr3adur1ri.nfile ~"inion of 
the Board of Management, the interelits ot euiployees are likely to be 
advers.ely affected by the prOposed decision. 
·. 
Article 126-e.-
1. This Article contains the .provisions requested by the European 
. . 
Parliament or:. the soci a1 plan to be adopted if establishments are closed 
. ' . . . . 
or transferred. As indicated in the explana.tor;r notes to Article 123 o.f.. .. 
the new version, it is not sufficient in this case to extend the right 
of tb.e European Works Council to participate in Jllalti.ng decisions, as 
. . . ' ' . ' ' 
propos~d by the. 'European Parliament; the Board of Management mu.st also· 
be obliged to prepa,re a. aocial plan and to discuss it with the .Europ~· 
Works Council. 
. .. 
.'+' 
2. The scope of the provisiona regarding the social plan dovetails with 
the list in Article, 125. All cas~.~ are t~us inolud~. :where the structure 
of the undertaking ma.v .be altered by a. deoisi.on of the Board of Manage• 
. .• . 
ment, and the inte:rests t?f Elllployees thereby adv~l'Bely a.ff~cted ... 
~ . . . ~ . 
,., 
Alterations ·resUlting 1'1'011 winding-up or merger of the SE. with other 
companies, decided upon by the.-General: :Meeting in. a.coordarlce with Article 
247-a.-, are excluded. Provision regarding the social plan ttas in such 
oases been made in oonjanction with preparation of the appropriate 
.;. 
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resolution by the Genem.l Meeting (Articles 2.3-o- <l.l~d 23-d-, which 1 by 
corresponding references, also apply to mergers , p:..'.rsuant to the provi s:~.ons 
/applies 
of Title XI~, Article 248-a- in the case of dis!'Jolution by rysoluLion of the 
General Meeti,ng) • 
3. Th~ provi,aion itself clos~ly follows those referred to above contained 
in Articles 2 3-c-. and 23-d: in, respect of mergers, which in tn .... "'n follo\-1 
Article 6 of the amended F':!"opoeal for a thi.!'d :::>irr::ctive on mergers of 
societen ancny;nes. Refere!'lc.e shoulc_ i'!.erofo:l.'& be made to the expla:1at0I>y 
notes to Articles 2 .:.-·c- and 23-d- of the ne~.z vorsion. 
4. According to pa.ra.g.raph 1, the Board of Manag€:nent must enter into 
r~egotiations en the soci.al plan if the European 1/o.rks Council considGrs .· 
that the dec:i fi0n ~rhich t~1e Board of ~.1anagement int3nds to r:1ake ·.-1ould. 
adversely affect the interests of empl0yecs. 
5. According to parag:•·aph 2, the agree.11•:mt between the Boc.rd c"? ~i:mage­
ment and the Ell:ropea.t1 Worl:s Council rega.rding the soci< .. l pla:1 :ha.s the 
effect of an agreement under Article 127. Art:i.cle 127 (2) and' ( 3) ther~:;­
fore applyo 
6. If no agreement is· reac.1ed ·on t!:e sociaJ. plan, and if the SnpA~-
vi o ory Board agrees to the d~ci sion· 
l<;hich the B(,.e.zd of Management int;mds to make, the appropriate couroe 
of action will be rlc~idad by an Arbitration Board, as in tha .:;d.sea 
referred to in Articles 123, 23-c- and 23 -d-. 
7. There is no justification for gi-anting the European Works Council 
a right of veto in reSf~ElCt of the c.losur~ of an entablishment if the 
rights and inte-rests of employees are protected ·in ·,thilS way. 
Su_ch a ve.to was. requested by. the L.egal Affairs CollJni-ttees of tha 
European FarliameJ;J.t, hut the re~est was rejected by farliament in 
plenary session •. · 
.; . 
way 
-;- ;-
·-- ---_... ._;-
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.Nor,. under the proposa.la applyi,_ng to national companies, are em-
ployee representatives granted tne right to objeot to :fundamental deci-
. , 1 tlroposal · 
sions; such proposals include e.g. the 'for a thiri Directive on mergers 
and the Proposal for a Directive on the retention of the rights and advan-
tages of employees in the case of me.rgers 1 take~ers and am~lgamations (Pro-
posal of 31 Ua¥ 1974, OJ No Cl04, 13 September 1974, p.i. ). 
In the .conte;~.."t of. the ~r:e- held within the European Company, the 
Supervisory Boe.rd of the SE is the most suitable body to bring about a sett-
, ' ' 
lemont which will take account of all interests involved, including those 
of emvloyees, where conflict arises as a result of the possible closure of 
an establisbment • .Artlcle 126 a therefore lays down that neither the nego-
tiations regarding the social plan, nor the referral of the matter to the 
. a.rbitra.t.ion board should these .neg<!Ua.tions break ~own, should ]!),ind~r em-
plementa.tion of the measures j,ntended.. That this is true in the former case 
is clear fro!ll .Article 126 a. in general, and from .Article 126 a (4) in par-
t.ioular, while f.rticle ?26 a. (5) 1 ~~\ram~ d on .Article 8 (3) of the 
abovement.ioned Proposal for a Directive, indicated that this also 
applies in the latter case. 
Article 127 
1. The :'L'uropean Tr~..de Union Confedere;tion considered that no useful 
pnrpose was served by granting the European Works Council tho right to 
conclude agreements. However, the Legal Affairs Committee and the Committee 
on Social Affairs and Employment of the European Parliament were in favour 
of retaining this 1J1icle. 
It seems desirable that the European Works Council should be equipped 
s 
that ensure that all employees of the SEt, irrespective of their place or: em-
ployment and of any change therein within the SE across intra.-Commu.'flity 
frontiers, should have a statutory right to be included in the SE's wel-
fare. r~.cilities. The provisions rega.rding'agreelllent 
.;. 
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on a social plan (Article 126 a) stress the importance for employees of 
the results of agreements ctm.oluded by the European Works Council .. There is 
no longer any likelihood1 following the redrafting of Article 
119, of a conflict between agreements concludecl b~ th8 European Works 
Council and collective agreements regulating conditions of employment~ 
w~ere the latter type of'agreement exists, ngrcements cannot be concluded 
by tho European Works Council. The Commission rete..ined Article 127 in view 
of tho,so consideratiop.s. 
The scope of agreements to be concluded by the European Works Council' 
has, moreover, been limited by pro-ngraph 1 to the cases set out in Article 
123, in order to Mticipate the possibility of conflict (within the area 
covered by Article 124) with collective agreements. 
2. Paragraph 2 has been supplemented as a result o~ the Opinion 0f the 
European Parliament, to make it clear that whichever prvvisions ar0 uo:r-o 
favour.:lble to employees must be applied. 
3. At the request of the Europecn Pt~..rliamont, paragrapll 3 clarifies the 
effect of n.greements concluded by·the Europc:m Works Council.· 
.;. 
' ' . 
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SU'.a-8ECTION SIX · 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 
Article 128 
1. Reference of disputes between the Boa.rd of Management and the 
European Works Council to an Arbitration Board for settlement was 
considered desirable by the European Parliament, especially in viet1 
of the European liorks Council' a co-detennination rights in the tnattere 
. . . 
dealt with by Article 123. '!his is necessary to prevent decisio'n-making · 
within the und.ertak;ng <?Oming t6 a h~l t. 
The rights of i;rades u¢ons remain as little affected by this 
·provision as by the- other· ·1. ·... . . t·he Europ~n. Works. COWlcil. ~rov1s1o~s ~oncern1ng 
' 2. As a result of the Opinion of the European Parli.ament, the powers 
of the Arbitrat~on Boani have been limited in paragraph 1. Paragraph. 2, 
covering the cotnposition of the Board, 'has been reiforded to make it clearer. 
3. Tile wording of para.gra~ 3, which imposes a duty ·of professional 
secrecy on Members of .the Arbitration Board has been adapted to Article 
114. 
Artiole 129 , 
The principle that displ.tes between the bodies representing employees 
at establishm.~t level and th:~ European Wo:r:ks Council should be settled 
within the unde.rtaking ,has been approved by the European Parliament. 
The only alteratim to this Article has been the -adaptation of its 
wording to Arti.cle 102. 
.;. 
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Section two 
Article 130 
1. The Group rlorks Council is not a. representative body :fvr establish-
* monte t but for undertakings belonging to the group as a wholet> 
2. At the request of the European ·Parliament, it is no longer a. requir<>--
ment for the formation of a Group Works Council that the SE end its depend-
ent undertakings should have establishments in seve~al Member States. 
l:..s the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament emphasized, 
con'trary to the position existing in the case of the European Works Coun-
cil, there is no need to take account t when making provision for the Group 
Works Council, of the_ opportunities under national law for employee repre-
sentation in dependent group undertakings. The Group Works Council must be 
seen in the context of the legal provisions regarding compr::my groups re-
lating to the SE and the latter's capacity to exerc~e sole management 
(Article 240) over the group. A Group Works Council must therefore be for-
med wherever a group exists, as defined i;n Articl~ 223, and if at least 
two undertakings within the group have sufficient employees to appoint 
representatives to the Group Works Council i;n accordance with Article 132. 
3. The original text provided that a Group Works Council had also to be 
formed if the SE WIJ.S in turn dependent on another undertcld.ng. This case 
does not in fact require any special treatment, since such dependance ~.r 
se does not essentially affect the capacity of the SE to ~;ercise 
management over other undertakings e.nd thereby to establish a group within 
the meaning of Article 223~ 
* On the Opinion of the European Parliament, the wording of the German 
text of this f.rticle has been amended to give full effect to this point .. 
• j. 
. ' ' 
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P. Group W·ork.a-council would therefore have to be established even 
in the absence of specific provisions. 
Special treatment is required only in the more specific case· where 
the "controlling" SE is itself subject to ~ified group management, i.e. 
as a "dependent grO\'l.p underla.ld.ng". In accordance with the proviSion ap-
proved by the Europe~ Parliament, a Group WCit'ks Coun~il must be estar-
blished in this case, in order that the int~rests of employees in the 
sub-group controlled through t~e SE can be protected by tho provisions of 
tho Statute as far as possible. 
lin exceptiot.l to -the general rule is, however, justified in oases 
where employees of the SE ~d of group undertokings controlled by it 
ore represented on a bony of the. undertaking which has overall control· 
of the group, on an equivalent basis a.s / Group Works Council of the SE, 
their repr0sentation on the · 
If employees ~-represented on a body of a sim:Ll~.r composition and 
havinff the same powers as the Group Works · Council in the ·SJ!l vis-a-vis the 
-group's. overall menagement, representation a.t sub-grou:;? level would only 
lead to en unneccessary. duplication of competence in'bodies representing 
·employees at 'intermediate levels, 
· 4~ ParagraPh two, which was ±ntended to enable other bodies to repre-
sent employees· in dealings with the Board' of ~a,gement having overall 
control of: the' grouT>, has· been deiet.ed as proposed in the European Par-
liament 's Opinion. The 'Oommi t tee on Social Affairs a.nd Employment ·af the ·Euro-
pean ParU.a.ment ha.d feared lest this provision be used to circumvent those 
by which th~. Group Works Council was set up. 
.j. 
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Article 131 
1. This Article on the a;>pointment of members of the Group Works COU.."VJ.-
' 
oil was ~endec! to accord with the Opinion ·of the Ellropean Parliament. 
The proposal for the indirect ~lection of members hns been retained 
in view of the deliberat-ions of th~ Legal Affairs Col11!littee of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Considering the large number of employe~s in different 
establishments who are represented by a· single member of the Group ivorks 
Counc:n, it would oe impossible •for such a member to make himself proper-
ly lmown to employees and gain their confidence in a direct election. 
If, on the other hend, the number of members of the Group Works Coun-
oil were increased to reme~ the situation, the Group Worko Council could 
become incapable of functioning properly and a dinlobUe with the group's 
overall management become considercbly more difficult to estnblish. 
2. As a result of the Opinion 1of the European Pexliament, tho circle of 
representative bodie~ entitled to participate in the election has been 
;contrast with 
expnnded in two respects in . the ori8'inal text. In al1 [;I'OUp under-
takings, tho bodies representing employees that have to be set up at group 
lUlderta.k:int; level in accordance with tho appropriate provision are not the 
:rrinoipal factor. If there is no central representative body at &,Toup uno.er-
taking levol, the representative bod:l.es at establishment level within the 
meaning of .t.nnex I jointly elect represent11tives for the undertaking con-
cerned. The new version of Jttticle 132 (2) lays down th~t in tr~s ~ase 
the management bo~ in the particular undertaking must ensure that the 
necessary steps a.re taken for the election to be carried out. 
In countriee where there are no employeesrrepresentative bodies within 
tho meaning of .i!nne:x: I, the election will be conducted by the persons or 
organizations r0cognized there as representing employees. 
./. 
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The text as civen in the Opinion of the l!.Ul'opoan Parliament has 
been further extended by the addition of e. su"J-pt".rng.t·aph (c) govet-ning 
the situation where neither form of employees' representative bodlf exists 
in a group underta.king. In this case, recourse must be had to the. boc'!Y of 
· . · . . ;as l. t J.S 
the employees as a whole. ~lis would appear unobjectiouabl~ small 
undertald.ngs with clearly defined structuresiwill usually be conoernod in 
· which 
sueh -a o.ase. 
1' .. rticle 132 
1. Paragraph 1 regarding the rxwnber of represeBtatives to be appointed 
from the group und.artaldng ha.s been adapted to the Opinion of the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
2. Paragraph 2 has been e.df..ed to ensure that the election is properly 
carried out. The responsibi.lities -at ea.ah stage of the proeedure have 
therefore been s~ressed. 
3• Paragraph 3 makep provision for the intervening period before .e. deci-
sion by the Duropeon· Court of Justice ·on whether an unc..ertal:ing ~s e.groa.p· 
undertaldng, if this is in d.isputo. A similar provision w_as proposed. by 
the European Parliament in respect. of the pm'ticipation of employees of 
.such undertakings :i,n the election of members to the Supervisory :Board of 
the SE (Article 4 (5) of Annex III) • 
. :.rticle l33 
There is justification fer the provisions regarding the term of of-
fice of the European Works Council (lil"ticles 107 to 109) being applied to 
the Group Works Council as well. 
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Article 134 
1~ The wo~ng of p::·,ragro.ph 1 on responsibilitie:;: of the Group Harks .. 
Council has been amended to emphasize thu.t it g,pplies to groups (or sub-groups) 
controlled by the SE. 
2. The first sub..:.para,graph of paragraph 2 emphasizes ·that the competence of 
the Group lj/orks Council extends over the group controlled by the SE as a whole, 
but at the same time it makes no material ch~~ge as regards competBnce in 
:natters concerning a number of undertakings within the group. As previously, 
this provision follows Article 119 (2) in defininc the area of competence. 
The amendments rnu.de to that article have consequ.ently been applied to ;~rticle 
134 (2 ). 
3. The indi vidmd po~.;ers of the Group lrlorks Council are now set out in 
Article 135. Article 135 (1) and (2) of the new version replaces the provisions 
contained in the previous Article 134 ( 3). 
Article 135 
1. ·rhe right vf the Group Works Council to be kept informed, to be consul ted 
end to share in decision-taking is now governed by this one article. The princ-
iples of this provision were original:ly contained in Article 134 (3) and 
Article 135 (1) and (2). 
2. The new version of paragraph 1 governs the duty of the Board of Man:1-gernent 
to provide inform:~.tion. This duty now extends expressly to mc.tters concerning 
the group. 
3. The new version of paragraph 2 now leli}·s dovm expressly that in ma.tters 
affecting the group, the Group Works Council has the SJ.l!le right to oe consul tor_ 
and to share in decision-taking as the ID~ropeBn ~arks Council. 
.;. 
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As already indicated in the in~roductory notes to Title IV, the Commission 
has adopted the Opinion of the Etu-opean P~.rlhment, and now proposes that 'o~e 
third of the members of the Supervisor.y Board should consist of representatives 
of shareholders, eme ·third of employees' representatives, and ope third of 
members· representing general interests and coopted by both groups •. 
In conformity with the general scheme of the Statute, t·he proVisions', 
regarding the ootnposition of the Supervisory Board were not, a.s originally 
proposed by the Europe on Parliament 1 included in .Arti~ie 137 und~r ·'Title V · 
on the "Representation ot Employees in the SE", but under Title IV in the 
newly incorporated Article 74a in the section headed "The SU:pcrvisory Board". 
' -( ··' 
There has not, however, been arJ.Y material deviation from the text of Article 
137 (1) cont~ed in the Opinion of the European Parliament. --
t:'' 
2. In accordance with its position in Title V on· the representation of 
. . ' . 
employees, Article 137 (1) now deals only with the election of employees' 
representatives to the SUpervisory Board of the SE. It provides that employees' 
·representatives must ~ elected by the employees of the SE end of group ~der­
. takings' controlled by it. 
The participation of employee!!~ of dependent group undertakingS in the 
election of employees' representatives to the Supervisory Board of the SE 
was requested by the European Parliament and taken into account in its proposed 
electoral rules (Annex III, Article 1). Such participation is necessary, since 
,. 
these undertakings mey, according to the provisions of the Statute applicable 
to groups (Artiole 240), fall under sole management. It follows from this 
that decisions taken by the management of the SE affect employees in dependent 
group undertakings in the same wa:y as employees in the SE. Tho former must 
. . 
therefore be given the same 'opportunity to sha~e and as·sume responsibility 
for the policy decisions of the SE as the· latter. 
·.:_ 
.j. 
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' <. 
3. According to the provisi~ proposed origin~ly, employees' re.presentatives 
on the Supervisory Board were to be elected by the national bodies representing 
employ~~s at establi~t level. This provision is n~ longer practicable 
since a general system of employee representation on a statutory or 
. ' . . . '"' 
formally aireed basis, to ulich reference could be made f~r present purposes, 
. \ '. \ 
does not oxist in the United Kingdoc or in Ireland. The provision cbnta.in'ed 
defeots even apart from this; since small establishments. ±h whi·oh there is 
·no reqUirement to set up bodies representing employees were. excl\l.ded · ~rQm 
participating in elections. 
The Europe~ Parliament therefore proposGd the· introdu·oti'on of' a·,unifo.rm. 
SGt of eleotoral rules for employee representatives on the SU.pe-l'ViSO'J"Y Eoard, 
and set these out in Annex III. The Parliament wished to incorporate.ithis Ar..nex 
into the St.atute by means of Artiol.e 137a, of its proposed text. The Commission 
. . 
views this .as a practicable solutiont\.end has therefoi_'e incorporated Arti:cle 
' ,• ' . ' ,·. f • • 
1~7a, of the t~ proposed by the European Parliament ill the n,ew text of Article 
137 (1) •. 
The electoral rules contQ,ined .in Annex III· are, like the- ori·ginal:· Qommission 
Proposal, based on the· indirect election of employee representatives to the 
Supervisory Board. The Legal .o\ffairs Committee of the European Parliament came 
out against direct elections, on the grounds that candidates would have great 
difficulty in moking themselves known to all the employees in the various 
est'ablishments ·and in gaining their .confidence. It therefore .proposed the elect-
ion of·emploj~e repr~sentatives by means of electoral delegates,·who.in their 
turn .would be. appointed .in aJ,L -:!;he establishments of ihe. S.E •. and of its ,dep-
. ' .. .. 
endep.t: gro~~ .un.de~akings in a.coordance with the principles ~pplic~'ble to the 
election of representatives to the European Works Council. 
The election of employee representatives by the electoral college is also 
i.."ltended to take place on the basis of proportional representation. 
If elections are held in only one establishment, they a,ioG·~to be conducted 
on a. direct basis, again, by proportional representation. 
.;. 
673 
As regards the electoral rules in detail, reference should be made to 
Annex III and to the explanatory notes thereon. 
4. Paragraph 2 now takes the Opinion of the European Parlia• 
ment by requiring a majority of the employee representatives to be 
employed by the S.E. or by group undertakings controlled by it. 
A proportion of the employee representatives may, ho~eTer, 
fall outside tho scope of such an employment relationship. Where the 
number of employee representatives is three, this applies in the case 
of one of them; wher~ there are five, seven or nine employee represent-
atives, as is arithmetically possible under Article 74 (3), this 
applies in the case of two of them. 
The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament stressed 
the need to include, amongst employee representatives, people who 
are better able than those employed in the undertaking to consider 
the undertaking both within the overall economic context and from the 
point of view of the particular industry. 
' ... ; .. 
~....... ~ ... 
However, according to the opinion of the European Parliament, 
it should be left to the employees of the s.E. ·to decide whether 
they also want to nominate and to elect as their repres~ntatives to 
the Supervisory Board persons not employed in the establishments of 
the S.E. 
.;. 
.. 
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5. Paragraph 3 provides tha:t, in general, employees of dependent .group 
undertakings will take part in the election of the Supervisory Board of the 
S.E., even if the S.E. is itself a group u:ndertt'lcing controlled by onother 
undertoking. This provision is bdsed on. the same principle as the original 
second sentence of Article 130(1) regnrding the Group Works do~ci.l in a 
sub-gToup. This provides that where an undertaking in a. sub-group is· ·c011trolled 
through an S.E., its employees must be suitably represented in the decisian-
mclcing process of the S.E. at sub-group level. 
However, employees in a group undertaking controlled -by an S.E. do not 
hc.ve to be represented. on the Supervisqry Boa.rd of the S.E., if the ~ •. E. is 
"- group undertaking controlled by o. cv'*pany. on llhose governing ~dies employees 
of the S .. E. and its dependent undertakings are represented in a manner equi v-
alent to that required unc.er the provi$ions in respect of the s. E. rego.rding 
the composition and pOwers of the Supetvisory Boa.rd. In this ca.se, the 
I ' 
employees'. represen-tatives on the ~persory Boc.rd of the s.E_. a.r~ only. 
eleoted by its own employees~ However, 1 the employee~ in undertak~gs controlled 
by the s.E. a.lso o.ppoint representa.tiv~s to the corresponding bodies of the 
controlling group compcny along with the employees of the S.E. 
Diffe~t .. o.dditiona.l provisions w-Puld multiply the number of electo.ra.l 
procedures and unnecessarily complice.tb the .decision-making struct~e within ., 
the eroup • 
.;. 
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6. Para.gr2-ph 4 provides that only dependent group undert<Jkings whose ret;istered • 
offices are situated 'trlithin the Cor:ununity r.Jay po.rticipate in elections to the 
Supervisory Board of the S.E. The St~tute car~ot impose requirements as to 
elections outside its field of applic~tioni nor could the courts gu3rantee 
that they would 0e properly inplcmented. ~.'Ioreover, undertokings wl~ose rebistorcd 
offices are situated outside th0 Community ~d which arc dependent on an S.E. 
do not come within the provisions of the Statute regarding groups. 
Par'1[;r::ph 4- l.;ys down a genero..l provision for the elebtion of employees' 
representatives to the Supervisory Board, to prevent the series of individual 
provisions which apply to dependent grO'llP undcrtokings from beco::1ing too tm-
wieldy. 
Article 138 
1. The European Parliament was in f~vour of enployees not being represented 
on the Supervisory Board of the s.~. if a majority of the employees so decide. 
The Commission has decided to adhere to this principle in pl.~.ce of the original 
requirement of a two-thirds majority in favour of renom1cing representation. 
However, in view of the electoral rules in luticle 137, this decision ccn 
no lon&-er be taken solely by the employees in the S.:::!). The employees in dependont 
group undertakings who p~rticip~te in the election of employees' representatives 
to the Supervisory Board must also be tclcen into account. Article 138 (1) 
incorporates for this purpose the provisions relating to enti tl8ment to vote 
contained in 1Uruaex III, Article 2, and provides that e~ployees will not be 
represented on the Supervisory Board if a mc.jority of the employees \-Tho are 
entitled to vote in cocordance with Anne;:: III J.rticle 2 vote ~cinst represent-
ation. 
2. At the request of the European ParliaQont, paragraph 2 cl~rifies the effect 
of a decision against representation tclcen in accordance with Article 138 (1) • 
. j. 
• 
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A~icles 139 to 143 
1. Since the electoral rules er~now cantairied in Article 137 (1) and 
l~ex III, the previous provisions relating to the election of employees' 
representatives to the Supervisory Board of the S.E. have been deleted. 
2. The provision contained in the previous Article 142 wa.s for sclieina.tic 
rec.sons incorporated in Article 74b (1) in Sect ibn 2 of ·T~ tle .t;/· in~ the fonn 
in whioh it appears as I..rticle 143 (l) of the Opinion of the Europe.an Po.rlic-
oent. The applic~tion of I..rticle 143 (2) in the version of the Opinion of the 
.European Parli8lllent we.s extended to all members of the Supervisory Board, a.r.1d 
incorporated in this form in Article 74c (2). 
Article 144 
1. The tl3rm of office and its premature termination are now governed in 
respect of all members of the Supervisory Board by Articles 74c and 74d. 
Article 144 has therefore been deleted. 
2. ·Article· 144!'• in the version of the Opinion of the Euro;,ean Parliament has 
been incorporo.ted in eh m:aended form in Article 74e. This Article provides for 
o. system of !i.ppeal to the courts in the case of gross dereliction of duty, in 
nccorda~ce with·the· proposal of.the European Parliament, ~hough applying 
equally to the Supervisory Boa.rdl' 
! .. rticle 145 
,. I 
1. The. first sentence of p~a.graph 1 retains unchanged, for the sake of 
o~~rity, the first eentence of the old provision, although. tAe principle of 
equali~y of rights end obligations is alre~.d;y :Provided for in Title "fV ~ in 
particular in Articles 80 end 81 and now additionally, in Article 74e • 
,j. 
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2. In order to prevent oisundorst~ndings, it w~s expressly laid down that 
m8mbersnip of the Supervisory Board should be compatible with wembership of 
the various bodies representing employees. A similar provision was laid clm·m 
in i~.rticle 107 (2) with regard to the reln.tionship betvreen oembership of the 
Europem1 \'forks Council and membership of national bodios representing Ci-1l>L~r­
ees. Membership of both the \'forks Council C~nd the S.lpervisory Bon.rC::. is commcn 
practico )n the Federcl Republic of Germany. 
Tor example 
.3. ·.;:he first sentence of p~-,ragraph 2 regc.rding protection from dismissal 
corresponds essenti~lly to the second sentence of the previous version of 
Article 145. Po.rc:.e;rnph 2, moreover, contains a pare.llel provision to thn:li 
contained in article 113 (1) and (2). 
Section four 
Regulation of Terus of EnplJyracnt 
Article 146 
Article 146 regarding the special ccpacity of the S.E. to conclude collect-
ive agreements was extended at the request of the European Parliament to include 
a provision ensurin~ that favourc.ble terms obtained in the individual cstcblish-
mcnts of the S.E. take precedence ... it m1y one time, tho most favourable -terns 
of emplcyrJent should apply in respect of employees. 
Article 147 
The Europonn Trade Union Confederction was not in favour of the idea thc.t 
terms of employment agreed in a Europecn collective agreement might, under 
para,cra~h 2, bo extended by the contrcct of employrnent to employees who do 
not belong to a trade union. 
Encroachment in this wcy upon the right to conclude contracts freely 1Jy 
prohibiting an extension of the contract seems,however, to be beyOhd the 
linited o~jectives of the Statute for the Europerun coopany. It cannot be 
inferred from this provision, which is concerned vnth the i~dividual contrnct 
of employment, that thu colleoti vely agreed conditions of employment are 
generally binding. 
• 
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Title VI ... Prepa.ro.tion of the Annual Acco~l.'tlts 
The provisions of this Title ~ave beon adapted to follow the 
amended ;P.roj&sal .lJt ·.a-1J'otlrih ·.Dit'~'t~:.-=,·Ue ~1 :aocou~ .. fit , li~i ted 
liability coopanies (Bulletin of. the E~c. - Supplement 6/74) and the proposal 
Directive en the structure of societas anonymas (OJ No « 131, of a Fifth 
13 December 1972 ), as expressly requested by the lliropea.n Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. liost of the anendments which 
follow are the result of this' adaptation and do not therefore require 
a special commentary. 
A draft Directive on the preparation of group accounts is at 
present still under preparation by the Commission. On its compl:e- · 
tion, the provisions in Section 6 of this Title (Preparation of 
Group Accounts) will have·to be adapted to follow it. 
Article l@ 
The irl'clusion of, a; statement ot source and application of 
funds in the annual accounts of the s.E. is .the· result of a f!Uggestion 
by the Europeen Pn.rliament. The reader of the balance sheet should 
be informed about the funds tl.t the compmzy's disposal during the 
accounting year, the sources of these funds (e.g. the yecr's.profit, 
increase in capital• issuing of debentures), and bow they have bee 
used (e.g. purchase of plant, increase of stocks, dividends). A 
much clearer view of the o~•s financial position will be obtained 
with the provision of a funds statement. The importance of the funds 
statement is becoming increasingly recognized in accounting practice, 
a.nd it -is, moreover, already requirai:iim some Member states for companies 
quoted on the stock exchange. The ~osllid:»tM6"tiv~ &ri tbt ~~~tua. 
to be-publiShed when socurities are aduitted to official stocl~ 
exchange quotation {OJ No C 131 of 13 December 1972) contains a corres-
ponding provision. 
_:v.,.:.. 
..... ,; 
...• 
The general provisions vJhich r..pply to tho drmdng up of the 
' ' ' 
rccyJ.ircr.,cnts as t0 the content and ln.y-out of the funds statement, 
which are to be determined by developments in prn.ctice. This 
process is not yet far enough ~dvanced to emble detailed rules t·o 
be -formulcted at present on this part of tho n.nnual accounts. 
Article 151 
:Jiscounts r.ru.st always be shown as a sepal'ate item, whether 
they appear in the balance sheet on in tho notes of the accounts 
( cf. Article 138 ). 'l1hey may be shown under costs of forEmtion. 
Article 161 
Particular L~portance is also ascribed in other parts of the 
Statute to the relatiom:hip of tho S.E. ldtb majority··held sub-·· 
siQiaries or ~nth undertrucings which hold a cajority interest in 
tho S.E. Such relationships are also relevant for the purposes 
of disclosure. The concept of the associated undertaking is 
therefore extended to include these relationships. 
Art i cl_e l§! 
.· 
This ~revision is modelled on Article 30 of the amended proposal 
of a Fourth Directive on annual accounts. !~ticle 31 of the draft 
Directive also authorizes the revaluation of tengible fixed assets 
and of pnrticipating interest and other financial aosets. Thqse 
revaluations, which are intended to fix the value of assets at 
• 
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present values, do not have to be carried out according to a 
fixed system. This provision mey seem acceptable ha.ving regard to 
the accounting _practices in some l•Iember States. For tho s .. :c. hoHcv·er, 
such a provision ·appears less d.esirable. Only a. systeLlatic 
revaluation on the basis of one of the methods set out in Article 181(1) 
is therefore pernitted. 
Article 191 
1. To ensure that the record is complete, the information required 
under iter:t 10 must also include the total eLloluments received 
b,y the people_ concerned on account of their positions of a 
comparable na.ture in undertakings dependent on or controlling the 
s.E. 
2. If the classical purchase price or production cost method of 
valuation is used in preparing the annual accounts, the S.E. must, 
in accordance with item 13, supply additional information as to 
the ~ount, of its_ assets r.nd the results for the yor,r, calcule.ted 
on the basis of one of the more recent valuation methods specified 
in Article 181(1)). It_ is important that this information is shown 
on the acoc'\)llts, so th<?~t the possible effects of inflation on the 
assets an4 the cor.rpany re!3Ults oan be gauged. There is no similar 
duty of di~closure in the emended draft Fourth Directive. The 
methods of valuation mentioned are not yet part of accounting 
practice in most of tho Member States, and their intrOduction could 
make effective auditing dU'f'icult. PNen though the introduction 
of such a duty ot: disolosu:re for all companies under na.tiona.l lp.w 
as part of a process of approximation still appears premature, it 
m~ nevertheless be instituted in respect of the S.E., which can 
draw on the necessary experts. 
1. The group aocml.nts must, like tmaocounts;.:referred to in Article 148, 
contain a funds statement, in this case for the whole group. 
2. Article 227 is incorporated in l~icle 196. 
(' ~· 
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In accorJ.ance t-d. th a proposal from tho European Parliament, 
paragraph 2 has been clarified to show that the admission procedure 
and the examination do not necessarily have to be governed by legal 
provisions. The conditions contained in this pn.ragra!'lh V"lill also 1~e 
fulfilled if the admission p:l:'ocedure and the exar:inction are 
recognized under national law. 
Articles 203 a ~- 21Q 
1. These .Arti.cles h<::.ve been adapted to follow the provisions of the proposal 
of. a ; . :· ...... ~fth Directive and, insofar c.s thc.'Y are concerned •ri th 
the publication of annual accounts, tho corresponding provisions 
in the draft Fourth Directive. 
2. The rulec governing the independence of auditors contained in 
:l.I'ticlc 203 a and 203 b n.lso take account of the relationships 
betvreen tho S.E. and undertcl<:ings dependent on it or controlling it. 
3. Article 209 governs the auditor's liability, as before pari passu 
~nth that of the special auditor under the new Article 15(3). This 
pro~o~or. corresponds with that reearding necbers of the Board 
of :f.:anagemont (Articles' 71 and 72 a) and of the Supervisory Boa.rd 
of the S.E. (Articles 81 and. 81 a). 
4• The provisions concerning tho discharge of t~e members of the 
Board of Management and of the Supervisory Board in f~ticle 216(3) 
and Article 218 have been deleted ~d not replaced~ In conformity 
vrlth Article 14(5) .of the draft Fifth Directive, the general 
meeting can still bring a civil action irrespective of whether it 
has granted a discharge from liability. 
EKplanatory notes 
'lii'tle VII-- Groups of- Companies 
, T~e essential feature of the rules applicable to groups of 
- ' . -
~ompll.Uies, contained in the previous proposal, have been retained. The 
E.'uropean Parliament has accepted in principle the provisions of the 
Stat-q.te applying to groups of companies and has approved the creation 
of the legal framework on which the operation of a group of companies 
. -
is based and the pJ>Otection to be afforded to outside shareholders and 
creditors of dependent group companies. The Economic-and Social 
Cormnittee has proposed no fundamental changes to these provisions either. 
Certain new rules have been added. The application of the 
protective provisions to sub-groups controlled by an S.E. is more 
' 
precisely defined (Article 224). The controlling group undertaking is 
now entitled to acquire the shares of outside shareholders of a. dependiiDg 
group compaZJy once it holds ninety per cent of its shares-. Similru:tly, 
outside shareholders are also entitled to require that their shares be 
acquired (Section 4). FUrther, provisions ha.ve been included concerning 
the liability of members of the board of directors of the controlltillg 
group undertaking for damage resulting fro~ their· failure to exercise 
the necessary care in conducting the group management (Section 6 ). 
Lastly 1 transi tiona.l rules have been laid down for applying the pr9vistons 
to group relationships already in exi~ence prior to the forma-tion of the 
S.E. (Section 7). 
Section 1 ·~ Defini tioQ, and Scope 
Arti'cle 223 
1. According to the criteria for defining- the existence of .a group in 
Fagraph· 1 1 tlie legal form of the controlling undertaking· is not a 
decisive factor. The grouping of legally autonomous undertakings 
under uniform· management can be organized other than in· the legal 
form of a company limited by shares. A rule that made provision only 
for controlling group undertakings in the form of a limited compally 
would be easy to circumvent •. 
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This does not apply to dependent g~oup undertakings. The definition 
in pe.rr..graph 1 takes accoupt only of dependent group undertakings 
carried on in the legal form of a limited company (paragraph 1). With 
other legal forms involving a greater degree of personal liability 
it is difficult to conceive of a conflict between the interests of 
the company aJ1d those of the group which might put outs:i.de shareholdr:rs 
and creditors at risk. The original propcsal also intended that the 
safeguards of the 3rd Section should apply only to limited companies; 
as shown o/ Article 238 of the previous version. lJi th the intro-
duction of Article 223(3) of the new version this Article has become ' 
redundant. 
2. In parn.grn.ph 1 the phrase "whether existing within the r.!ember States 
or not" has been deleted as being redundcnt. Article 224 defines the 
scope of application of Title VII. 
3. Title ~~I applies only to dependent group companies formed under ~he 
ln.w of a llfei•lber State. Paragraph 4 is worded accordingly, as are 
Articles 224(1), 225(1) and 228(1). 
1. Certain .drafting changes have been made, especially 'dth. regard to 
the new Section 6. 
2. The criteria laid dow.n in Article 223(l)·for defining the existence 
· of a group are based on the economic unity of the gr.oup. The group 
consists of ~ controlling unde~aking and one or more dependent 
companies under the uniform management of the controlling undertaking. 
The concept "controlling undertaking of a group'' in Art.icle 224 must 
be interpreted in accordance with the definition in Article ~23(1). 
. . 
This means that where an indirect relationship of lllnp00dence exiuts, 
the safeguarding provisionJ3 to the benefit of the o-g.tside shareholders 
and creditors must be applied by the unde~aking in overall control 
of the group. In fact, only this un~ertaking has the right to issue 
instructions under,Article 240. 
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A special situation arises, however, where further group companj,.es 
' . 
a.re controlled through a dependent S.E. within J. c_.:r· ..l.~:"~, i ...... 
j '. .. 
where a sub-group is controlled by a.n s~E. If applic<:..tion of t .. 1c 
provisions safegUarding outside Shareholders and creditors were 
not extended to group compa;ni~s controlled through an S.E. it 
l'10uld be simple to circumvent the provisions of this Ti'tle. · 
Companies forming an S.E~ would only need to ensure that tbe 
S.E., instead of being at. the top of the group structure, · 
occupied a.n· intermediate position· in the chain of group companies. 
The provisions of Title VII Would then apply merely to the 
relationship between the controlling group undertaking and the 
dependent s.E. within the group, but not to group companies 
aontrolled through the S.E. For this reason the scope of 
apptioation of-Title VII now extends to cover $he situati.on where 
a sub-group is controlled by an S.E. A further consideration is 
:that· employees of ·companies in a. sub-~group are protected a.t .the 
.level' of the s.E., which controls it. They participate in the 
elections to the Supervisory Board of the s.E. and ·are repr,esented 
on the Group Works . Council of the S.·E. 
The following diagram illustrates the situations that cottld arise t 
;.. l. :·~ 1. y~ 1. y) 2. 2. s.E • ..,. ~ 2. 1 . 
3. X /. 3. Xor s .• :m.~· 3. S.E. /.!. ~ 
X : dependent group oompe.rli1" formed under the la.w of a 
Membur state 
y ,. c~ntrolling gt-oup undertaking (not a.n S.E. ), irres-
pective of the location of its regestered office 
· T~e arrows indicate which undertaking must gi-ve. the guarantees· 
r~ferred.to in Sections 3 and 5 to which other undertaking. 
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Situation A 
rJ.~·<c 8.~. exorcises uniform r:m.nngemcrl;t and is_ therefore also able 
to cause loss or damage to company 3 through company .2. For this 
reason it must give both companies the guarnnteeE laid down. Other 
provisions of the Statute are based on the same concept so th~t,. 
for exar.J.ple, .the Supervisory Board and the shareholders of the 
S.E. enjoy a right of access to information in respect of the 
dependent group compopy 3 (Articles 73 and 90(1)). A Group. Work~ 
C-:mncil, in which the interests of the enplo;rees of comp.'1IlY 3 
arc also repres6nted, must be forme~ within t~e S.E. 
§.ituation B 
The dependent S.E. within the group must, for its part, protect 
shareholders and creditors of company 3 (paragraph 3) •. It counts 
as a controlling undertaking of a group under the terns of Articles 
225 to 240 d and must give the guarantees laid down in Sections 3 
and 5· It also hcs the right under Article 240 to issue instructions 
and is subject to the rules on liability contained in Articles 240 a 
to 240 c • In the event of an exchange of shares, the shareholders in 
.compa.ey 3 become normally outside shareholders in the S.E. and are thus 
agein covered b,y the safeeuards of Section 3 (Article 224(1)). If 
the conditions laid down in Article 228(1) a or b were .satisfied 
the S.E. could also make c direct offer of an exchange of shares 
in company 1. On the other hand, the S.E. must ~ot be allowed to 
calculate the equalisation p~ent provided for in Article 228(2) 
on the basis of ita own profit for the year. The S.E. is itself 
•' 
a dependent company within a group and could guffer ~hrough the 
exercise by company 1 of its right to issue instructions. Article 
231(2) b acco~dingly contains special rules. applicable to a sub---group. 
There is no need for similar provisions in respect of creditors. 
Creditors of compn.ny 3 become cred:l.tors of the s.E. when the 
provi Bions of Article 239 apply and thus they become oredi tors 
of company 1 where necessar.y 
/ 
6ut 
Si tun.tion C 
Outside shareholders end creditors of the S.E. must be protected 
not by comp..:-my 2 but by company 1. Undertakings 1, 2 and 3 form 
a group. Since 1.:mderta.ldng 1 exercises unifom ma.nagmaantt tt is 
ultimately liable for any harm done to the S.E. by company 2. 
In the case of oil exchange of shares, an equalization payment 
under Article 228(2) or liability for non··payment under Article 239, 
any guarantees given by company 2 to the S.E., could also be to 
little effect. Company 2 is itself a dependent company within a 
group and could. be injured by und.ertc.king 1. 
., 
1. In certain circumstances it can also be important to an undertaking 
fomed under ndional law to know with certainty whether o~ not it 
must be regarded as a controlling undertaking .of a group 1iithin 
-the meaning of the Statute and whether ·it must therefore give tho 
guarantees laid do"t-m in Sections 3 wd 5• For this reason the right 
to apply to the Court of Justice for' a decision under paragraph 1 
is extended to such companies also, as it is,of course, to dependent 
group companies in a sub-group controlled by an s.E, 
2. In calculating tho s~~res which must be held by outside shareholders 
under ,ParnSra~ 2(a), thooe owned directly or indirectly by the 
controlling group u.nC.erta.king or uhich are attributable to it must 
be left out of account. The criterion for calculating the 
shareholding in an s.E. ~~e been deleted and has not been replaced. 
3. The inter3st s of er:rplo~rees of a group company controlled by an 
S.E •. vxe catered for in the n~~er laid down in this Statute 
when the election of members of the Supervisory Board of the S.E. 
is organised and through the formation of a Group ~~orks Council. 
For this reason employees end their repres0ntative bodies have 
an interest equal to that of outside shareholders 3nd creditors 
of a dependent group company in being able to apply to the 
court for a decision as provided under this Article (paragraph l). 
Section 2 - Publioitx 
Article 226 
l·!hen giving notice that it belongs to a group, the S.E. must 
mnke clear the position whior. it occupies in the group stn1oturc, end, 
where it is a dependent group company, it nmst publish the nrune of 
the controlling group undortclcinz. 
Article 22] 
This Article ha~ been incorporated in Article 19G • 
.§..~.£!.;.2!Ll.:· Protection of O'.J.tside shC!reholclers 
.Article 22~ 
1. Under the original propo:::al a controlling group undert~ing \'rhich 
was a~ S.E. or a company limited by shares formed un~er national 
law w.th a reeistcred offico within a Member State heA to offer 
outside shareholders tho option of a cash pa~rment or an exchnn0e of 
shares. I~ certain circumstance~ such a rule could place a heav,y 
financial burden on the controllinz group undertaking, especially 
if, whore the shareholdi~g was a relatively small ono, a large 
number of outside shareholders was to opt for a cahh settlement. 
For this reason the controlling group undertaking har:> now been given 
the right to choose between a cash p~ent nnd an exchange of shares 
but only, of course, in the oases specified in sub-paragraphs 1 (~) 
and 1 (b). ~~oro thu controllin~ undertaking is an S.E. or a company 
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limited by shares formed under the law of a Menbor State, it may 
I 
offer a cash p~ent or an exchange of shares or both, in which ease 
the choice is left to tho outside Sh~eholders (paragraph l(a)). 
A company limited by ~ares not formed under the la\i of a Mcmb(lr 
State ma~y offer outside shareholders only a cash payment or the 
choice between a cash payment and an exchange of shares. vJhere a 
company limited by shares formed outside the Community is involved, 
there could be problems in examining the share exchange :n;t.ica, so 
that in this case tho offer of nn exchange of shares alone ~s not 
permitted. Where an exchonge of shares is offered, the shareholders 
must al~s be in a position to opt for a cash settlement (paragraph 
l(b)). 
... 
l'lliere shares are exchr'..nged, tho controlling group undertaking may 
offer (convertible) debentures instead of its own sh~res. rJhere c 
sub-group is controlled by an S.E., the latter Lley, ns an alternative, 
offer shares in the group company t-Ihich controls it 1 provided that 
the conditions laid down in paragraphs l(a) azdl(b) are satisfied. 
2. Under,Article 231 of the original version the controlling group 
undertaking had disc~etion.to offer outside shareholders an annual 
e(lualization payme.nt D.s. t:rel.l. Thio rule can lood to outside shc..re-
.. 
holders boing forced t.o relinquish their shares since no real 
alt:.er.tlelllli- is o~en to them if they are offered an excessively lot-1 
payoont or no.~~ent at all. 
The second p'?..l'agre.ph of ·Article 228 of the new version requires the 
controlling group underta~ng to offer an annual equalization paynent 
in every case and, in a.dcb.tion, Article 231 of the ne\'1 version.leys 
down certain criteria for calculating its amount. This ensures that 
outside shareholders have complete freedom to decide whether or not 
to relinquish their shares. 
1 The ~ ni tiu.ti vc for the proocdurc laid down in Section 3 must be 
,.) . .... 
taken by· the controlling group undertaking (pr,racrcph 1) which 
must itself decide on the opt.ions open to it under Articles 228(1) 
and 231. The procedure has thus been modified in thC'.t 1mdor tho 
original proposal tho controlling group undortnking l'l'C..S roquiretl 
to submit a proposal only after it had received tho exports' 
report on tho adequacy of thu offers of tho dependent group 
undertaking (!iZ'ticle 233 of tho former version). 
Articles 229 Jlt2.L2.30 
ThGso provisions have been incorporated in tho first paragraph 
of Article 228 except for Article 230(3) which it has been possible 
to drop in the light of tho last sentence of t~ticlo 224(3). 
Article 2 ~.1. 
Tho annual equalization p~cnt_to be offered by the controlling 
group undertakine must provide outside oharo~olders with a real 
alternative; the criteria for caloulnting its nmmmt ho.ve aecordinely 
been more precisely defined. Those criteria arc designed to secure a 
minimum amount but the annuc.l equalization amount can be higher. They 
also provide a yardstiCk to tho exports who arc required to exrunine tho 
adequacy of tho offer un~or Article 232. The annunl equalization 
payment must be o.t least as much as the dopen~ent group company's 
potential future dividend. It may be calculated on the basis of 
future dividends payable by the controlling group undertaking only if the 
latter is an S.E. or a company limited by shares incorporated under 
nationn.l law (paro.graph 2(a.) ). In this caso the ra.tio botl-men both 
companies' shares must be calculated and examined qy tho experts as 
provided for in Article 232. 
According to po.ragraph 2(n) read togothor with Article 224(3) of 
the new version, where a sub-group is controlled by an s.~., tho latter 
could calcul~te tho payment on tho basis of its future divi&ends. This 
>rould, however, be h:ss approprio.to since the S.E. is i tsolf a dependent 
company within a group. Pa.ru.grt1ph 2(a.) therefore provides that in this 
case the ca.louln.tion may be made by reference only to future dividends 
paid by the compnr~ with overall control. 
Arti.Q.l,e 23~ 
1. Tho dependent group company need appoint experts only after tho 
c_ontroll:ing group undertaki~ has made the offers under Article 228 
(see explanatory notes to Article -228(3)). The experts' report 
is intended for the out side shareholders, who mey have sight of 
its entire contents (Article 234(3)). 
2. ThG experts are under the same liability for errors and omissions 
in their report as the auditors under Article 15(3) (paregr~ph 1). 
Protection of outside shareholders is strengthened through thoi'r 
; 
richt to challenge the appointment of the experts before the court 
within uhose jurisdiction the registered office is situated on the 
grou..'lds that they are insufficiently unbiassed, ond to ask for 
other experts to be appointed (paragraph 2 ). 
4. Paragraphs 3 to 5 are modelled on Article 23 • 
.Article 233 
1. Because of thv changed procedure under Article 228, paragraphs 1 
to 3 of the original version have become redundant. 
2. Paragraph 4 of the original version has been aligned on Articles 
228 and 232(1) of tho amended version. 
Article 2~fl 
1. At least one month must elapse betweon the date of convenine the 
General :Meeting required to decide on the offers a.nd the date on 
which it is held. This ensures that outside shareholders have 
sufficient tioe to consider the matter (paragraph 1). 
2. Paragraph 2 is aligned on the amended version of Article 223. 
3. With regard to the last sentence of paragraph 3, see Article 23(b)(3) 
of the amondod proposal. 
1\.rticle 235 
1. Paragraph 1 has been aligned on tho ~ended version of Articles 6 
nnd 223. 
2. Under paragraph 3 the proceeJ.ings of the General I·~eeting arc to be 
recorded in a notarial deed. The minutes arc to be filed ru1d made 
available to ony interested p~rty. 
Article 236 
1. The General M:eetin~ might possibly reject pnrt only of the proposals 
of the controlling group undertaldnt;. Hhere such rejection relates 
to nn offer 1<rhich is not mandatory under Article 228, e.g. to a.n 
exchange of convertible debentures ldth a simult<:meous offer of a 
c~sh p~ent, a decision of thv co~rt under Article 236 is unnecessary, 
It would be necessary only if tho entire settlement procedure were 
blocked through rejection of the offer by the General Nceting. 
The controlling group undortiking waul~ appear to be the most obvious 
potential applicant, although the possibility of its ceasing to 
operate, thus· preventing the procedure from taking its course, must 
not be excluded. In this case thv indiv~dual shareholders of the 
dependent &"roup compn.:ny have the ritjht to apply to tho court. 
2. The experts appointed by the court (pnr~graph 3) arc. under the saJne 
liability as the auditors under Article 15(3). 
Article ill 
1. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 have bGen ~ligncd on l1rticlc 228 as nmendcd. In 
addition, paragraph 1 gives a more precise dufinition of the term 
"conpany journals" o.s applied to dependent group companies not in 
the lugal form of an S.E. 
2,. Para~:;rv.ph 5 makes the e;roup undertaking concerned jointly and· 
severally liable for making tho annual equalization payments. 
.-
Sec~.i,on ~ - Relinaui shmenLof minorj. t:y, sho.rop..q,ldere 
· This Section ·is ne\v• Under the lm'l of some Uember States, where a. 
companY holds more than a certain percentage of the shares of a.."lothcr 
·company, it has the right, in certein c~rcumstances, to acquire the 
shares of the reno.ining minority shareholders in that company • · The 
introduction of such a rule for the ~.E. l'IOUld appear entirely juBtified, 
and it 'WOuld appear appropriate to tie this directly to the criteria 
for determining the existence of a group as defined in the Statute. 
It is precisely in a group, especially where there are dependent 
group companies with only a few minority shareholdero, that the interest 
( 
of majority and of minority shareholders may conflict. In such circum-
stances it oould be in the interests of the controlli-ng group u..Ylder-
taking to make the dependent group compal'l\1 entirely subordinate to the 
interests of the grvup and to integrate it into the group policy. This 
would be made much simpler if it could ac~tire the shares of minority 
shareholders in the dependent company. Further, in su.ch cases the few 
minority shareholders aro not in a particularly env:! able·· posi t;i'on; ·, tM.rr 
ability to influence the workings of the conpany is in practice negligible. 
There is therefore every ranson for giving them tho opportunity of 
relinquishing their shares in it. 
Under the following ru.les, the proportion of shares l'Ihich must be 
held is fixed at ninety per cent. Once its holding roaches or exceeds 
this percentage the controlling group undertaking mey- acquire the &'1ar~s 
of outside sharehold,.ers of a dependent group conparcy--and the·outside 
shareholders I:ley, for their part, requiro that their shares be acquired. 
Tho controlling group un6.ertaking ma;y ncquire ninety per cent or 
I:lOre of tho shares of the dependent group compn.n,v at various tiraes. 
Basically throe cases are possible. It nay hold this percentage when 
. •. 
the group· co:r.ws into existence, the percentage may be· r<:1achod in the 
cov~se of the procedure laid dow.n in Section 3, or as a recrult of the 
acquisition of further shares after coopletion of the procofr~e. 
Article 238 a lays down rules eoverning tho first and the third cases 
~mile the second case is covered by /~ticle 238 b • 
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l·!horo the ~bove-montioned percentage has already been reached 
or exceeded by tho tiou tho group comes into existence, the controlling 
-group-undertaking mey elect to carrJ out either the procedure ln.id 
down in Section 3 or a procedure under Article 238 a • The difference 
between the two is that in the first case, outside shareholders nunt 
be offered an o.nnunl equalization rn.yncnt. If the controlling group 
undertcldng does not wish to acquire the shares of nll outside share-
holdors nt the time vJhen the group comes into existence it can still 
decide to do so later. 
h~ero the controlling group undertaking acquires ninety per cent 
or more of the shares only after conpletion of the procedure luid 
down in Section 3, it does not need to decide imr:10diately whether or 
not to acquire the shares of tho remaininc outside shareholders~ No 
period is laid do1rm within which thin decision must be tnken. 
The controlling eroup undertaking cust in all cases ~1ediately 
notify its acquisition of ninety per cent or more of the sharos to the 
dependent group conpar~ concerned so thht this nay be published in 
the company journals (pnragraph 2). It is on the basis of this 
inforuation that out side shareholders r:my thomscl ves en·force their 
right to relinquish their shares. 
If tho controlling group un;lertclcing 'd.sh·JS to ncquire the shares 
of tho out siclo shareholders it must offer them n cash payment or an 
exchange of shares. The provisions of Sect:i.on 3 rclatin& to the rules 
of procedure, cxnmination ~d the process for reaching a decision 
tmst be applied... Upon publication of tho final offer, tho shares of 
the m.;.t side slmreholdcrs ipso jure bccone the property of the 
controlling group undertaking and outside shareholders c~ then no 
longer act in that capacity. If they hnve a share certificate this 
is evidence only of a claim to a cash payment or an exchange of 
sha.ros(parCJ.uroraph 1) and it cocsos to confer any rights on them. 
If an .outsidE? .shareholder wishes to relinquish his shares the 
controlling group,. '\Uldertald~g must, at his request, make him an _offer. 
It mo.y offer a. cas~ pa;yoe;nt or, in t~e caeec .cpccifi~d in Article· 228(1 ), 
the alternative ,of shares or debentures in exchange.·. The· outsiclc· 
. .. 
shareholders mey so request ~ a:rzy time after pubiica.tion pursuant 
1 •• ' ,: ' 
to paragraph 2. No tillle-limit is laid down. Where, pursuant ""vo this 
provision, the controlling· group undertaking has preViouF·ly acquired 
th_e shares of other outside shareholders it behoves a nev1 applicant 
' ' 
to know l-;hat offer was made to them and its ~.mount. This reduces 
the· ri$: of unequal troatm~t. 
TJ;l;e pr.oco~Ul,'al rules and the rules on examination of the offer 
in Sec;t~.on 3 do riot a.ppl;:( since in this case re~e$tS will·, for th(:l 
r ·~·;:--t pc..rt,, como.from individual outside shareholders and any procedure 
under those rules would be too cwnbersome. ':]:he adeq\lacy of the offer 
in response to a request from an outside sh~eholder does :riot there-
fore need to be examined and verified by an expert. H<mevcr, if the 
outsidG shareholder finds the runount of the offer unnccept.able he ·Llau" 
have recour~e to the' court it Since the court •s decision is of" import.;;. 
anoe to r:my remcining outside shareholders of the company, it must be 
published. 
T~is provision governs the situation whero, on completion of the 
procedure laid down in Section 3, the controlling group company has 
acquired ninety per c9¢ or mor9 of the ca. pi tal of tha dependent £TOUp 
company by obte.ining outside shareholders' Shares for cash or by share 
exchange. The controlling group undertaking mey then subsequently 
acquire the shares of the remaining ,.out side shareholders of the denend-
. " . .. . ... 
ont group compaxzy- who ha.V'o decided to accept the. offer of' an ~\].al 
cqu.alization p~"'D.ent, on the same terms as those offered to them on 
. . ... 
comph~tion: of the proped~e laid _down in Section 3 (Article 237(1) ). 
Tho outside shareholders, .for ~h~ir·part, m~ require that their shares 
be purchased or exchanged o~ those terms. It is perfect~ conceivable 
that th-Jy might wish to alter their original decision to remain members 
of tho conpany onco tho predot1inanco of the controlling group undor-
tald,ng has further increased. 
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The procedure laid down is simple as the conditions for 
acquiring the shares of outsicle shareholders' have alrec:u:cy- been 'tested 
and confirmed. IJ:'ho proceclure must of co~zc be carried out pro~ptl7r 
since tho ndoquacy of the cash payment or share oxchonge ratio mieht 
otherwise become uncertain o~ing to changes in the economic circumstances. 
The procedure is as follows. Uhcre, on expiry of the period 
referred to in l~ticl~ 237(2), the controlling group undertakinr has 
acquired ninoty per cent or more of the capital of the dependent group 
corrpany it must, 1d.thin one w·eek after this period has lapsed, notify 
tho dependent group company whether or not it vii shes to buy out the 
remaining outside shareholders (paragraph 1). This notification must 
be irmnediately published in the compo.rly journals by the dependent 
group company, with details of the ar.:~ount of the cash pa~r::tent or cf 
the share exdhange ratio (parau~n.ph 2). 
If the controlling undertaking does not \nsh to acquire the 
outside s~areholders' shares, these become the property of the 
controlling undertu.king ipoo jure as soon as notification i.s p,.lblished. 
If the controlling undertaking does not \nsh to acquire the 
shares of out side shareholders the latt or Iilo.y, 1-rl. thin one r..o1;1th of 
publication of the notifico.tion, require that their sh~res be o.cquircd 
for cash or by way of an exchange of shares (parneraph 4) • 
... 
If acquisition of the outside shareholders' shares is desired 
neither by the controlling group undertruKing nor by the outside 
shareholders themselves~ both mcy still r~qttest 'this at o. later date 
unc3.cr the general rules in Article 238 n. • 
-~tlqu_2- Protection of creditors 
A--wticle 232 
1. Tho definition of the scope of application in parau~cph 1 has 
been deleted as this is now dealt with definitively in Article 224 .• 
'I 
2. The .words tt jointly:· and: several~tt1 ·in paragraph 1: have been 'deleted. 
The liability -T~ferred. to 'in paragraph l·is not· joi~'!;.·and several 
since C:redi tors must first claim pa;yment · .. from :the c"..epend,e.n:t. group 
'., 
company 'itGelf (paragraph ·2) •. They must-hG.ve made a written: detland 
for p~ent and -have failed to o-btain. satisfaction. 
Section 6 - Irigtrngt:i0'i£! and liabilitx 
Article· 240 
'The original version only· resot ved the conflict· that mey co!'l.fi·ont 
the bqard of directors of the dependent group company when the controllil'.l.g. 
group undertaking exercises 'its de fa-cto power~. This board is ·reqtiired 
·.to~ eaf'egt.tard the in~-erasts of the dependent group ·compally alone. , ·In. 
order-· to establiSh clear: rela.tf.onshi:ps bet-ween -'the ·gr~up und4trta.king~- ·, ~ 
concerned, the controlling ~oup undertaking now enjoys ~ {3~ress rig~t· 
:.to. is13u~ in~tructions •. The right to issue instru-ct_,i.p~e is tP,e ,qounte~:-
.. . . ' ' . ... ; 
part of the gua.r~~ee·s to be~offe~ed _by the· controlli:pg ~oup ~d~x;·.: .... . t • • ·' 
taking. A controlling group undert·aking not formpd :under the latJ of a :· 
' ' . . . ~ . . ... . ' ~ ; ~: .. 
1.1ember State also has the right to issue instructions since· such ~de_:.· 
ta.J;~ngs must also provide the gua.rantee_s• (pa~agraph 1 ). 
The right to issue instructions may be exercised from the time of 
"',•- . 
publication under Article 237. _The guarantee~ are d~initively in fo~ce 
from that time o~wards. 
. .~ . 
. . . 
Problems may a..rise where, under- tth'e law goVerning the dependent 
group'eompa.ny, 'ceMain deciSions of its board ~f dillac:tors may 'be 
ta.lCen only 'with the consent of a. so.pe,~so:ey bOdy.· 
In this connection,_ .the possibili:!iY· must, -also. be 
. considered that ·employees hav.e seats .:on ~)le £U.~rvi-so:ry. body .whose 
cons~t ·is requil·ed •. ·The abili!ty to-. enf9rce ~ ins~ruction ~ven against 
the wishes of ·-a supervisoey, body, which includes such me.t.abers 
• . • ' ' ; .. • • ~' t .. , • ' 
. '. ... .. 
·· . · t~oulQ. appear to be justifi~d 
: .. ' . ~ ~·. •. • . •• ,1 .. 
. ·only if the .interests ()~ the employees of the dependent group company 
. ' ';- ( . . 
1 ·are. protected in the same or in an. equivalent manner in the ·decision-~ 
.• making, proc~dure at. the level ~t: the co~tr~lli,ng. b-oup. und~rt~~g.· 
• #o I ' • • 
.. · 
... 
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This requirement would b,e satisfied in a group or a sub-group con-
trolled by an S.B. Employees in companies within a group controlled by 
an S.L. p9rticipate in electing members to its Supervisory Board. Thus, 
under Article 240(2), the s.~. is able to enforce a decision even if the 
consent necessary at the level of a group company controlled l.y it is 
refused, but only after it has ob_tained the consent of the Supervisory 
Board of the S.E. 
Where the controlling group undertaking is an undertaking· formed 
under national law,it may enforce an instruction against the wishes of 
the Supervisory Board of an 3.~. within a group controlled by it only, 
if the interests of the employees of the s.~. and, in the case of a 
sub-group, of other group companies controlled through it, are protec-
ted· in the same or in an equivalent manner at the level of the con ... 
trolling group undertaking. It is impossible, within the present scope 
of the Statute, to lay down rules as to the structure of a controlling 
group undertaking formed under national law. However, this should not 
result in any reduction in the protection of employees inte1·ests 
afforded by the S.E. 
The reference in paragraph 3 to the powers of a dependent group 
undertaking which is an S.B. under Article 240(2) applies where a sub-
group is controlled by an S.B. Under Article 240 the ,, -u • ..J!I. also has the 
right to issue instructions within sub-groups and is thus able, where 
the conditions set out in Article 240(2) are satisfied, to enforce an 
instruction against the wishes of the superviso~y body of a group 
compa:ay controlled by the s.:c.;., In exercil3ing its rigY-tt to issue in-
structions the controlling group undertaking could disregard such a 
only if the employees 
decision of the Supervisory Boardjof the s.E. and of companies associa• 
ted with it in the sub-group are represented in an equivalent manner 
ori the governinP;1 'b6'di:o-e o:t' the· controlling group undertaking. 
The powers of the employees• representative bodies existing 
within the group undertakings (European Works Council or representative 
bodies within the meaning of Annex I to the Statute) remain unaffected. 
If the controllirtt unr~&rt'1dnr7 of ;'1 eroup is however !H'l. ·'• '• ::n-:.{'1 the 
mt,•N113Ur.-s envicn~o~ :-<ffr .. ct s<~ver~-1 croup un•'ort.,ldni·:s, nrticle 135(2) 
nnd (3) s~~ll opply. 
I ' 
' ' ...... ·-, .... 
Where the controlling group undertaking acquires the right to 
issue instructions und~ Article 240, the board of directors· -of' the··;· 
dependent group compa.ny' 'in:sofar as it' is' required to carry out the 
'instruction~~ becomes. merely the. inStrument tor putting into effect 
.:t .... ,...,· • .. 
the group policy laid down by _the com~ witli overall control. In 
certain circumst~c~s this could adversely ·a.I'fect th~ inter-J.Jlrts' of 
an individual dependent gr~up. ~ompacy~ However,. once the right -to • 
issue instructions' has been reco'gnized the gr6unds are removed f-or '· ·. 
. ' 
holding the membei-s of ih~ board of directors of the latter .company 
liable to it t'or. any. ha.ci. 'th~y- may cause .n: (Article ·240 c).· Liability.-
must in fa9t a.t.ta'ch at group level~ . In ~2:er6isi~ uniform management, 
the members of ·the' 'board of directors ot· the co~trolling underta.kirig, 
and, where there is a supervisory body ·e.nl·a. ·ma:na.gemEmt boey, the 
members of both bodies, must eXercise the necessary standard .pf ·Care·. 
(.t'l.:rticle 240 a). If they fail t?"d_O so,.the ma.ne,geme~~ at group_level 
is liable to .the d~pendent group compa.tzy" for any. x-e~ting harm c~us'?d 
. ." . 
to it (Article 240 b(l))~-
. ' . 
This liability at·ta.ches only from the time at which its powe.rs·, . 
of manaS-ement a,x:e legalized •. · If' the' dependent ·gi-o-&p· company sustains. 
loss as a result_ of instructions ·carried out before this time, the 
members of -the board of directors of the company will ·be subj~ct·. 1:o , 
the traditional rulos ·gov~rniBg' lia.bilit;y: .. , · ·. 
·.-::Pz:oceedings may be 'brou.~t bi one· or more autei'cle ·shareholders 
in accordance with the ~onditi~ns laid down inArti~le-240 b(2}(a.) 
or, wher'e a~propriat~, by 'the liquidator ·or·~t:rtistee ·i'il.barikruptcy 
(Article 240' b(2 )(b))~ , . Since both .t:ht9'··board· of directors· and the 
General Meeting of the dependent group company are entirely under the 
control of the group ·m~emt;int_, they .a.r.e -·~o.t l~ely ~o < dp ~::~o~ . . , , 
-- ::· ..... 
.. . '' 
. . ' 
: ' 
,. 
. ..... 
.... 
'•'l.o 
699 
Section 7- Speci~~~_les_re~gtdipg gto~p [elationshiP§·in v~istence 
I?:r..,ior to the formation of t,he S.J!1. 
I 
h!l,icle 24Q...9; 
• f 
Not frequently the companies that form th·e S.E. l>.'ill therJsolves 
be.l.ong__:tro -a gr<>uJY and_ control one or more dependent B!'OUP companies •. 
After the SeEo ·has been· formed these latter companies could become . 
dependent group companies in a group controlled b,y the S.E., especially 
where an S.E •. is formed by' merger ·Or through the establishment of a 
holding company~ If the S.E. were required to i~ediately apply the 
procedure laid down in Section 3 to al1 such compn.nies, a considerable 
financial burden could be laid on it •. This might, on occss.ion, be seen 
as a reason for :riot· forming an- SeEo FU!'ther, ·t.he question arises as to· 
lvhether the S.E. must be held liable for all the corrmitments of these 
companies. The introduction of transitional rules therefore seems 
appropriate. 
. ' 
The rules a~ply only where the S.E. notifies the Commercial 
Register and publishes in the company journals immediately once the 
group oomes into existence firstly the fact that cert-ain of its 
dependent group companies were, prior to the formation, group companies 
of one of its founder companies, and secondly, the names of the dependent 
group companies concerned (paragraph 1). If the notification is not 
made, the provisions of Sections 3 to 6 must be applied in full. 
Within 18 months after it 'is formed the s.E. need offer outside 
shareholders of the companies notified no more than an annual equalization 
payment (paragraph 2'). The right to issue instructions may be exercised 
and the rules on liability' contained in Articles 240 a to. 240 c apply 
as soon as the annut1l equali'zation ·payment has been determined 
¢paragraph 6). 
The S.E. oust offer a cash ·~~nt or an exchange of shares under 
Article 228(1) within six years of its formation (paragraph 3). ~fuere 
the transitional rules apply1 the S.E. m~ acquire the shares of outside 
shareholders under the Section 4 rules. only after this procedure has 
.. '700 ... 
been completed. From that time onwards outside shareholders ~ 
also . require that their sha+'eS be acquired. und~r these :rules (parOl-
graph 4). This provision is necessary since outside shareholders 
could otherwise require that their shares be acquired immediately 
after formation, provided the requirement of Section 4 were met, 
and could thus invalidate the transitional rules. 
Creditors of the companies notified m~ bring claims against the 
s.E. only in Pespect of commitments arising after the formation of· ·· 
the SeE~ (paragraph 5) • 
• ' r 
'~. ' 
, 
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TITLE VIII 
There h:1vo bacn no fundamental che..neus in t~w rubs for :11 toring 
tho Statutes. 
_l.rticl.J 2-11 
,;?rovid.)s thn.t tho Board of r~Iana.e;-Jmont may :;::>ro~oso an alteration of tho StatutJs 
to the Gon0ral i~Ic..:ting only with tha cons0nt of tho Sup0rvisory Board. It so-Jms 
d<3sirabl-3 to lay down a formal proc0durc of co-o:;>,_,r_Ltion Ni th th0 Su_.Ju:rvis.Jry 
Board similc.r to that unclJr whic!J. thJ ;;>rior aut:J.orioa~i )n Nf ..:rrvd t) in 
.i.rticlo 66(1) is 0l'taimd, with regard. to t~'l.J pru;;Jare,ti0n of Board of r1ana,gom.Jnt 
pro~os3.ls for alt':lr"tti0n C>f th.:J st:1.tut 3s. Tho d_uty form)rly im~1osml upon the 
Board of ~1anagwm..:lnt by 1-.rticL~ 242(3) of justifying its prol.)osals baforo tho 
Gonoral HJ.;jting is doal t with in th3 sucond Jarat,:rra;_);1 of L.rticlo 241, thor0by 
consolid'lting thJ rul.::s rvlatin,c;; to th.J c:_uti.:;s of th.;j Board of ~-:e.naco;,1ont w.Dn 
C~n al tcration of t:1c St~tutos is ~)r::>p.)SJd. 
Th,) rights of tho Gunoral ~IuGting of tho shareholders rJrnain unaffec-
ted by tho no\-r additions. ThJ sharoholdJrs thJmsJl v0s rete"in thu right, ad 
bJfor.J, to r0quest c.lteration of th.:: St:1tutos \'ih..;r.:; .".rticl0s 8) or 86 a.,Jply. 
:1.rt ic L: 2':i-_g 
Par~T,r~~h l has had its wordinG ch~ncod. 
Pan~<;ra~h 2 also includos thJ ro)ort to b.J draim Uj_) by tho Bo:1rd 
of Uanagomont :i)ursunnt to krticLJ 241(2) of tho nvw t..:xt m.1onest docum.:mts 
Paracr:1-ph 3, .-rhich rolatos to this ro)~rt, h'1S b-3on dolotocl ns 
superfluous since its first sontonco has bocomo Lrticl0 241(2) and its second 
scntenco .~ticlo 242(2). 
Th-3 quorum roqniNd undor :xl.rccgr::t:)h 1 t ~ .:m 1.blc tho General 11..; 3t ing 
to rosolv.:J resolutions 0ffoctivoly and tho nuod to conv.)n.:J a socond G0nore.l 
~bating wh..;r_; this quorum is not roached hav\3 boon rogardod \vi th so,no misgivings 
by thoso c.:mcorn8cl in .MGmbor ;.3t:'ltos whos..; com:):ll'\.V lm; contains no ~)r•)Visions for 
such a quoru.'n. 
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However, tho European Parliament has insistod on the need for a 
quorum, a.S r ... quirad in Belgium, Franc.J, Italy and Luxembourg, both h\)ra 
~~ in th~ ceso of a moetinc of dobontur\) holders (4\rticlo 58(2)). Tho 
Commission hr.s not altJrod the first ~arau~aph of l~icl~ 243 since Parlia-
ment has not objected to its present form. 
Paragrap!s 2 and 3 have boon marged so that tho Sta.tute;s ·mey now 
only )rosorico a m~jority highar the~ tho t~rae-qu~rtors majority laid down. 
Thc.w mey no longer impos3 additional roquiramonts a.s WD.S provi~usly possibl·J. 
Thora a,po~rs to be no overriding need fo~ sudh requirements which might give 
ris3 to uncertainty in tha case of a. company oparating in a. European con·taxt • 
.Ll.rtiC19_. 2~2., 
Th3 procodura wherob,y tho Durope~ Court of Justice scrutinises 
alterations to the st~.tutcs h~ c-a~m more clos.Jly alignod with th3 rules in 
Article 17 governing scrutiey of tho formation of tha com:1a.ny, to tho n~m 
taxt of the expla.n3.tory nota to which .\rticlo roforonco mc-,3 bo made. ~it tho 
sam.;; time, account has b<lGn taken of tho Economic and Social Committee •s 
I 
dcsiru that parJ.gra.ph 1 bo amend.Jd. Sub-pa.ragra.~h (b) of the formor paragraph 2 
has b~en drop)ad a.s a. ground for refusing registration since it might have given 
the impression that it roquirad tho court to 3SSCSS the auditors' report 
from an economic standpoint. This thG court is, however, not askJd to do, 
cs?ecia.l~ as the new rule concerning liability in Article 43(~) effoctivoly· 
ensures that ca.pita.l is fully paid U? in all ca.svs. 
The new tart accordingly rlt;Uns only sub-pa.racrnph {b) of the 
previous text a.s a. ground for refusal. However, it mentions on~ the reso-
lution of the General Mooting, since defective procoedincs aut0ma.tical~ result 
in th~ rosulution itself being defective and therefore do not need separate 
mention, as uas ;vrcviously th.J case. 
Par~~a.ph 4 of the now text co~ros~~ds to ,\rtid1tt 246(1). This 
~rJVision rcg~ing registration of the alteration hcs been included in 
Article 245 \'lith thJ other provisions conc::Jrning the ~roccdure for examina-
tion by thu court, so as to match u~ with 1..:-ticl.l 17. 
..; ... 
P?.ra.cra.ph 5 corr.Js~J..Jnds to ~l.r-~icl..; 246(2). This provisi:m,too, 
h~s b.:;.:m incori_Jorat.Jd int.) th() oxistine ; .. rticlo 24) to ma.:0 for 2. cl.Jnrer 
a.rrangam.:mt of tho rul~Js • 
. irticlc 245 
Tn.; ~Jrovisions of P"l..'3.5ra.phs 1 and 2 :1cw ... bo.Jn asswnGt~ into 
Articl.; 245 b.Joauso thoir snbst.?Jlco is closaly r0lat.Jd to it and in view of 
th~ provision mad0 und0r ;;.rticlo 17. 
·Pari'l.r;r1.;:>h 3 :1a.s buon dol-3t :ld since th..; olff . ;ctFJ of an al tor:1tion 
of tho Sb.tut :Js as against third ~)artios arc no1·1 g__,norally d.Jal t with und.;r 
.lrticlo 9-? .• 
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Title IX - Dis!£.lutio;q, LiSC:t;f,de.tion, Bankruptcy und relates .. 
' . . ~ ' . ~ 
At the request of the European Parliament, provision has been 
made for the European Works Council to be consulted before the 
General Meeting reso~ves to dissolve the Qom~. In addition, 
the pre_paration o~ a ·s·o.bial plan hae bee-n prescribed to deal 'with 
. I oonsequenees. . 
socJ.al -· B.l:'1B;J.ng from such a. decision of the General ]1lee~1.ng. 
Furthermore ,provisions of this Title have further b~en changed 'trlth 
regard to certain technico.l points, with pa.rticuler reference to the 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Comittee. It will consequently 
by be possible in future to continue an S.E. to operate whichhas either been dis"' 
General Meeting resolution or by the fpassag~f time provided that· dist'ribti.tio~ · soJ.y,?·i 
of its assets among the shareholders has not yet begun.· 
S~ction l - Dissolution 
A;rticl,e 241 
1. The wording of sub--paragraph c) raga.rd.ing winding-up under 
Article 249(4) hv.s be(m amended so as to state with greater clarity 
that i;eso jur.e dissolution is concerned. ·No other statutory 
grounds for winding-up are at present included in the Statute. The 
Cornmission does not therefora·feel t~ the time is ripe for 
adjustment to the future introduotion of fUrther grounds for 
dissolution, as requ.estad by the ~gal Affairs Coomittee of the 
European Parliament. 
2. .Sub-paragraph d) regarding dissolution upon insolvency now' e~ressly 
.inclu4es the case of_~ssolution b,y a decision of the court refusing 
institution of ba.~ptcy proceedings due to ~ack of assets. 
,. 
3. · Sub-paragraph d) ha.s been added in- order to take account of the 
expansion of ·powers under Article 99 inserted·· a.t the request of );he 
mlx-opean Par-liament.· 
.... 
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1. Paragraph 1 regarding thG condition~ for a rGsolution b,y the Gcner~l 
Meeting to d:i.ssol ve the company :w.s merely beon reworded. 
2. The new paragraphs 2 and 3 take account of thu :&.uropean Parliament's 
lvish to alter Article 125 and ensure that the European Horks Council can 
form an opinion before the General Meeting decides to dissolve the S.E. 
2. The Board of Management must, under po.ragraph 2, both advise and hear 
the views of the European Works Council if it itself intends to propose 
dissolution, and also if shareholders have awplied for dissolution 
under Article 85. 
4. Parao~aph 3 corresponds with Article 125(2). 
Article 248 a 
This Article contains a parallel provision to Al~icle 126 a, adapted 
to the special features of dissolution, rebarding tho social plan to deal 
with the consequences upon the employees of dis~olution decided upon by 
tho General Meeting. 
The provision takes account of the request made by the European 
Parliament for the introduction of a social.t--plan a.oongst the list. of 
decisions requiring approval under Article 123 (Article 123(1) h, of 
the parliamentary draft). 
l1.r'ticle 249 
1. Paragraph 1(2) of this provision regarding the resolution to be passed 
by the General lreeting upon the conpany encountering substantial losses 
has been altered at tha request of the Eurlbpean Parliament in orde!' to 
avoid conflict between the Board of l-1a.nagement and th·.l Supervisory 
Bocrd. The provision, has, further, been worded more clearly. 
2. The report by tho Board of . !vian~eoent a..'ld the Supervisory Board's 
I : 
opinion on dissolution ~~11 in future be cade available not just to 
persons a.tt ending the General Meeting, as w.:~.s previously the case, i' 
.The interests of employees and ·their representatives and those of 
creditors will also be affected by the dissolution. Provision has 
therefore been made in the second sub-paragraph of the new version of 
,. -,-
• 
• 
706 
. i .• 
paragraph 1 for those reports to be made available to axzy- interested. 
perso11. The ori.gi.nal proposal oade similar provision in respect of 
the document of constitution and its appendices (Article 24(2) of 
the original proposal, now Article 23 b(l) 9£ the new version). 
3. The requirements for statutory dissolution Wider parag.1.•aph 4·have 
been stre3Elined at th>:> Eu.ro~ea.n Pa.rlianent 's request. From the 
statutory point of view, the question is merely one of the absence of 
a valid resolution b,y the General Meeting. 
Article 250 
1. Tlais provision has been redrafted in order to clarify the procedure 
to be followed for registering the dissolution and publishing it both 
in the case of dissolution b.1 General Meeting resolution {Article 247 a) 
and in the case of dissolution b,y passage of time (Article 247 b) or 
de jure {Article 247 c). The pr~cedure in the case of dissolution 
through insolvency (Article 247 d) or by court order (Article 247 e) 
is dealt with separately under the provisions e.pJ>lying in such casas 
(Articles 263 and 99). 
2. Para.gra!J}l 1 of the new version governs supervision of the dissolution 
resolution of the General Meeting·{Article 247 a}' by the EUropean Court 
of Justice and registration of the dissolution and pub:lication· thereof, 
by reference to the provisions relating to changes to the statutes. 
- .. 
3. Under the new version of paragraph 2, in the cases of dissolution by 
passage of time (Article 247 b} and de jure (Article 247 c) originally 
covered by Article 250, the liquida.to:rs.;a.re now required to have the 
dissolution registered. Under paragraph l of the original version this 
only ley upon the Board of ~ww.gement. In such cases, however, dissolution 
till 11 OO:rltre:\y to what is -:he case- wi'\h dissolution by reaolu:Uon of the 
General Meeting, a.lreo.ccy- have occured batoN regist~tion.· Th8 potfers of 
the Board of Ma1laBGUient haw in fact been e'xtingul.sh~d upon dissolution and 
passed on to the· liquidators·(Artiole 252(1)). · 
4. Paragraph 2(2) contains the substance of the provision in the previous 
paragraph 2 regarding registration . to be ordered by the court in the 
case o~ dissolution by passage of time or de jure. 
·""• ,( ·, 't" -..~ ... o\. ,·~~ 
~- ~ ... , · .. )), r 
.. 
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The, sccor.d. sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 contains a provision for 
publication applying both to registration of the dissolution by the 
liquidato~s and to registration under court order. The costs proviGion 
thereby becane dispensable and was deleted. 
£Lu~scction 2 - Liquidation 
Article 252 
1. Puragraph 2 of' the riew version has been al terod so as to get out 
;:which 
the occnsiona on tho court ·may intervene in the appointment and 
disQissal of liquidators more clearly. 
If the court orders dissolution of the company under Article 99 or 
registration .of de jure dissolution under Article 250(2), it is then 
proper for the court itself to appoint the liquidators at the outset, 
so as to give a guarantee that abuses or irregularities that have 
occurred cannot be repeat.ed. 
2. Paragraph 3 has been made to state clearly that tho liquidators appointed 
by thu court under paragraph 2, cannot be disnissed .e.g. by the 
General Meeting. 
Article 253 
This provision now states further that it is for tho liquidators 
appointed in each case to not.ify the Conunercial Register. 
Article 2j~ 
At the suggestion of representatives of coomerce a.nd industry, the 
liquidators have now been enabled to distribute assets ~f the company 
amongst the shareholders at their Llarket value rli.ther than eonvort such 
assets into cash, wherever disposal in this ~ is possible - e.g. in 
the case of shares held by the S.E. 
Article 255 
1. The-procedure under paragraph 2 whereby creditors are required to notify 
their clains, has been ~implified by th~ general introduction of notice 
by registered letter instead of tho reference, previously adopted, to 
tho provisions of domestic law governing th~· service of documents. 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
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2. At the request of the l!hropea.n Parliament, and the Economio · a.nti Soo:I.Sl 
Committee, paragraph 3 no longer provides for the extinguishing of 
unnotified claims. According to the aaw version, creditors who , . 
fail to notify their claims within the prescribGd period lose only 
the right to enforce thetr claims on the compa.n;y. Such claios other-
wise continue unaffected - e.g. against third parties l'dth joint 
liability. 
The exception requested by the Economic and Social Comoittee in 
respect of future claims seems inopportune to the Commission. Such 
claims can be provisiona.l1y notified and where necesse.r,y discharged 
under Article 257(2)~ 
Article 2!2~ 
Paragraph 2 takes account of the release from liability 1lllder 1 I 
Article 218 and no longer states this provision within the reference thereto. 
Article 257 
The substance of paragraph 1 has been adjusted with regard to 
Article 49(1). 
Article 25§ 
Only shareholders and creditors are now given the opportunity under 
paragraph 2 to proceed against the scheme of distribution as on1y they 
have their statutori"ly protected rights affected thereby. 
Article 260 
The Commission agrees with the Economic and Social Committee that modern 
methods of information storage must be available to the European Commercial Re- ' 
gister, but feels ·that the proper way in which deposited documents should be 
safekept should not be governed by Article 260 but by the rules to be prescribed 
by the Council under Article 8(2) • 
Article 260 a. 
This provision has been introduced at the request of the Economic and 
Social Committee in order to facilitate continuation of an S.E. dissolved 
by a resolution of the General l:leeting, provided that distribution of the 
assets to shareholders has not yet begun. The provision has been ..,t'dui. · 
analogously with Articles 248(1) and 250(1). 
, ..... ., '"" .. .#;"-~"\ ~ 
•',I ,'"' §:.¥ ~ y ·• ~ f, .. ~~·· 
.-:r ,..:· .... ~· . ~-t • .,.,. 
t-· 'Ill! I ...,. 
/ 
' '-t' 
Article 260 b 
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Having regard to the provisions of Article 260 a, it scezas 
fitting thet an S.E. should also be capable of continu~tion where 
the period laid do~n for its duration in tho statutes has expired, 
provided that distribution of its assets amongst the shareholders 
has not yet begun. 
Article 2GO 1 permits an appropriate alteration of the 
statutes to suffice for this purpose. 
.. 
.. 
l . . 
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Section 'l - Bankru~.sv~ -v;indi~-,un,~, arrapgeme.t;-ts, cc:;1mositions ~·~-.:e.~~ ~~3.......,_111 • !~~~ ...... · ~t:~ _.... ~•••Pr "''ii'"'...#~~ 
and similar ·;erooeedin.c:s :-. ~.._.,~, ................ c,.-C~ ~..-~ 
· Article 261 : 
,.,. .. , --....-.. 
· The terrrdi1ology of the provision ·a.nd the heeding to this Section 
have been _ada:>ted to the "prelimin.a.ry draft of.' a. Co:1VE'l1tion C71 'bl;clt;r- · 
. ~ . - ' 
. !Uptcy, · winding.::..up, u.r:r.•a.rtgetr.en~ s, compositions and similar procecli..."tJ.gs" 
of 16.2~·1970. 
lrrnder Article 3 of tho [-l.bove prel~rJinary dra:ft of a. Convention 
on bankruptc:r, s·ol·e competence for the hearing of bar...kruptcy proqccdit:gn 
rests. with 'the cow:·ts of the :Menber S·tate in v;hich thG debtor·~s centre 
of" administ:i."a:tion is si~uated. In ~;he case of coopanies i't is !Jrc&1imed 
(subject -to rebuttal) that th<? company• s cent:t"e of q,dmini strati on is 
-'situated. tvhere the rf:gistered office is established. under tlb.a stat1.rtes. 
This provi.s:ton j s to be preferred in respec·t of the SeE~ to t:r .. at 
originally mad~. in Article 262t whe.:r~cby 1:t was irrefutably premun~t'?. t-;t'1o.:t 
the s.:m.•s :register-ad office under the' statutes l>JU9 its centre of 6.d6in-
istrt.tion. In this wa::J it was intendea to ensure tha.t 'the court having 
jtl.risdict~.on over the :plac_e of the registered office 1rould be compotent 
for the institution of baJ".Jcruptcy proceer .. ings (1 ). This provis:io,n ··mlgh"t:-, 
however, have led -'co difficulties ~~~Jhm~"'e the. S.,E., hact'severa1 :r·egistored 
offices. 
If compe·tence to hear bm'lkruptcy p::'OCeedings against the s.E. is 
dE;fined by tho genera.l provi .. siont7 or the Convention, s.tlCh difficulties do 
n-::>+ arise,. 'l''l-1e provisions oontained. in t.he preliminary dr:J.ft a.lrearl:r 
compreb.-ensively cover the possi bili i:y of courts of sever1? .. l Mernber States 
bGing seized of the ba.tikrupt cy of the same SqE. 
On those considerations the s:;;0.!cial provisions of .Article 262 
we:-e de lot ed$ 
1. Paragraph 1 not-r ensures tha.t not only the insti tuti,,n of bo..."'lk:rupt cy 
proceedings but also that of composition a.."'ld other proceedir.~.g"s in :respect 
of "tJhich the .provis:LorH3 _of the abo"'.re prelimi:r.ary d.ra.ft of a Convention 011 
ba.nkrtlp~cy apply (Al--tic1~ 1 of the preliminary dre.ft) will be notif5-~d 
--------------------(1) cf. the explaua.tory notes to A:r·tiole 262 of the original proposa~ 
. • 
. ,. 
'1' . 
'/ 
. 'rll ·, 
, . 
. : .. :· 4-"'. ~ t' , ~~ ,. 
· to the Eo.ropean Commercial -Begisteri.tor:, ~egi~ration. 
, • ' • ... •· ..... ~' : t ., .... _ ..... ~... • • 
··' 'l'his provjsion corr~sponds wi;,th Artiole 25(2) of- the prel:tmina.ry 
' ' . . 
;. dro.ft ·Of a ConVE4~tion. on banlo:~ptcy. Tho pa.rtio1il.ars to' be enterod 
o:ii' 'tt.La' E:u~oi'>ea.n ·aommeroial ·Ragi·s·t·ez: liave ·been stat~d ··in greater 
deta.il·as· th~· draft ·conventio:nr m~es no ... stipU.l&ti>)n to thi~ e~f~ct. 
. . . . ., . . , . . -· , J?een . . . i .• :. · 
The opport'unity h~s, however, ta.keit to incorporate the information to 
. be published in the Off~oial Journal of the EEC pursuant to Ar·tiol~i III 
· o_f the protocol to the Convention. 
2.- Paragraph 2. ensures that the ,judgements aud acts to be pu.blished in the 
OffiQial Jour11al of the EEC pupsua.nt to .Artiolo rr.·. ·of··the, above 
. . . ' 
_protocol will also be no·tified to the ·European Commercial Register •. 
. / ' 
',.· ~ 3. :J;he ·new par~a.ph 3 proVid.es for rei'istrat.ion.· of dislli~sal. of · --
'~ I 
.. barikruptoy'' proceedings. o~ing to want of assets, by direction of_ th~ 
oou.rt~ 
Inatri.tctions mtcy" be gi van by, tho cou~ - as is. usual in such ca.aes 
in.-the Federal Republic ·of Gerttanyl!~th!~qsE;eits .otrm moving o~ on 
application b,y' an i~erested party. 
' 4• . Paragraph_ 4 ,co~ta~us f::. ·t:»>'ovi~ion reg~ng publi~a.tion ~f .the regi~tr~- . 
~ion\ _applying to pa.ragraphr; 1 ond 3. 
': 
'' 
. • . 
:_ 1- . /
-~ 
-' ' '~ 
{ ' 
.. ' ~ 
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Thi3 E'u.rqpoan Pa.rli~en-t and the 'Economic and Social Cor!!r.li ttco have 
jlimi ted .. 
ap:Jrovcd tho principle that a.n s .. E. mey bo transformed into a __ . co~u:pa.ny· 
constituted unde~ national law. 
The rules rolating_to tra.naforma.tiun set out .in the carlit)T version of 
1..rtio1os 294 and _265 havs, hOWGVOl" 1 been su::~I1Gm0ntad by ,Provisions i.YJ.tr1ild.ad, 
to onsur\) that employees continuo to bJ represented in· tho govo!"ning bodies 
the 
ThG Log··al .:ffa.irs Commi ttov of~"'Tiuror"~:Jall Parliament a'.'ld. t;h.e _Economic 
. . I V 
and S:_x;ial Commi ttoe ~lave also discus sud ways· of ~nsurint; that omploy,.los 
contini1.0 t0 l)c~<rticipato in docision-·making \"Thvn a..'l'l. S. E. is transformed. Those 
discu.ssions dl.d not t howevor ~ result in any proj)osals for supplo..-r,9nting·. tha 
previous tex-t, 
IJ:'h:;l. Pommission's viet·T is that a m.ore c:ffuctivo gua.r,:•.:r:t·:3i3. of 
continu:.3d :,Jartici~aticn i:n d.ccision...:..making is . nmt~ requir<Jd, in pm:-ticu.la.r 
. b..Jcau.so a different oonce;>t based on th.c ·O:vinion of the Europe;;!.ll. Parliament 
undorli.os tho cmpl~y..:~ t.parlic:ipaiton. rules,. 
l~ooording to. tho .O~}inion of tho Eu.ropoan ParlirunGnt, which the 
Ccm.11iss.:t.on b.as: follo1.:od in its amond.od Pr:>posal~ omplcyeas ara t;o be rel_:Yre-, 
santad. on ~h,:) Supervisory _Board of tho European .comp:my on rll.l ·equal footing· 
with . sha.rohc:ld,~rs, f?O that the,, intorosts of both grou.11s ar() proroi'ly talcen 
into account il1 supervising th-3 1."'1.llll'ling •::;f ths e·omp~.'tf and in tal::i:rtg me .. jo:[i'· 
decisions. C(:ncerning it. This new .cone.:;pt __ of tha 's.:m,, which ~~ concerned 
oqna~~ with th~_intcrcs~s of shareholders and.employ0cs, is ~ncom~atible 
't-ti th a si tua.tion ~ .. ·horc thv right of OiniJloya3s to be raprosont~d on tho S-uJrer-
visory Board of the S.J~. cou.ld be withq.ra·(m through transfo!'!!lati.on· of th-"J S.E. 
•• _. . f ":· 
into a compc:.n;r in?orporatG~ under na:tiona.l law, without aqu.i vala~rli provision 
for emplo;re? ;pn.r,-tioipation, ~o1cly:. by a:.lt'Esnl:o.tion·:otf" tb:c~ G~ti.;J:rbi..l.lwraoting. 
Tho Commis-sion thoreforu pro:~o:;;os th~\-L tho convorsion of an 'Sll'E. 
involving t\ rcducud mee.,sure .Pf 1-linplojrCC pSJ!tioipa-tion.~on ~iihri::4gt)v,'Ci"!lj·ng 'bodiGS of 
the company . iilaJ" i·o!~ly bo effoctod _ i:f a.· :majority of t~10 'amplbfc::os • ~t·.Jprosonta­
tivca on the ~1..q:ervi.sory Bo.=~rcl of tl1o S.,J:U. is con'\?i.nccd that tl"a.nsformation 
is an 0conomic necessity, and votes accordingly. 
. .;., . •. 
/ -
j 
,.., 7ll.~ .I 
.. 
Tho rules gowrtiing tho toohnica.lities of transformation hava, 
moroovor_, .been arr~ad · moro logically in a.ocorda.nco with· tho observations 
l . 
. of tho Economio.a.tld Social Committ3e .. 
. ' 
-~ l· · ,In ·OrP.cr to givo Qffoct to tho rules for tho protection of omploya3s 
interests set·out in tho introduction to tho now version of this Titla, 
tho :first par8t,~a.~h now. provid·3a that an S.3. mC\Y be' tran'sform0d "by th;o 
· General Moct~ng onJ.y u;>on a proposal '·by. t11e Board of l~anagoniant 1 and 
that ··tho j,)roposal requires tho agreom~nt. of tho Suparvisocy .Board. 
· .', ·· 2._ . Tha newly ¢ded t'ourlh p$ragraph 1'\YS down that the consant ·of the 
, -.Supervisory Board to transf·ormation of the S.E. into a. com~nny on l1'hoso 
' . ( • ' I . I 
governing: b~dias· omPloyco r~pros3ntjl.tion is not. cqu.ival3nt to that rG-
/ quirod under tho rules governing tha s.m. will bo affective only if' 
· supported by a. majority of the amployo\Js' rcprosetnta.tivas on thG Super-
. ~ ,visory B~)a.rd •. Under tha no"t.rly a,d4od soo.ond paragraph of . ..lrticle 265, 
.·the SUl?orvisory Board cannot decide t-thathor to give it~ consent until 
tha-. Board of :i:ianagemcnt -has oonsult.od the Europen.n Works ·Council. 
/ 
3. In a.ocordn..~ce with the wishes or· thb. Eui-o~an Pa.rlianlGnt' and tha ~anomie 
and Social Committee 1 this provision .ona.blos th~ S.E• to ba transformed 
' on thG groun~.s of un~voida.blo economic nocossi ty in certain circumstances. 
'fit tho sam.p tima howovor, the·. Commission fools. that it takos full a.ocoun-t 
of th~ UQl-T conca:)t of tho Europe~ Qompan:r and of tha interGsts of· its 
employoes. ' 
. " 4•. The S(~con~ arid t:hi~ .. d paragraphs· a.rG.'rotainod 'tin6hangod. Tho obsorvanco 
·Of a Wa.itinc; porfed b~fore Convorf:d6n can bo'of'foctod is. Still. a sound 
~'rineiplo~· It pr?vents the· S.:E. baing used rrtcre.ly as a means of changing 
the ·form of' ·a. compa.rzy-• Suoh usc .and th~· da.ngors of· abuse· ari:Sing from 
· .. ·~ it. would, be, detrimental to tho success of .tho novT legal framol'lork ·ror 
a :IDtU.opoan compal\y. HoW-aver, 'in··viot: of th~ protective provisions ensu-
ring thG oontin.uatiop_ of a pa.rtio~.pa.tion in. decision-making on thl3 part 
of.omployoqst it _no longer a:~paa.rs ;noocssa.ry to extend this. period to 
five yoars .. ,as ·requested by ·tho ,Eqonornic and. Social Committee •. · 
• ,f ... 
'I 
Article 265 
Only the \':s:rding of tho. firf-3t paragraph has bgon ·a.l t.3roc.,_. 
·The second :;.:>a.ragra;~)h onsuro~ that th:; i11.n:'OpGan Horks CoiJ.ncil lS 
consulted boforo -t:w SoE. is trru1sforrri.)d ... Th0 Europ.:Jtill Pa_rlia.rr.ont proposod 
in respect of Articlo 125 thc_::. .. :t "'liho E'lt.rOi,),oan Horks Council should. also- be 
consul tod on nattvrs of im)orotr...'tlcG t0- tho undertaking othor tr_an t-hos;:; sot-
out. in thq .t~rticlc. 'S1J.ch mattors would in fac.!; inc1udo transf.:>rma.ti.)n, along·· 
tri th dissolution and mcrgors e,s s::K!Cifiod by Pa:i.~lia.mqnt. 
Transformation. dii'fors from th:J dissoJ.u.tion o·r"" tho s.i~~. or- 1~org·2~0, 
hmvcvor, in th:1.t no social plan has b::.3n }.Jrovidccl for , sincG transforma.ti2n . 
ac such cannot have: conscqucn0es for omployoos which would. no:frl to bo dca.l t 
with by a social plen~ 
_ l-.i.rti8lc 266 
... 
Tho tl1ircl and. fourth pars.gra:)hs havG b3on amended so. that tho termi-
nology conforms vdth tha-t used in tho amond0d j_)rovisions cf .:u-ticl-) 245 con-
cerning scrutiny of tho a.ltora.tion of thG Statute:.s by th3 Etu:-o;oan Co-q.rt of 
Justic0.· The r~3n.dar is roforrod to tho ox:)lanc-.tcry notos to that .. 'lrticl;;. 
This :)rovision gave ris\3 i;o misu.."1.dcn:'st'"anding concorning tho timing 
and Gffoct of tl1o tranr.formati:-:Jn. It' has th:Yroforo ~oeon deleted and inuorpo-
ratGd. in a. diffar0nt forrn as tho second paragraph of .f:..r·~icla 26B of tho new draft. 
The tr2,nsforma.tion procedure follv't·ring ox:s.rnination of the transfor-
mation by thJ ~uropoan Court of Justice (Article 266) has boon madG cloaror. 
This is tc avoid. misundorsta."ldings as to tho formali ti..;s to b.J ca.rrie:d out 
and the saqu.cnce of tho procodural stops. T~1o ne1·r rulos t·ollmv noro closely 
1 tho pro:'..imina.r-.r drn.i't ma.da by Professor- Saz1d0rs , and taka accotmt of tho 
obse-rvations of Gho ~conomic el1d Social Committo3. 
'1'}13 first ;>arn,graph mckos it clear that t:1.c subsac;rt.:tont tre? .. r~sforma.·­
tion· proceduros takG ple£o at national lovel. 
The second para..:,"'''a~)h governs tho offvct of tra.nsfc>rmation; u.nliko 
thu dolotod :~iclo 267, it makos it clear that thG identity of tho com~~ 
is retained .. 
1Prolim-:ary draft Statuto f-')r tho Eu.ropan.n comp~..y, Doccmbor 1966- Co~p3-
tition seriJs 1967-6o 
./ 
I. 
J 
' . 
. Tho third and. 'fourth pa.ra.grJ.Iihs. of tho no\-r draft contain osscn-
~i~J.vv tiio . proVisions relating to~ tho proc-Jdurc .to :ta followed on· complotioll. 
Of tr~sforma.tion, Which ~Aero contained in . t_llO fi:r;st and second para,era.phs 
ot 't ?.e grigina.l 'draft. 
The third paragraph of ·the original text is dcletocl, _sinco th0 
eftoot of rogistoring· t}le transformation ·as -against. third parties is 
.gov~~ed -'o/· tile nol-;rly .introdtiocd. ~-nora!_ .i,1rovi~ion. regarding_ publication 
. in· Article 9-a.. 
', .. 
\. 
. ·'··, ', 
,' 
~ i. 
'·. 
!.. ' 
:. 
.· 
r.rhe pr'ovisions of Title XI concerni:t:lg th'e mel"'gel~ of EUrclpca.n 
C0l1111a.nie's ha:Ve been cornpletely redra.ft~d, al t:hough they are still 
based o:a the fundamental concept embodied in the original PrOpO~f ... l tha.t . 
a. Etirope~:n compa....~y should 'be able to nerge t:i th. othE~r. Eu.:r.ppean c?mta:ii~s 
and t1ith-lim~ted .. cPtlpanies ir1corporated und(.:~r p.a.t.ion~l law by .. taking_ 
· them over ,:_;r by formin.g .a new Europem1 c-QID.pat;y trd th them. Mo:;eover, 
the l"'GVerse process should be nermi ssi bl e so tha.t ·it should be posi3L ble . 
• ' • .1.,. ' ' t. -1 
for a bbropean company to be abs.o.rbed by'. a li1ni t£d. coop~ -~ncorp<".i~tea; 
urKler national law or to form a nev; limited company U..'flder national la.w 
Kith. suoh compa":lies <lr vdth :&'uropean cornp~\llies {1). 
This ooncept has been formally app:roved by the European Parliament 
and b-J the Econom.ic _and Social Committee. Howeve't', the Economic _and 
Social. Committee, in particular, has rightly pointed out that i.he 
forme.\." :culus do not do just~ce to this ~oncept and it has stressBd that· 
the Sta:tuta tm.1.st include epe,'}ific rules on the acquisition of an S.E. 
by a limited conpa.r..y incorpo:2ated under national lal.v~ 
The former l.~es l'tere also clearly in n()ed of improvement in ot.her 
' . ' 
:respects. The pre\i-lt1Usly mentioned references to -the provisio:r~s 
governing :~o:::-ma-tion Jtn Section 2 of Title II which relates- to n·~ergel9 
1Jy formation of a :new company ·are riot, in ft'1.Cj;, always appropriate in 
-the case of: ~ergers by talce-,-ovel~• 
Where _it. has not been possibl.e· to refer to Section 2 of Title II 
regarding the p:t>ovisions goverping form~tion, the ne·w provision~ of 
Ti-tle XI have been a.r:3id.milated, as 1-rere. the prov,tsiona govel"'tling 
' ·- - ' . ,,. . ' :, .. . 
i'ormction, tQ the provisions of th~ am.ended PJ:opo~al fo~ ~ ~.i,1·~ L~~eotive 
anO: to those _of th~ Draft . Convention on the in:tettt,.a.tio:nal ner.ge~. ?·P 
limited companies~(~~· 
{1) Initial e;tpla.naiiory note to Title XI - Suppler:l·~lt ·to. :Bulletin .. ·8 ~· 
1970 of the European Co~rmruni.1!iies 
(2) In th.t s ctm.n.ection cf. the initial ~ls..na.tory note to the ar.1ended 
provi::lions of Title II. 
'; 
The first ·sectiotl .or·· the new ruies, "General Provisions", contains 
~ list; of- all oases in whioh ~ S•E• .m~ pa.rtioipate in -a ·merger and 
-- - • . I " ' 
'rater~;,., to the ~.ovisions.~ o£ thi_s StSttute that. a.ppcy. in specific cases. 
"'\ . . ' .. ' . ' 
Further, this. Secti-on Qontaills gene;r~l provisions which apply in· ·ever:~ 
O~$e ix;i which an S,.E. pSl"'ti_oipa.tes in·: a tnerg~ •. 
The :.~e~6nd Section lays down the ru.ies that_ applj where an S*E• 
-t*,~s. ov~r a~qther s·.]!!. -or a company- gove~e<i ·:b;r national law~,. ·In the-
origina.i- ~dpo~al,· the ~les that applied in 'theee t~ cases We~e 
1 ~ • I ~ , . ' ' ' ~ , , • , · • 
__ - ce~~~i;ilecl: in Sect~9ns 1 a.nd Q (Articles ~Jl and 274). They ca.~, hotfever~. 
'.1* ci~lt wi_th 'together. 
' ! 
_ (lQ;see of merge~ by formation a·r a. ~new s..E. ~- ·also >dealt. with )n· 
' ' 
Secti,Qns -~ --~ 2 of the original rule~, ~e a.lr~ady a.utomat~ca.lly 
> I' ·~ ' , # 
-~pev-ered by the provisions gOverning forma.tio11 in, T~tle II and no longer 
. ·,11eed . setx:.rat e cent ion other th&-l. -in .. the . general pro vi sio~s .in the first 
.. s~-ion of ~itle 'xr. Th'e i:.hird Section o! the new text of Tit;~ XI 
,:,.::.r, ,I· ·• I . •. , ' . ' • 
· deais.'· ~1. th the ,a<rquiMtion of· a.n s.~. by a, 1~ tad oompa.n.y inco_rpo;ra.t ed 
·, Ufld.er national' law. 
, The concluding fourth Section of t~is -Title lG\Ys down th-e rules 
: th~t ·apply ·to a me:cger by t·o..rr;na,tion o:t ~ new l~ited. oo~pa.ny u..'tlder. 
national law. 
' - ' .- \ ' 
St:~ction l_now proyide13 a complete ·liet of the Vc;J:"icius oases in 
"',. ' . . ' 
· which an -.s.E. Pley parlicipat? in a merger. _, At thtr 1dsh of the En.ropea.n 
:, \• ,' \ • • • ' ' ,' ·• '.' I • I_ " ••• 
·parli~e.nt a...1,d of tlt& -.Economic and Social C.onmdttee 1 :it expresBly 
' : "' , '~ ' 1 , •• , -~ ' ' " • ....... -. • ' ., ' • • ;. • l ' 
. '~mit-s the pos~i-~ili~y of a me:rg~r ~t-we~ a.r;t.' s.E. and s~v~ral ?ther-
.· oompa':das. It was l>(Js~ible'1 un<ler, the fol)m,er · P,:.oposa.l~. fo:r more than 
two _ot;>mpe.nies to partic1.pa.te in the formation of an S.E. by merger 
'\ (of~ Articlea-2 end 3)~ 
... 
- I 
--~ 
\' 
• 
-.i;-
'_' 
-T18~ 
Section 2. defL:1~s the merger operc:: .. tiol.'ls, regulated by Title XI, 
.. :t.•• ~"m . ·i'i ..t. J.n 't<TuJ.cn an a..~ •• tt,,. ma,~r Ih?.,I'iJJ.C pa~.~e. 
Various people have expressed the wish that a"l S"E. should also be 
able to par·ticipa.te in operations similar to meztgers, su.ch as sci :-;.sion>;lo 
However, the corresponding legal forms in the various Meinbcr States 
.differ eonsi.dera.bly and in some they are. unl:JloW'l::."' The establishment, ·ot 
scvtisfactorj:r- rules· for the S,.E~ therefore prer•ents considdl'e.ble difficUlty;· 
especially in ·the case, of cross·...:frontier operations. At -the present time-
the Commission oonsi&;;rs that su.ch rules arc not absolutely necessary-. 
I 
Section 3 of the new rules contains tho provision ~n the_ fo:rr.nBr 
· 1Jt,'=r.!'agraph 2 concerning th~ participation in a merger of an S.E. iri 
1: qui dation. Furthermo:"0, where national companies in liquidation are 
a,cfqui red by an S.E. they may participate in a merger. Corresponding 
~les relating to the founder companies of tb.e S.E~ ha~v~e already been 
adopted in Article 21(2) of the ne'tv text. It is logical tl1at na.t:tone;l 
limited compa."'lies sho~.Ud receive the same treatment in both these types 
~of merger since their a..sse1;s are to be transferred to an S.E. in each 
of ihe t"t-:o cases. 
£iicle 21.Q. 
The new text of this Article contains provisions t-Jhich apply to ab 
~E. in ~tll cases J.n -v;hi'ch it participates in a Jlerger (paragraph· I). 
Formerl~,. such pro,r:tsiono did not e:xis't. They are, howiir·.rer, neoese:;a.ry so 
that the referencea to the law 80Ve~ 1he mergi11g eO!!Ipanies cont'ain~d.· 
in ~he provisions goverx:ting forma:ticn in Title II or in the s~J,bsequent 
Sections of Title xr ma..v be. complemented. if an s.r;. is ·affected.-
·, . - -
·Paragraph 2 lays dotm 'rules for drawlng up the draft document o-f 
constitution or the merge1"' plan. 
Paragre.ph 3: requires the -:soard of li:a.nagement to appoint tl1e ·auditors 
chosen by: the G,:;neral J.lee'ting -'Who possess the necessary qualifications fer 
carrying cut the formation audit {Article 203), tcf'. the 'fortrie:r:· fl..rticles 
270(2), 271(2)}. 
,, 
Paragrap..1t 4~ lStVS down 'that ~he resolution of ·c.be General }IeetiT~g 
. • . ' • • . • ~ • . . I -=-. . ,. . ' . _I - '.. ~ . ' ' i - ; "" . I • .. : 
··a~O'Virlg-,:th~. inerger must . be passed in like manner to 9- resolutiOrl 
for ~teration. of th~ Statute.· This corr-esponds to the poncept 
/. . .... 
: ·~bod1~4 in the former rttles (Article 271(1)). 
I l 
.. There ·a.re inany references tD !mbsequent Sections of this' Title 
\ 
tQ-.the provisiO!is. 5".0verning formation in Title· II. Ho~i'ever, concep-ts 
': . 
. ' \ . ,/ 
used. il;i' the la.tter1 such. as "founder 6ompttJ'lY~. ·heed to .be replaced in 
f '· . ' . ' 
. the ca.~e regulated in S'3ctions 2 and· 3,· ·since these E,re .concerned not 
' , , I . . . 
'with merger by fqrmaticn·of a. new' S.E. but 'with merger by take·-over. 
' .. ; 
· b,.rticle 270 makes this adjuStment, 
.. ~ ~bw~s}~!91.& ~-.s·~!.. 
~ > ' \ I 
.··. ··:~tic!.2~1t-
'· 
1. rThe materi~ _requi;reme¢s in par~aJ?h l(a.) to (e) Whi?h the merg~r 
pl&"'l must sati~fy in tho event -oi the take-ovar of a limited. co~pa~ 
· ·, by -a.n S.E. correspond to. the l'll.les governing -merger by take-over in 
. ' ' 
·Art:tcle 3(2) of 't:Q.e amended propo~a.l for -a Th:Lrd Direcrtive and· 
Ar-ticle 8(2) of the Draft Conveh·tion o.n inter~tiona.l merger.s,. 
- .~ 
, ., .L_; .2._ ~he ~other;, ruleS <governing the QOlltent Of the Jnerger· plan : ~d i t·S . ' ' 
' !; 
a.tu+~e~, are elignetl on Art-icle Q2 ·or censis't of references' to that 
..... . . ·, . ' 
. ~, . ' 
The ru.les whimh go~ ex:1minati0l'l. of the m~rger plan, _explai.ta,tiol'l 
of it to all interested. parsons, covening of the. Gene:r:a.l Meeting, 
discussion with ~ployees of repercussions ·or the merger, determination 
of-~·. rnea.sures. to be adopte~ in I'espect of .them' aJld 5 lasi~y, 'e,pproval 
, of, the merger by the. Gene:r-al_ JlaeU-wr, in Jthe case both ·of the· COQ.PSZ;Y 
.~quired. and of ·the acquiring coopa.cy-, ,·consist larg(;~: of ·references on 
,th~l "same lines as the p:rovisio::ts governing ,formation i~ Title II~ ; 
. \ 
• 
. . 
[·, •. ~.•.. · ..
-. --:-~.·~:·;;;'~-~~~:~.·-~;.~-!.": ·. ~;;: __ :_·:_~~:;----~. -,·. ,'~ ·t\.,1 ~.-
•/' ,. •, )• r • r .-! l. ; -~ - ~ • 
As was in fact' the case hi't-he1;to r limited compa.ni(;s tncori>ora.ted 
ux1.der national law arc therefore Slib jeet. to the sallle Community r-u.les. 
in all oases where their assets are transferred to an s.E. by trrey of 
/.r-tict_e_?,11~f 
.. c.- ·~ 
- The rules vJhich goverl1 notifica:tion of the merger to the· Com~ 
of Justice of the European Cornnnniities for registration in the 
·Ebropea.n Commer~:i.al Register are modelled on Article 26(1) •. 
This pr'ovision la.:-rs ·down :rules 
concernin!g examination of the merger by the oourtt 
publica,tion of it and the date on which it ·takes effect on t:he same liz\ee 
·as tho. p:roviaio11s governing\ fo~mation of an> S •E" <with regard to 
paragraph 3,_ cf. Article 26(2) ) • 
!:£:~1;;:1~ 21Ll! 
A reference to Al"1:icle 27 ensures the prot'ect:i.on of cireclitors of 
'b-he/com.:pany acqui.r\:l1.. · 
1·. This .provision regulates the ~pecial c:trcumstanceB which may arise· 
\vhere the acquiring SfJE. Ol;ns shares in one of' the companies accr.1ired. 
'I'he rules in Section ~ 03ft·ea~ in substatlce to 1l.rticle ,28(1) and 
those in 3e\:.-tion 2 to .;~rticle ;,(2) of the Draft Gonven1iion _on 
inten1a.tim~al merg02·s., The provision is in rBsponse to .a -wi.s..."l 
expressed by.the Economic and Social Commi-ttee. 
2. ·The revers'e case, ltvhere the comp~"'JY e.oqu.irod ovms shares in the 
SI)E., is cov-ered by the rules in .Al~ticle 46(4) ai 't'Thich requ.ire 
the s .. E. to dispose of its own sb.9.X'es t.;here these are acquired bs 
way of universal succession • 
' i 
i ,-· 
. ·'A§.qili~i,r~Jsn of EID-,Ss~c 1!,} th e. l~iq~e.~ .. o,o,pa~~9.?-1ll~!.if1bd, undEt~.pat1;o·nal 
i~w ........._.
\ ·. 
Thi.s p:t·ovision regulates the material requirements to be satis-
tied ,by' the merger plan, e.nd. · by the pr~oed.lz.res, for e:xa.mina. tion and ex-
, ' :})·~a.nation of_ it, through references to the rules in the seoon.d Section 
of "this:· Title • , .. 
As" :i,n the oa.se of the trensforma tion of a.n S .E.-• .--into a. limited. 
. . , I ' 
. company inoo:t1;>0ra ted under national la.w·· where an S ,.i «> • is taken d-tter by · 
' ~ 
tu.oh 'a oompa.ny, the qu~stion of 1'"epresentation o£ employees on ·the la.t•: 
. ' . . ' '· . . · .
. '.tel''.a .governi.ng bodies ·.also-- a.ri~es .if the .limited compa.D.Y'-in~pora.ted 
. . . ~, 
·, 'Und.e; nat~ona.l la.w is not ~ub.jeot-t0-empl..a..'1£.e.a__pa.rtia.ipa.tion rule-~~<"ltui-
, .. v~len t · ~ those . wbi, oh govern . the S .E • "--"' / .._ 
As in the case of trans£orn:a.tion, the Commi~sion o6n.siders it 
... r· ~e. un;tusti.fied, in the event or a merger-, that through the merger, em-
;.·l'~ote·as. of' the S ._E, should lose th~ir representation ·on the S~per--r~aory- ; 
• .··Board .of 1;he;r oomrany or see it considerably reduced aga.ins t. ·the wishes ·, 
ot their eleoted representatives. 
\' 
1 
' In this oonnection,. reforenoe should be made as rega.rd.s· poin~s 
of deta.il to the .. expla:na.t,ory notes to ·Article 264, .concerning trans~o:r ... 
tna.tion.o · 
With regard to a.n. S.E. which }1.as been aoquired 1 i;Jl~ rl'.les ·which 
gov~rn the convening of ·the· Gerier~l Meteting, aiscusai~n-r "tith ein.ployees . 
on ·reperciu3sions. of i;he f!lergert-. dete~i.na.tion o~ any mea.s:urea ·to be 
, _ iedopted. in reape.ct of the_rq a.nd a.ppr~val o£ the me;ger by .. th~. General 
Meeting, consi:st ~·r· ra~erence.s .to· the. P,rovis:i,ona .so,rern=l_t)g fo;1la.tion • 
' On the other hand' with regard to.\ the:.· a.cq,uirin'g' 1imi tad -f;Omp.any 
I , these matters may be S&\'tt_led by the national law applicable to them· and 
therefore need not be dealt with by the Statute. 
,I 
• 
'·' 
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ThJ.S ·Article lays dO~Vl'l 1~1.los' governing supex·visfon of the merger 
by the Gou..-t of Justice of the ELtropea.'l Corrm:iu...~ities and. is modelled on 
the corresponding Article concerning tra..,aformation (Article 266 ). 
This provision regalat.es registration of the merger in the 
Eu.ropea.n Cor.n~tercial ·Register and notice of such regi.s,.~t:r'ation at 
Colll'!luni·ty level. 
Th.e effect of the merger - that the s.E. ceases to exist &:- iB 
governed by_ standard rule~ at Community level • 
. , 
T~·:ds pro'\'ision protects creditors of the S .. E~ 'by :a•e::fening to 
· Article 27. However~ crcdi tors may well avail themsel vee of ~'lY tJnore. 
favourc..ble guarantees to 'vhi.ch they may be entitled under tbe la.'trl 
governing the acq•Iir:ir...g · company. 
This lli-ticle lays dolll!l the rules which apply where the acqn.il"ing 
compa...~ O\'l11S a11. or part -of the shares of' the, S.E • 
.Article 271 i notv.d. thstand.ing, no :;..,U,e;;- are laid dow for the final 
treatment. Of E~lCh sha.r·es; thiS: iV JOVGI"ned bJo- the l&W to .which the 
acquiring company is subJect (in this connection~ sr.3e the ·explanatory 
notes to Arti~le 28 and. the Goldman: Report on A:rt:tcle 5 of the Draft 
Convc::rt.ion on ir~ternationa.l merger8 ). 
Section .:'~ 
--
!_\\}.z~.'~l f'2rtncittqn- ot ~k neNliat ted.l::i~bility c.omrewr .incdreto~ 
u...'ldfW n~t.i mal law ts· - ... ~
~icle.Jrzi 
I 
This A:rticle lays down rules goverr..i,fl€ the material requirements 
which the merger plan must se·tisfy.. Referencos to the provisions 
governing formation ware possible since the cases.are arranged in muah 
the same way. 
. .... ' ~ : 
. " ' ) . 
. ·. TM .opening balance she.et to be prepared. under Article. 22(l')~o . . 
, . . · an ·. ., .· · · . /which is 
an resp,~at of SJ:. has not been preecrJ.bed. for.- ·the new company to oe f • . . ·.· . . . . 
. .:i~o~~ra~~ ~der :na~iona.l. law. Under. ~ti?l~ 273 .e., dom(;st:j.·c la~:· 
will. a:PP,ly in this c~se. , 
Paragraph 3 corresponds to Artiple 45(1) ot the !raft Conve~tion 
· . :o_n i~ternat,i.onal merger. 
· l>a.r~aph ·4 oonQerns .th~ . qualifications of the .audi-tors not 
~·:ooverad. in pe_,ra.gra:ph 2 ~ the referenee·to Article 23. · 
d 
'· ·.:, >Tha con.tent o'f these Arti oles corresp~ds to that of .Article 272 a 
'. l'' 
t·. 
•. r r _ , " ~ • 
. "to; d. »':qual treatment of tlie S~E •. ·is justified lTJ' the ·:ra.ot that in both 
'· 
·: cases the S.E,. ceases to exist and trat.l~ers its assets aJ.'ld liabili t~es 
, _:to a.. compcw."'JY incorporated under national la~i. 
The rJ.les gove~:ning formation of the new compa.cy cqrrr:;sp~nd ~<:? 
_Artfela 46, bf ·the Draft Gonve:ntion on international mer·ger. · 
. . . \ . 1 
It was posed ble to 1~ doto-m. ·rules, gove:rn~ng exam5~nation- of the 
!ferger b:y- the EUropean. ·Court ot J·t~st-ice a.:t1.d registration of the! merg~r 
. ·. . -. ' , , , . . , I -
' 'Py" reference ,tQ the proviEdons whic}l, app~y t,o mergers ~ ·t,a.ka-ovar of. 
a:n· S•E• 
' / ... 
, The 'time apee-ified. in para.gl:-aph 2 io governe4 by the provision.s 
referred. to in Article 273 e. It is important beoause of ·the effects 
I 
referred to· in Article 2'73 g. 
/ 
( . ' ' 
~~\I' 
1 ~. J. 
I 
I 
l 
' .- . ~·.J ~ - ... ' 
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new company~ Thus, tn contrast 'td tl.1 othax· forms of merger,·_ th~ effects 
of t~e merger cannot be regulatBd -exhaustively a.t --C~ty leve1.c 
'rhis provi8it)n corresponds to Article 272 h. 
P&"agraph l of this p:!'ovision _corresponds "to Art~l..clo 272 i (l); 
rafere·nce mey be made to the e~~lanatory notes to tbe l-atter. 
Paragraph 2, on the other ha.:nd, corresponds to Article 28(_2); 
ref-erence ~, again, be made to the expl~atory notes to the latter. 
lloq-wialtial by an SoE. is now dealt with in SeciiQn· 2 of this 
Title. A:r·ticle 274 has there:f'ore been deleted. 
I ' 
·., 
No changes ha.ve o.een made tO· the substance Q.f the provisions 
·. ~t thi~ 'fitle •. ···Tha 'rules laid. do'Wil in the S.tatute have been 
:a.:PPr.oved. i·n principle 'both lzy·' the ·Eilrt>pean ·:Par-liament. a.nd. by_ the 
' -- ~ . I 
,·-.:meon~mic,.~d.. Soc.ia.l.Coromittee~ 
. ' 
. ~ection l - · Fortrmtion ~ •. ·-' i -
The Eu:!-<)pea..'t'J. Par·liament wished to fr.lpplement this provision 
,eQn6endng' the foma.'tion of a. l!U:ropoan ,holding oompatcy" ~th a. clause 
~ - -~ <. ' -- - - ' . I ( ,• - . 'T ;' ' . - .· . 
. stiwlati~ that eha.Tehol.d~rs' .benefits under dou:ble taxation a.gre~ 
I' - . •. • r ' ' 
ment·s shOUld not be prejudiced. · 
Holding oomp$nies rr,.'i thin the -~:i:oy are generally . o~vered by 
' ' . ' ' ~ ' . .. ' -. . ', - . : . .. ' . ... 
. ~eh a€;reemente. As a. x~.le, e.n s.;g. or its sh~ .. eh9l(iers ~benefit from . 
r,them ·witheut special mention being necess~ •. However, double taxation· 
agre~.;;;Llent~s do not ·apply to holding ootl)panies ''eubject to a. special ta,;{; · 
· ,system,,' as may~ in parti,cuiax.·, . be. th~ case :·in LUXembourg.·· . . 
Th~ addition t~~-ticle 275 cou~d, however,· lead to such companies 
tn1justifia.'bly deriving. benefi:t from. 9-ouble taxation ~eaments. This 
· w1st be prevented in tp.e interests· ot comba.t·~~ing tax evas~on. · 
~ I ·:~.'~ .... . :::· ;~ ... :~_~: :~· ~': ~f. ' 
In·- view. ct;.;_.,_.. these considerations, the Commission has ~ot . ad.opt ed the 
amendment desired. 
~o a.voi.d double taxation of an s.:E~~~ wit.h a. permanent e·stablishment 
in~ another :Momber st.ate, the EuroPean P~li~ent would like ntlca· ~ 
the lines ~f those in Article 2~1(2) added 'to .A.rtiele 278 :to· ensure 
I 
·that J)erma"'lent establishments and subsid.ia.r--i companies are gi ve;n. equal 
treatment when carry~ng 1 losses. torwa.t'd :to the S.E. 
•, 
... ~ 
• 
• 
' 
I 
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This request for parity is, however, misconceived since the 
situations of the permanent establishment and subsidiary -CQtllp&ny· 
are not identical. The Statute applies only to permanent establish-:-
ments within the Community (Article Z78), whereas there is no such 
limi tatian in the case of 'subsidiary canpa.ni es (Article 281). It is 
known tha.t all Member States including the three new ones permit 
resident companies to oa.rry forward their losses. It ·~h~refore 
follows that under Article 279 permanent establishments will also 
be able .to do so. The proposed paragraph 5 is .hence superfluous. 
Subsidiary companies on the other hand may find that under the 
fiscal system ·or a. thiid country they are unable to carry forward 
their losses.· Provision is therefore made for this contingency in 
Article 281, pe..ra.gra.ph 2, first sentence. 
Articles 280 and 281 
The amendments a.re no more than technical corrections • 
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Title XIII Offences 
Article 282 
1. The· concept underlying the previous rules has been retained. 
Hol<Jever, th0 European Parliament is unwilling to leave it to 
Member States to ·ley down the penalties attaching to the 
offences set out in the Annex to the Statute (Annex 4 of the 
new text). It has called for a Community Directive establishing 
the nature of the offences and the appropriate penalties. The 
Economic and Social Committee has also stated that it is in 
favour of establishing penalties as part of Co!llrrn.:nity laN. 
In the Commission's vie.w, to meet the Parliament's request would 
give rise to difficult legal qur::-stions regarding the' equivalence 
' . 
of the penalties provided under the existing 1vide variety of 
s-Jstems of crininc.l lat-v and forms of criminal procedures, and would 
unnecessarily increase the complexity of the Statute. 
The aim is to penalize certain offences set out in the Annex to 
the Statute (Annex 4).· 1 It can bo left to the national legislatures 
to provide for the means most suited to achieving this aim in the 
particular national context. 
2. The wording of Article 282 has been amended to tclce account of the 
special circumstances which result from the distinction drawn in 
Germany between administrative offences punishable by fines and 
criminal offences .• In fact, certain acts 
equivalent to those set out in the Annex are dealt with in 
Germany not as criminal but as administrative offences. 
• 
• 
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Title JaV ·- Fino.l Provisions 
....._....-.-, _......,... ..............__ 
Article 283 
The European·Parli~ment· and the Economic and Social Committee 
have expressed mingivings about the shortness of the period within which 
national laws must be adapted. At the wish of the European Parliament 
this period l:as been extended to 12 months. 
i\rticle 284 
At the '!trish of the European Parliament, the period referred to 
in Article 284 has also been extended to 12 months to keep it in line 
~~th tho period referred to in Article 283. 
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hNNEX I 
Article 102 of the Statute ha.s bean .:::.ltered in conforr.1i ty v.ri th 
tho opinion of the E.U.ropean Parliru:J.ent. As a result, tho nationc1.l 
eoployee reprcsent0tive bodies to whom reference is made in tho 
provisions of Title V and elsewhere in the Statute are nol·J listed 
in this Annex. 
Reference is nade in these provision3 1 at times, to representation 
at plant level and, at tines, to central representation (cf. e.~. 
Article 131, where th..; election of members of the Group Norl:s Cou.Ecil 
is primarily a ne:.tter for the centrally formed o:r;;ployce ropresentati ve 
body). 
~mnox I has accordingly been C::.ivi·icd into two nections, in ~vhich 
the representative bodies and thvir leg~l or negotiated bases ore 
listed at each of tho two levels. Only ~~ch rc~rcsontativo bodios 
have been listed for which t~ore is a statutory or g~nerally 
recognized negotiated basis open to ~11 euployoes. At thu present 
tirae no Guch roj_)resentation exists eit~<Jr in the Unitecl Kingdo!il 
or in Ireland. In BelgiUD n:ncl Dermark they so far exist only c.t 
works level. 
The .Annex v.Jill hnve to be kept up--uated in tho light of dovelop-
nents and, where necessary, res·t;ated in greater detail. The latter 
point applies particularly in tho case of Itr.ly 1 v1here "CoiJDissioni 
interne" have in nany undertakings been replac-:;d or coBplemented by 
"Consigli di fabbrica" as the ropreaentati vc body for c,ll tho 
employees, wholly or partly acsuming tho tcsks of the forBer. 
• 
• 
• 
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Alit-lEX II 
1. Annex II contains tne electoral rules recommended by the European 
Parliament for the 1uropcan t'l'orks Council. These rules have' been incol'-
porated into the ·statute by the new Article 104. 
As regards the reasons for introducing the electoral rules, reference 
should be made to the expl~~~tor,y notes on the new version of Article 104 
of the Statute. 
The rules were prepared by the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
European Parli~~ent in consultation with the rapporteur of the Committee 
for Social -Affairs and with· the technical support of officials of the 
Commission. 
2. Section I (Articles 1 to .8)_ contains the general rules applying 
to elections. 
Uembers of the European Works Council are aected at the individual 
establishments of the S.E •. by the workers .employed therein, irresp~c:tive of 
their nationality and by direct·, secret ballot (Articles 1 and3 (1)). List-s 
of candidates may be submitted by the trades unions and ~y groups of em-
ployees (Article 3 (2)). 
There seems no justification in granting the right to appoin'tf candi-
dates only to the unions; as is the case e.g. in Belgium. The relationship 
between organised and unorganised labour varies too greatly. in this respect 
from one Member State to another and to some extent, ·within the same Member 
State, even from one undert~ing to the next .. It appears however to be justi-
fied to increase the minimum number proposed by the Parliament for-groups 
. . 
of employees from 25 to.tlOO, in order to ·prevent too wide a fragmentation 
of votes. 
Employees have not been divided up into individual groups, such 
a.s 11 yprkers", "staff", or "supervisory staff" for the purpose of European 
Works Council elections. Such categorisation differs too greatly from_ 
Member State to Member State. On this point, the Legal Affairs Committee's 
Supplementary Report reads : "The division of 
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er.1ployees into different electoral groups is based on the po.rticular 
characteristics of the respective national systems of er.lployees' 
rcpresento.tion. These characteristics certainly do not apply to 
e~ployoe representation o.t tho international level; neither 
its functions nor its composition nre tho SaL10 11 • (1). 
By adopting the d 'Hondt systen of proportional reprGsentation 
by tho mc.ximum quotient cothod ;.lith a preference vote for one 
candidate on th0 elected list (Articles 5 c.nd S) fair representation 
on the European lAforks Council of al_l groups of employees in tho 
establishment concerned can in fact be ensured as far as lJOGsi lJle. 
3. Preparo..tions for (Articles 14 to lG) and inplet~entatian of 
(Articles 17 to 19) the elections governed by Section II are in th0 
h~n~s of an electoral co~JJission, independent of thG S.E.'s Boc.rd of 
Managenent (Articles 9 to 13 ), uhich is to bo set up in the establish··· 
mont concerned (~rticlo 11). 
The tiuo·-lini t s included in tho indi vidunl cloctornl rules 
rolntc to a timetable, according to 1v-hich th<. clf'ctions are due to 
toke place not more than 75 dayo after tho formntion of the S.B., or 
30 days before tho expiry of tho ~oriod of office of the European 
Harks Council that is to be re-olectcd ( cf • Article 14(1) ). To ensure 
trouble··free <.:dhosion to this tir.1otable, tho period fixed under 
f~ticle 9(2)) for objections against th8 listing of all estnblishnents 
pcrticipn.ting in the election was reduced, contN1.ry to tho text of 
the European Parlinoent's Opinion, fron 20 days to 15. 
4• Section III (.trticlo 20) covers contestation of tho electionG 
and tho consequencec thereof. 
(1) P.E. 35.861. Docuuent 67/7~- of 26.6.1974 paragraph 113. 
• 
• 
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5· As robards details of thQ voting procedures, reference should 
be Iaade to :Mr. Brue,ger's explr.natory cox:nnents in the Legal Affn.irs 
Comnittee's Suppleuent~- Report (op.cit. paragraph 118). This 
applies particularly as regards the description of tho d 'Hondt 
no.ximuc quotient method (Docunent G7/74 P.E. 35.861/fin. of 
26.6.197-4 1 po.rn.grc:.phs 112 to 130 ). 
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ANNEX III 
1. The provisions rocarding tho election of enploy3es' 
r0.presentati vos to tho Supervisory Boo.rC!. were, lil::e tho provisions 
of Annex II regarding elections for the Europcnn Horks Council 7 
prepared by'thc Europeru1 Parliament's Log3l )\ffairs Cor~~ittec in 
consultation with the rapporteur of the Cor.nittee for Social 
Affnirs nnd vrith the technicnl nssistance of th0 offici~ls of the 
CoQDission and approved by th~ PlenurJ of the European Pcrlianent. 
These Hero incorporated into tho Statllte 1)y the notv Article 137(1;, 
which corresponds to l~tiole 137 a of tho text of the European 
PE'.X'li~nent 's Opinion. 
Th,; ren.sons v.-hy the provisions 1.voro introduced ha.vu alJ'{'..:J.d,y 
been stn.ted in the explnnatO.t'Y notes on tho ne.,.1 version of .Article 1~7. 
Here the chief points hcwe also b<:en sot out that the now vJOrdinc; 
shares Hi th tho original proposal an~ also tho~~ 1')"1 1.r'hi ch t!~P-.Y <H .. ft'8r" 
2. Gcncrn.l r.mtterE arc dealt vJith in ."..rticle 137 of th-.:: Statuto 
rnd in Section II of fillnex III. 
As 1vas done previously, provision is c.ade for the indirect 
oloction of enployees• rcprusenta.ti vcs to the su,orvisory Board, in 
cases where several establishr1onts participate \Article 1(1)). Under 
the now provisions, the votea in this case are cnst by special electorz 
elected on a uniforn basis in tho individual er:tablishr.lonts (Article 1(2)). 
Not only the S.E. 't:: ecployeos but also thl; er.1ployees of group uncler-
tclcings controlled by the S.E. having their re{:;'istercd offices ~ri thin 
the lllcnbcr States p11rticipate in these elections (Article 137(1) (3) nnd 
(4) of tho Statuto; Article 1(1) of Annex III). If a vote is to be 
tween in only one establishocnt, however, the c~ployees' representatives 
~dll bo elected directly (Article 1(3)). 
• 
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For the grounds unclerlying t:1ese re.gulations, reference should 
be made to the e:x:plc.na.to:cy notes on Article 137 of the new proposal 
• and to paragraphs 131 a.nd 132 of the Supplementary· Report of the 
European Parliament's Legal Affairs Conmittee (1). 
• 
3. Section II (Articles 3 to 22) govarns the indirect election of 
employees' representatives. 
4,. Sub-section A of th:i.s Section (Articles 3 to 6) governs the 
election of electoral delegates on the principles applying in the case 
of the election of members of the European Works Council (cf. in 
pa.rt.icular, lu-ticle 3(1) ). 
5• Sub-section B of this. Section (Articles 7 to 21) governs the 
election of employees~ reprosentatives b,y the electoral delegates. 
lfominations may be submitted by the lllu.ropean l~orks Council, tho 
trad$.unions, and groups of employees,or electoral delegates (Article 7). 
For the same reasons as we:re stated in the explanatory notes to 
Appendix II in respect of elections for the IDuropen.n l-Jorks Council., it 
would not be proper to accord nonination rights only to the trades unions. 
The el~ctornl college for its part elects tho employees• 
representatives on tho Supervisory Board of the S.E. If a Damber of 
representatives arc to be elected the d'Hondt system of proportional 
representation by the maximum quotient nethod 'Will b<J used (.tu-ticles 10 
and 11 ). Here, too, t\S in the case of elections for the European Works 
Council, every attempt is nade to use voting procedures to ensure that 
all groups of employees will be represented on the Supervise~ Board. 
The technical implam~tation of elections of electoral delegates. 
o.nd of employee represen.-;ativ~s on the Supervisory Board is closely 
coordinated 'With that applying to menbership of the Euro,ean t·lorks 
Council • 
(1) P E. 35.861 - Documc~t 67/74 of 20.6.1974• 
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Prepc.ratior.s for .::.nd inplemcntr.tion of the Glections is left 
to a central electoral conL1ission (Article 14). This commission is 
composed. of three members appointed from the electoral commissions at 
plant level. The central electoral comf.lission presides over tho 
discuss:.i.ons >vi thin th:.:: electoral college (.t"..rticle 19 ). Provision 
hns been made to ensure that nominations not made by the electoral 
dolo&ates themselves can still be amended, withdrawn or consolidated 
v.rith other noninations in the electoral college by their representatives 
(Article 13(4)). 
6. Sub-section C (Lrticlc 22) covers contestation of the elections. 
7• Section III governs the direct electi~n of employees' repres-
entatives on the Supervisory Board \'rhich occurs in accordance mth 
Jtrticle 1(3) if voting is confined to one establishment. 
The elections arc prepared as provideQ in respect of those for 
the Europem1 Horks Council; sen.t s "rill be di stri but od in accordo.nce 
1dth th~ rules applyine under Section II \rith regard to the electoral 
college. 
G. As regards details of tho.eloctoral rules, reference should. be 
uado to the SupplcnontaiJ· Report of the Legal Affairs ComJittee, by 
Jllr. Brugger (1 ). This applies pnrticularly to an explanation of the 
d'Hondt uaximun quotient method (2). 
9. Certain technical departures have, ho~"l'ever, been made from the 
electoral rules as stated in tho European Parliament's Opinion. 
Those relate to the alte~ation of Article 137(2) of the Statute 
consequent upon the European Parlin.mcnt 's Opinion. Contrary to tho 
original wording of the Comr:1issiou'e proposal and the recorntlendations 
(1) P E 35ob51 ·- Document 67/7!:,. of 26.6.1974, paracraphs 131-141._ 
(2) Pnra~graph 138. 
• 
• 
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of ,the European Parliament's Legal Affairs Canmittee, the election to the 
Supervisory Board of a number of emplqyee representatives from outside the 
undertaking is no longer mandatorily re~~isita. 
Consequently, when distributing seats on the Supervisory Board, it 
e was no longer necessary to ensure that the required number of persons from 
_ outside the undertaking under Article ·137 (2) should obtain seats on tlie :Board. 
According to the new version of Article 137(2), it is necessa_~ nm1 only to 
prevent more seats falling to candidates from ~1tside the un1ertaking th~1 is 
permitted under Article 137 (2). 
Having regari 1n the above, ~'lrticles 8 regarding the lists of candi-
dates and 10 (3) .and (4) and 11 regarding the distribution of seats in the-
event of there being seve~al lists, and 12 (l) and (2) ·re~ing the distri-
bution of seats Hhere there is only one list have been altered accordingly. 
If, as a result~ the number of seats allotted to candidates not em-
plqyed in an establishment of the S.E. exce~ds, as to the persons not em-
• 
plo.yed in the establishments of the s.E., the maximum n~ber permitted under 
Article 13'7(2), the supernumerary co.ndidates must give wa:y to the candidates . 
emplo.yed in an establis~~ent of the s.E., who are next in line on their 
electoral list. Example : 
Five emplqyees' representatives are to be elected to the sUpervisory 
Board~ Under the maXimum quotient' system of d'Hondt (Article 11 (1) s~ats 1 
and 3 are to be allotted to list A, seats 2 'and 4 to list B, and seat 5 to 
list c. 
Seat 1 falls to a candidate not employed in an establishment of the 
. . 
s.E. entered on list A, either through precedence on the list itself or as 
a result of preferential votes in his favour ; seat 4 is allocated to a 
Eimilar candidate on list B. 
If seet 5, allotted to list c, subsequently falls to a candidate on· 
this list. not employed in an establishment of the S.E., in order t.o ·prevent 
that more per~ons not employed in an establishment of the s.E. will be elec-
ted than -is permHted under. Article 137 (2), this candidate r:rust give wa:y, on 
the distribution of seats, to the candidate ·nearest to him on list C either 
in sequence -of listing Or in the number of preference votes obtained, but em-
ployed in an establishment of the S .. E. (Artiol_e 11 (3). 
• 10. In article 23 (3), the minimum number requi~ed in oases of direct 
el~ctions for groups of emplqyees wishing to submit lists of candidates was 
incre~ed, as compared with the proposal of the Euro~ean Parliamen~, from 
25 to 10q, as in· the similar case· under article 3( 2) of Annex II. 
/.-
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ANNEX IY 
1. In the introductory clnuse, it is left to the Member States -· 
as a co~sequence of tho alter~tion of Article 282 - to penalise 
the inc:i.dent s subseqD .. <.mt ly listed either by crimina]. proceedin~;s 
o~ in some other wny. 
2. As incident under iten VIII has been extended to include the 
threat of sanctions not only in the case of a breach of 
.ll.rticle 82 bl.:t also of failure to fulfil the declaration"· 
obligations under Article 46 u of the nm..r version. 
3. The incidents under IX to XI have been nowly adC:ed. Under IX, 
Membor Stutes uro obliged to introduce sanctions ugo.ins-t the 
breach of tho obli~ations of secrGcy UL~der the Statute for 
European Co1.1panies. 
No effective protection cgainst tho revelation of secrets has 
hitherto been ufforded, but is nor·etheless indispensublo.. The 
provision embraces all persons who have a duty of secrecy ioposed 
upon them by the StGtute, i~e., in particular, mcobers of tho 
Board of l'lano.gement, of t:·.8 Supe:::-visory Board, of the European 
Harks Council, and of the: Group Works Council, auditors, trade 
union representatives n.ttmv'!:i.n.'i r.1eetings of the European V.Jorks 
Council, ant:. Eu"!:'opoan Works Cc-,uncil experts. 
X. was necessary in ordo~ to e:1.sure that tho votes of E-.1ropean 
1-Jorks Council r.1embers and of c>:1plo~rees' representatives on th0 
Supervisory JJoarcl of the S.E. remain free from unfo.ir influence. 
Coraparable provisions mcy bo fvc;:1d in the legislation of certain 
l~eml.)er Stctes! protecting tho 5.r.1)ler.1entation of elections for 
eL1ployee reprocontati ve bodi·Js SEf~ up under r:runicipal ln.w. 
XI. serves to protect the trade names of the S.E. by crou-t:i.ng 
sanctions age.inst the unlmv:;:'ul usc of confusing descri:ptioLB. 
XII. is intended to facilitate tro.noactions with the S.,E. and to 
ensure thn.t third pr>.rties hm..: ng dealings with it v.rill have continuing 
~d untrtumncled access to irforraation that is importc..nt to -!;hem. 
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Obligations on the pa.rt of Member Sta.tes such as those 
m~1tioned under AI. and XII. have also been incorporated b,y 
the Coooission into Article 19(2) of its proposal for a 
regulation of the Council on the European Co-operation 
grouping (ECG) (1). 
(1) vfficial Journal of the EEC C 14 of 15.2.1974, with explanatory 
notes printed as Supplooent 1/74 to tho Bulletin of the European 
Communities. 
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